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Asian Tigers were sometimes referred to “developmental states” for they were 
capable of designing successful development agendas and implementing these plans 
with the compliance of private capital instead of simply regulating the market. 
However, with the fast democratic transition during the 1990s, the developmental 
state encountered serious challenges from business sectors, opposition parties and 
civil groups. Some literature suggested that this infiltration of private sector 
jeopardized the state’s autonomy in formulating long-term plans. The chaotic policy 
process at the early stage of democratic transition revealed Taiwan state’s capability 
in controlling developmental agendas has been weakened. If the developmental state 
of Taiwan ceased to function, in what way did it evolve? 
This dissertation aimed to answer this question by examining the role of the 
Taiwan state in promoting three major investments, the Formosa Steel-making Plant, 
the Central Taiwan Science Park in Holi-Chixing and Erlin, and the Eighth 
Petrochemical Plant, from 2006 to 2010. While developmental states were often 
 
argued incompatible with democratic regimes, this dissertation demonstrated that the 
status of Taiwan’s developmental state remained firm after democratic transition 
given that the state was still autonomous in terms of defining and preserving national 
interests.  
Furthermore, it WAS the public participation and environmental institutional 
monitoring brought by democratic transition that reinforced the developmental state 
in Taiwan by correcting the state’s errors in promoting those inefficient projects. 
Through the interdependent governance in the review mechanisms, these industrial 
programs based on outdated development agendas were smoothly postponed. Some 
programs were even called off by the corporations themselves. The democratic 
transition did not lessen politicians’ pursuit of constant national economic 
development; moreover, it brought in correcting mechanisms and thus further 
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Chapter 1  Survival of the Developmental State? 
An Overview 
In 1990s, scholars have been amazed by the successful economic growth of East 
Asian Countries. These Asian Tigers, instead of simply regulating the market 
mechanisms, exerted dominance over the economy. They were called “developmental 
states” for they were capable of designing successful development agendas and 
implementing these plans with the compliance of private capital. In other words, the 
state was not only autonomous but also capable of guiding industrial sectors to catch 
up with developed countries.  
Among those states such as Japan, Korea and Singapore, Taiwan has been 
considered an anomaly. Unlike the close partnership between the state 
decision-makers and corporations in Japan and Korea, a far more remote relationship 
between the authoritarian KMT regime and business sectors has been observed, and it 
seemed to have contributed to Taiwan’s economic success. As a group of strong 
economic bureaucracy in Taiwan has been accredited for their deliberate 
decision-making in shaping state’s economic schemes, the strong autonomy of the 
state brought by the authoritarian rule seemed to have guaranteed the compliance of 
private sectors with state’s industrial policies. Haggard has thus believed that 
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authoritarian rule may be the key in the model of Taiwan the developmental state.1 
However, with the fast democratic transition during the 1990s, the 
developmental state encountered serious challenges from business sectors, opposition 
parties and civil groups. The participation of these groups into political decisions tend 
to result in a “lame duck state” since the state could no longer monopolize the 
decision-making agendas. While business groups started to play a more important 
role during democratic transition, their demands on various economic privileges have 
accelerated. This combination can jeopardize the state’s autonomy in formulating 
long-term plans. In addition, while the political-business relationship has come closer 
during democratic transition, the massive participation of civil sectors and 
oppositional political parties may also break the state’s monopoly in decision-making 
processes. In other words, the weakening of the authoritarian regime may lead to the 
collapse of the developmental state of Taiwan. 
When the authoritarian regime stepped down in 2000 through the party turnover, 
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) rebuilt its own policy network. The massive 
participation of new stakeholders into a much opener policy-making mechanism 
seemed to have further posed a change on features of the developmental state. The 
state could no longer ignore external costs of previous economic plans. 
                                                 
1 Haggard, Stephan. (2004). “On Governing the Market”, Issues & Studies Vol40, no. 1 (March 2004): 
14-45. pp15 
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Environmental pollutions accompanied with old developing projects as well as 
cost-effectiveness calculations of new ones started to be open to the public through 
the EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) reviews after the democratic transition. 
From 2005 to 2010, these plans faced stringent challenges in the EIA reviews held by 
the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency). The state endeavored great efforts to 
facilitate the development projects passing the EIA reviews, and some of the 
measures ruled by the court were even illegal. The state declared that those plans 
were key to constant economic growth of Taiwan and that it was the state’s obligation 
to support these plans, for they would construct good foundations for rapid industrial 
development or upgrading. However, the state’s arbitrary actions have aroused fierce 
resistance from civil groups.  
These state of Taiwan intended to “remain businesses as usual” after the 
democratic transition. However, with diverse opinions in the policy-making process, 
how did the developmental state stayed operational in front of public reviews? If 
the developmental state of Taiwan ceased to function, in what way did it evolve? 
This dissertation aims to answer both questions by examining the role of the 
Taiwan state in promoting three major investments from 2006 to 2010. In these three 
cases, the state was trying to galvanize grand-scale developing projects in three 
different industrial sectors (steel, LCD and petrochemical) as the state claimed that 
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three projects would help Taiwan achieve long-term economic benefits. A careful 
review on the behaviors of the Taiwan state and the features of these economic 
projects may help to explain whether the developmental state survive the challenge of 
democratic transition. 
Developmental State Theory and Taiwan’s Experience 
Since Skocpol, political scientists have begun to emphasize the salience of “state”. 
States were no longer treated as neutral and mindless.2 Particularly, some scholars 
have been interested in the developmental role of states in the East Asia. The rapid 
economic success occurred in 1980s in East Asian countries such as Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan and Singapore had drawn scholars’ attention, for the states in these countries 
appeared to be dominant and active in guiding national development issues. These 
countries have been considered paradigms of “Developmental States” for their 
effective policy formulation and administration. This notion particularly describes a 
group of state officials that are capable of guiding state development and embracing 
the economic success.3  
With the economical boom of East Asian countries, the “Developmental State 
Theory” drawn from those economic miracles became popular during the 1980s and 
                                                 
2 Theda Skocpol, (1985) Bring the State Back in, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985 
3 Kohil, Atul, State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global 
Periphery, Cambridge, 2004. 
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1990s.4 While these countries have already fallen behind of developed countries in 
the beginning, they concentrated their limited resources on strategic industrial sectors. 
To do that, the developmental states wisely selected their developing strategies and 
nurtured certain industrial sectors to compete with their competitors in other 
developed countries. 5  The developmental states exploited their capacity and 
efficiency to reach success in the world market. During the process, instead of being 
passively responding to the demands of business interests, the state played an 
essential agent in leading the country to prosperity via selective industrial policies.  
How did the developmental states shape their industrial policies? There were 
different approaches. Johnson believed that the principle of developmental states was 
“market-conforming,” which was directing private capital to compete in the global 
market with other countries. 6  Amsden particularly emphasized the “market 
augmentation” strategy, which means the states exploited tax policies to assist certain 
industrial sector to expand their territories. Through this “subsidy,” the states are able 
to nurture strategic sectors.7 Aoki further argued that while unconditional subsidies 
would encourage the rent-seeking behaviors of business groups, a “contingent rent” 
                                                 
4 See Amsden, A. (1985) “The state and Taiwan's economic development,” in P. Evans, et.al.(eds.) 
Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Onis, z. (1991), “The Logic of the Developmental State,” Comparative Politics, Oct. 109-126. 
Johnson, C. (1982) MITI and the Japanese Miracles: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975.  
Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. 
5Johnson A. Chalmer, (1987) “Political Institutions and Political Performance,” In Frederick Deyo 
edited, The Political Economy of New Asian Industrialism, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987)  
6 Johnson, C. (1982), Ibid. 
7 Amsden, A. (1990) Asia’s Next Giant. NY: Oxford University Press. 
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would be required while incentives were needed for these sectors to enhance their 
competitiveness. A “market enhancing” strategy would offer developmental states a 
punitive mechanism to laggard industrial sectors.8  
Sometimes the states even had to create a market when the market did not exist. 
Wade suggested that certain kinds of sectors could be considered infrastructures given 
their long-term potentials and significance in the supply chain; therefore, the 
government needs to create and govern these markets.9 Under the principle of 
“governed markets,” the states adopted favorable measures to introduce capital into 
these markets, while private capital may seem less interested in taking the first move.  
Despite the difference of these strategies, the developmental state theorists agreed 
that the states were able to guide the private capital into strategic sectors and to exert 
punishment to ineffective corporations. According to Kuo, these states shared three 
characteristics in their developing patterns:10 
A. Autonomy: The states officials have to maintain a sufficient autonomy to 
resist corporations’ infiltration. While the rent-seeking corporations may be 
particularly concerned with their interests, the state officials have to pursue 
a collective interest for the country. In these Asian countries, some 
                                                 
8 Aoki, M. et, al. (1996) “Beyond the East Asian Miracle: Introducing the Market-Enhancing View.” 
In Aoki, M. et. al. The Role of Government in East Asian Economic Development. Oxford: Clarendon  
Press.1-37. 
9 Wade, R. (1990) Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asia.  
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
10 Kuo, Chengtian (1995), Global Competitiveness and Industrial Growth in Taiwan and Philippines, 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1985. 
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authoritarian measures were adopted to preserve state’s autonomy from 
being weakened by the business groups. 
B. Rational Bureaucracy: While the politicians may be influenced by the 
short-term political benefits, the bureaucracy must provide deliberation to 
formulate rational and consistent policies. These non-political elites may 
serve as wise designers of the state’s macro-scope developing schemes. 
C. Developmental Leadership: The political leaders in developmental states 
need to show their determination to halt the economic stagnation. They 
have to prove that the priority in keeping economy growing would not be 
compromised by the institutional flaws, especially corruptions. 
The DS theory on the Asian models soon encountered two challenges. The first 
one is transnational capital. During the financial crisis in 1997, the Asian Tigers were 
severely hit by the hot money. The Asian states’ failure in controlling inflowing 
capital resulted in the disastrous crisis. In the 1997 crisis, these developmental states 
were proven incapable of governing the financial market. However, this challenge 
was particular threatening to the countries with more debts and opener capital inflow. 
For Taiwan, a much closer financial system with fewer debts, the 1997 financial crisis 
did not pose a lethal challenge. 
For Taiwan, the bigger challenge came from the political liberalization. 
 8 
Although the East Asian countries shared the similarity of DS, there was a variety 
among them in the regard of state features. The biggest difference between Taiwan 
and Korea/Japan was that the business-state relationship in Taiwan has been more 
remote, and the relatively small-sized firms have further made the influence of 
corporations less significant. Compared with states who kept close relationships with 
large corporations, such as Korea and Japan, Taiwan did not quite fit the corporatist 
model11, for the industrial sectors did not play significant roles in the decision-making 
process. Rather, at least in the authoritarian period, the Taiwanese government has 
kept a certain distance from corporations.12 
However, with the rapid democratization in this region, the authoritarian measures 
could no longer be used to stabilize political order. Without authoritarianism, the 
relative autonomy of states would be threatened by the invasion of business interests 
or civil dissidents. The penetrative capacity of the states may also be compromised by 
the democratic institutional arrangements in all levels of the government. In addition, 
with periodical elections, the short-term political concerns may overpower rational 
planning of the long run. These factors would hinder the capacity of the government 
of Taiwan to remain an effective developmental state. 
                                                 
11 Wu Yongpin. (2004). “Rethinking the Taiwanese Developmental State.” The China Quarterly,  
no. 177 (March): 91-114.  Haggard S. (2004) “On Governing the Market,” Issues & Studies, Vol 40, 
no. 1 (March 2004): 14-45. 
12 Hamilton and Biggart believe Taiwan fit in “strong-society” model, instead of “strong state” (Korea) 
or intermediate” model (Japan) because of Taiwan’s weak business/state relation under KMT 
authoritarian regime. See Hamilton and Biggart, (1988), “Market, Culture, and Authority: A 
Comparative Analysis of Management of Organization in the Far East,” ALJS, July 1988, S52-S94. 
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Developmental State in Taiwan: Authoritarian Past 
In Taiwan, the KMT party-state in Taiwan has a long history as a developmental 
party-state. In order to survive against the Communist China, the KMT regime 
exploited authoritarian measures in stimulating economic growth.13 In Governing the 
Market, Wade listed Taiwan, Korea and Japan as strong states leading economic 
growth. He argued that these three countries, especially Taiwan, boosted the economy 
by “intervening” into the market with strong state capacity, rather than directing 
private sectors toward a market-oriented economy.14  
The privilege of the Taiwan state in remaining its autonomy through insulation 
from the corporations was its unique feature. The KMT administration was an 
exogenous regime from the mainland China since 1950s. Therefore, the 
business-political connection in Taiwan appeared to be much weaker. During the 
authoritarian rule, the KMT regime had relied on authoritarian methods to control the 
society in Taiwan. Both the Leninist doctrine and the Martial Law contributed to the 
power concentration on the political leaders in the KMT regime. In order to receive 
allegiance from local political strongmen, the KMT regime built a patron-client 
relationship with local factions and businessmen. The KMT offered local privilege for 
the local strongmen to monopolize local markets to exchange for their political 
                                                 
13 Kirby, William C. (2004) “The Chinese Party-State under Dictatorship and Democracy on the 
Mainland and on Taiwan,” in Realms of Freedom in Modern China, California : Stanford University 
Press, pp113-138 
14 Wade R. (1990) Ibid. 
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allegiance.15  
 Gong thus argued that the previous Taiwan state was not a typical DS, but more 
like“party-state authoritarianism.” The KMT state penetrated into the society by 
building-up party branches targeting different social groups, and weaved a net of 
intertwined interest among different sectors.16 The KMT’s strong penetration into the 
societal sectors allowed the state apparatus monitored and controlled private sectors, 
including the corporations. 
Owing to the strong political domination, the financial bureaucrats in Taiwan 
were capable of carrying out their industrial policies without participation of private 
sectors. Along with foreign aids, the apolitical techno-bureaucrats deliberately 
sketched a series of development agendas to lead industrial sectors in economic 
growth. 17  The priority of financial techno-bureaucrat in 1970s was to nurture 
petrochemical industries, mostly because of its strong connections with other 
industrial sectors.18 In 1980s, to respond to the massive competition from the other 
East Asian countries, the KMT administration decided to focus on the IT 
(semi-conductors) sector. During the 1980s, the KMT government established a huge 
                                                 
15 Wang, J. H. (1996) Who Rules Taiwan: Transforming State Apparatus and Power Structure, Taipei: 
Julieo Press. (in Chinese) 
16 Gong, Yi-jun (1998). “Exogenous Regime” and Domestic Society: The Development of Social 
Foundation for Reformed KMT. Taipei: DaoXian Publisher. (Chinese Version) 
17 Greene, Megan (2008). The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press (April 17, 2008) 
18 Chu, Wan-wen, (1994). Import Substitution and Export-Led Growth: A Study of Taiwan's 
Petrochemical Industry. World Development, 22(5): 781-94. 
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IT complex in Hsinchu. Collaborating with the state’s Industrial Technology Institute 
(a governmental research center, also providing technical support to industrial 
sectors), the IT business in Taiwan soon achieved a great success, and that made 
Taiwan the top producer of IT products ever since.  
Government-sponsored industrial research labs also provided crucial technical 
supports to assist corporations to upgrade their technology. Amsden and Chu proved 
that, since 1970s, the Taiwanese government has played a key role in facilitating 
latecomers to achieve success in the global market. The conjunction with government 
labs, which paved the way in providing needed technological assistance, contributed 
to this success. Besides, several state-owned enterprises (SOEs) also played along in 
driving rapid industrial growth for they were mobilized to provide financial supports 
or new market for strategic sectors. This experience was thus viewed as a paradigm of 
the developmental state.19  
During the authoritarian regime, the Taiwan state bolstered the economy basically 
through tax return and subsidy. It also set up joint companies incorporating public and 
private sectors. Sometimes the KMT government also supported these sectors by 
extracting capital from financial institutions. Through banks, the government used 
high interests rate to attract funds and then loaned them to designated strategic 
                                                 
19 Alice H. Amsden and Wan-wen Chu, (2003) Beyond Late Development: Taiwan’s Upgrading  
Policies (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003) 
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business sectors. In other words, many financial institutions were to serve 
corporations given this mechanism.20 Among them, SOEs (state-owned enterprises) 
were the main beneficiaries. In Taiwan, instead of private firms, it was the SOEs and 
party-owned enterprises (POEs) that took the leadership role in policy making in the 
authoritarian period.21  
The Challenge: Democratic Transition and Environmental Activism 
Like their counterparts in Europe22, environmental movements appeared to be a 
significant drive in democratic transition in Taiwan. During the past KMT regime, the 
states were able to concentrate the limited resources on the sectors that the financial 
bureaucrats aimed to develop without taking environmental costs into account. With 
KMT’s monopoly in political and financial systems, the developmental state was 
active and thriving. However, the rapid industrial growth led to serious environmental 
pollutions. During a series of environmental struggles, the activists soon realized that 
they were actually fighting against a monster behind the industries, since these 
corporations were strongly patronized by the authoritarian government.  
This situation inevitably led to the linkage of environmental concerns with 
political liberalization. During the anti-nuclear movements in 1990s, there was a 
                                                 
20 Wade R. (1990). Ibid. 
21 Noble. G. (1998) Collective  Actions  in  East  Asia:  How  Ruling  Parties  Shape 
Industrial Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), 38-41 
22 Hicks, Barbara. (1996). Environmental Politics in Poland: A Social Movement between Regime and 
Opposition. New York: Columbia University Press. 
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well-known saying: “to oppose against nuclear plants is to oppose against autocracy,” 
which officially connected environmental degradation and the KMT’s authoritarian 
regime. 23  Acknowledging the political nature of environmental disputes, 
environmental activists thus built an alliance with political dissidents. During 
Taiwan’s democratic transition, environmental activism has been considered a 
powerful impetus to liberalize the regime in the process of democratization.24 
Political dissidents (formed Democratic Progressive Party afterwards) and 
environmental activism reached mutual benefits in mobilizing resources and 
gathering media attention during various campaigns. According to Tang’s research, 
these environmental practices provided significant momentum for democratic 
activism in Taiwan.25  
To alleviate the social grievances brought by environmental activism, the KMT 
set up the EIA Act as “a safe cushion” in 1993. Since then, most major developing 
projects in Taiwan had to go through EIA reviews before starting the construction. 
The KMT tried to use this arrangement to institutionalize overwhelming 
environmental activism. However, as the EIA appeared to be the only public 
battlefield in reviewing those major projects cases, the reviewed topics could range 
                                                 
23 Lin Jun-Yi, (1989), To Oppose Nuclear Plants Is To Oppose Dictatorship, Taipei: Zhili Evening 
News Publisher. 
24 Kim Sunhyuk, (2000) “Democratization and Environmentalism: South Korea and Taiwan in 
Comparative Perspective,” Journal of Asian and African Studies, 2000; 35; 287 
25 Tang, C. (2000). “Democratizing Bureaucracy: The Political Economy of EIA and Air Pollution Act 
in Taiwan.” Comparative Politics, 33, (1)81-99. 
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from social impacts, cost-effectiveness, and to justice issues accompanied with the 
projects. Therefore, the EIA evolved as a public checking mechanism on the state’s 
actions. 
In 2000, Taiwan experienced the first-time party turnover. Most Taiwanese 
environmental activists believed that democratic transition would open a door for 
environmental concerns into the decision-making process after the DPP replaced the 
authoritarian KMT regime. Not only may the DPP be more friendly to the 
environmental issues given its history, the disconnection between the KMT and the 
developmental state may produce a better chance to evaluate previous industrial 
policies. 
After entering into office, the DPP quickly showed a better prospect on 
environmental concerns. During 2000 to 2008, the DPP appointed two anti-nuclear 
activists, Lin Junyi and Chang Guolong to be the EPA directors in 2000 and 2004 
respectively. They introduced public deliberation into the EIA procedure by allowing 
non-scientific experts, such as local community representatives or environmental 
lawyers, to be selected as EIA committee members. They opened the door of this 
monitoring mechanism to the public, and allowed diverse opinions to be existing in 
the EIA. Because passing EIA reviews was a necessary condition for any huge 
developing plans to begin the construction, the inclusion of social diversity into the 
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EIA committee thus forced the state to expose their developing policies in front of the 
civil deliberation.  
To realize the DPP’s environmental commitment to their supporters, the DPP’s 
new president Chen Shuibian also announced that the construction of the Fourth 
Nuclear Plant (FNP), a very controversial establishment causing a 20-year 
anti-nuclear struggle, would be terminated in 2000. However, this decision would cost 
the Taiwan government a financial loss of 1.8 billion NTD as Taiwan would violate 
the contract with General Electric.26 This abrupt action soon aroused a political 
turmoil.  
The KMT-affiliated Premier Tang, who was a symbol of the coalition cabinet 
under the DPP president, decided to resign for the conflict. The KMT then initiated a 
revoke voting against President Chen. Under immense political pressure, the DPP was 
forced to continue the construction of the FNP. The inconsistency of policies was 
understood as the weakening of the state capacity in Taiwan. Most media believed 
that the chaotic decision-making process brought by democratic transition has 
undermined the state’s capacity to pursue economic growth. That was a sign that the 
development state in Taiwan may face serious challenges after democratic transition. 
However, during the DPP’s second term (2005-2008), the DPP started to inherit 
                                                 
26 New York Times, October 28, 2000. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/28/world/taiwan-ends-construction-of-its-4th-nuclear-plant.html 
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KMT‘s legacy of the developmental state. The DPP began to promote several huge 
developing projects in Central Taiwan, all carried very considerable environmental 
risks. Among them, Formosa Steel-making Plant (FSP), Central Taiwan Science Park 
for the LCD industry (CTSP), and the Eighth Naphtha-Cracking Plant (ENP) in 
petrochemical industry were listed as top priorities. While there were insufficient 
domestic demands, even global demands, for these industries, the state insisted to 
push these huge projects into practices at very high environmental costs.  
In order to pave ways for these projects, the DPP firstly violated the EIA Act and 
allowed the Hushan Dam, a new dam in Yunlin County designated to provide water 
supply for these huge facilities, to begin preliminary construction without the 
approval of EIA reviews. Although the DPP’s agenda triggered a series of conflicts 
between the DPP and environmental groups, the DPP administration has stayed 
determined. During Premier Su’s term (2005-2007), his dominant actions enhanced 
the state’s “efficiency” in both the reviews in the EIA and the APC (Area Planning 
Committee). In addition, the Holi-Chixing plan, part of the CTSP plans, also passed 
the EIA review in 2006. The hasty review processes soon led to strong resistance 
from the EIA committee members. Some of them thus claimed that the “EIA was 
dead” in 2007; stating their distrust of the DPP administration.  
As the KMT won the presidential election in 2008, the state’s promotion of these 
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three major projects still proceeded. With the comeback of the KMT in 2008, the state 
has been “hardworking” in excluding environmental dissidents from the decision 
process. Through 2008 to 2010, the KMT administration kept advertising these 
projects and providing institutional support during the policy process. Although the 
Formosa Corporation has currently halted their FSP plan since 2008 due to its market 
strategy, the KMT administration, by adopting many expedient ways to avoid intense 
EIA reviews, successfully has the EIA and the APC approve the CTSP’s expansion in 
Erlin in 2009, with the ENP on an urgent timetable in 2010. 
Most of the state actions above have suggested a typical pattern of previous 
developmental state, as the state tried to break the market rule. Not only did the state 
plan to create markets for huge productions brought by these new facilities, it also 
aimed to stimulate the GNP growth by investing much capital into these enterprises. 
Most important of all, most of the decision-makers still planned to operate them in a 
policy black box without public monitoring, while in fact they have encountered a 
series of resistance from civil groups. 
Did these events suggest a reviving developmental state, though penetrated 
by business interests and public monitoring, regained its dominance in a 
democratic regime? If yes, how can it survive the challenge of public monitoring? 
What is the difference between the current developmental state and the previous 
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one? In order to answer these questions, one has to first review a relevant inquiry: 
Does the developmental state of Taiwan still exist after democratic transition? 
The Developmental State on the Line: Dismantled by the Democratization? 
Owning to the democratization wave in the 1990s, the role of the Taiwan state has 
integrated growing demands from social and business sectors. If the operation of 
Taiwan’s developmental state were fostered by political authoritarianism, the 
operational patterns of Taiwan’s developmental state would face critical challenges 
from both inside ad outside. 
Inside the state, the DPP has governed Taiwan from 2000 to 2008. The cleavage 
between the state apparatus and the previous KMT has widened. Not only has the 
DPP less associated with local factions and SOEs, its previous environmental 
positions such as “no-nuke” and “anti-ENP” would also create direct conflicts within 
the state. Outside the state, while the DPP has built alliances with various civil groups 
and donors in Taiwan, it was not surprising that they would introduce diverse 
opinions into the government. An opener system, with the inclusion of various 
interests, including business interests and environmental concerns into the policy 
process would pose challenges on the previous developmental state. 
There has been a group of literature indicating that Taiwan’s developmental state 
status was seriously weakened after the democratization. Some scholar believed that 
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the developmental Taiwan state was dismantled once the authoritarian developmental 
state no longer existed. After the dismantling, the state apparatus has lost the capacity 
to formulate and implement consistent industrial policies. The state thus transformed 
into opportunism, seeking for its own survival and system maintenance. 
After examining the DPP’s economic policies, Wu Yong-ping suggested that the 
state of Taiwan, after democratization, could hardly be called as a “developmental 
state.” Instead, the unorganized policy outputs and the facts that bureaucrats paid little 
attention to economic development would make Taiwan a weak economic 
“dirigisme.”27 Some scholars have proved that the DPP administration after 2000 
party turnover constantly delivered self-conflicting agendas. Policies were seriously 
intervened by various interests groups. The case of “revoking the fourth nuclear 
plant” was a typical example illustrating the DPP’s inconsistency in terms of their 
policy decisions. The economy decision-making thus fell into chaos and deviated 
from the model of developmental state.28  
Based on the DPP’s performance during 2000-2006, Wu Yushan has proposed 
that the developmental state in Taiwan was replaced by interest politics, while the 
state capacity was serious undermined. Wu thus stated that the democracy regime has 
compromised the effectiveness of Taiwan’s developmental state. Since democracy 
                                                 
27 Wu Yong-Ping (2004) Ibid. 
28 Wang Zhenghuan and Su Yaochang, (2002) “The Successes and Declines of the Developmental 
States: Case of Taiwan and Hong Kong, ” paper presented in Annual Taiwan Sociology Conference 
2002. 
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was created to reconcile different demands in the society, conflicts between the notion 
of democracy and the previous developmental state was inevitable.29 In other words, 
according to the research, the failure of the Taiwan state in remaining monopolizing 
the policy process after democratic transition resulted in the degradation of Taiwan’s 
developmental state. 
 These arguments seemed to suggest that the Taiwan state in the democratization 
era, with the intrusion of various interests, lacked the capacity to propose or 
implement consistent and efficient policies. Even when the state officials adopted the 
previous developmental approaches, the result was proven unsatisfactory. For 
instance, Chen Yi-tsong’s research on the software industry under the DPP regime 
also suggested that the DPP administration, though aimed to develop new sectors by 
enthusiastically establishing pilot agencies, turned out incapable of providing 
resources in the nursing stage.30  
Not only was the state’s capacity seriously questioned, the relative autonomy in 
the authoritarian KMT regime in Taiwan has also surrendered to business interests in 
the process of democratic transition. According to Chu Yun-han, the 
business-government relationship has drastically changed during democratic 
transition. Corporations started to possess significant influences in the political realm. 
                                                 
29 Wu Yu-shan, (2007)  Taiwan’s Developmental State: After the Economic and Political Turmoil,” 
Asian Survey, VOL. XLVII, No. 6, November/December 2007 
30 Chen Yi-tsong (2003), State and Software Industrial Growth in Taiwan, Master Thesis, National Sun 
Yat-Sen University in Taiwan. 2003.  
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What Wade described about the remote distance between political leaders and 
corporations in the authoritarian Taiwan has turned into a much closer companion 
now.31 Chin also pointed out that the emergence of “Black Gold,” a combination of 
business groups and organized crime mafias, during democratic transition, has 
undermined the state autonomy, as state policies were often intervened by these new 
agents.32 With vast business interests flooded into the decision-making process, the 
Taiwan government seemed to have surrendered itself to these new powerful agents.  
Most of the literature above suggested that while the authoritarianism declined, 
the Taiwan state’s capacity in presenting rational and consistent policies was seriously 
weakened. In the events of FSP, CTS and ENP cases, similar situations occurred. 
During the review sessions of these projects, high-ranked politicians constantly 
revealed their closeness toward corporations, and some even endorsed the projects 
without knowing the features of the facilities under review. Through personal 
connections between political elites and business elites, corporations expressed their 
detest against EIA reviews and even threatened to withdraw the projects. The policies 
also made efforts to escort these projects in different forms. These series of 
pro-business behaviors were criticized by civil groups, especially during the DPP 
                                                 
31 Chu Yun-han, (2003) “The Realignment of Business-Government Relations and Regime Transition 
in Taiwan,” in Business and Government  in  Industrializing  Asia,  ed.  Andrew  MacIntyre  
(Ithaca,  N.Y.:  Cornell  University  Press, 1994), 113-41  
32 Chin Ko-lin,  (2003) Heijin: Organized Crime, Business, and Politics in Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: 
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administrations, for their supporters were more inclined to opposing these 
high-pollution projects. The business-friendly actions taken by both Presidents and 
Premiers may be considered a proof of “lack of state’s autonomy.”33  
Regarding the state’s inclinations to economic growth, there was a fine line 
between “planning long-term economic growth” and “sheltering business sectors.”  
While the former was the fundamental nature of a developmental state, the latter 
suggested the state’s dependency on the corporations. While reviewing the DPP’s 
policy on the IT sectors, Tu believed that the state of Taiwan had surrendered itself to 
the corporations during the DPP administration. She argued that the IT business in 
Taiwan has played a dominant role on the DPP’s policy-making procedures. While 
the expansion of IT sectors faced serious health risks as well as very arguable 
profitability, the DPP administration still played along with the IT business 
communities in facilitating their expansion projects. Tu concluded that the state 
“played a comparatively small part in controlling and directing the development of 
the high-tech industry,” but “gave their dedication to the expansion of IT business.”34  
Tu believed, that this “power asymmetry35” between the Taiwan state and 
                                                 
33 Ever since the DPP started their term, the corporations showed their impatience against strict 
environmental standard. They publicly claimed that these standards are partly responsible for Taiwan’s 
economic decline. They even file their complaint to the President Chen. The worst of all, the President 
Chen announced that he would “knee down in front of the EIA members” to help corporations to pass 
the EIA reviews. http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2001/new/aug/17/today-s1.htm. Some politicians 
stated that the EIA review was the obstacle of Taiwan’s economic growth, even after 2008. 
34 Tu Wen-lin, (2007)“IT Industrial Development in Taiwan and the Constraints on Environmental  
Mobilization.” Development and Change, Vol. 38, No. 3:507-27.  
35 While the Taiwan state constantly spent huge public resources to invest on IT sector, the tax brought 
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business sectors illustrated the state’s incapability of retaining its own autonomy 
against the corporations. Therefore, the state of Taiwan after democratic transition did 
not play a guiding role as it used to do. Instead of designing the long-term 
development of key sectors, the state became a promoter of industrial expansion 
without evaluating the efficiency and the legitimacy of its strategies. 
To explain this asymmetry, Ho thus tried to provide a “political exchange” 
explanation for the DPP’s subordination to business interests. He argued that due to 
the fact that the DPP’s social foundation was not solid enough, the DPP had to make 
compromises to the business community in exchange for their support. It was the 
“weak state” that caused the invasion of business communities.36 This intrusion 
jeopardized the core of a developmental state. 
Weak Administrations or a Weak State? 
This dissertation suggests that although the developmental state appeared not to 
function very well during the DPP’s terms, it may be a little hasty to claim that the 
“state” was weak. Since the oppositional party, KMT, has constantly consisted of 
more than a half, sometimes even two thirds, of the seats in the Legislative Yuan, the 
DPP was no doubt a weak administration. The DPP political leaders’ cooperation with 
                                                                                                                                           
by the IT sector was not as significant enough compared with their political influence. Hsia, C. W. 
(2000) ‘How Many Science parks are needed in Taiwan?’, Common Wealth Magazine: 228: 103–11. 
36 Ho Ming-sho (2005) “Weakened State and Social Movement: the paradox of Taiwanese 
environmental politics after the power transfer,” Journal of Contemporary China (2005), 14(43), May, 
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business interests suggested that the DPP had to compromise as a minority in the 
Legislative Yuan, but it did not necessarily refer to a weak status of the Taiwan state.  
First, while most of the literature focuses on the state actions during early DPP 
administrations, it may overlook the fact that the DPP administration was a novice in 
office. Without any governing experience before 2000, the DPP was very unfamiliar 
with running a government. The so-called “decline of the state’s capacity” in 
coordination and policy formulation may be highly associated with the DPP’s 
long-time isolation from administrative bureaucrats and SOEs.  
Second, the “weak state” in Taiwan, described by Ho, may only refer to the DPP’s 
weak administration under a semi-presidential system, not “state” per say. The 
political and institutional foundation of the DPP was relatively weak. President Chen 
earned only less than 40% of the votes in the election in 2000 and only won with 
slight margin in 2004. In addition, through 2000 to 2008, the DPP never was the 
majority in the Legislative Yuan. The weak political status may drive the DPP 
administration to seek for more collaboration from business groups. This was a 
rational and reasonable decision. 
However, if this “weak state” was caused by the DPP’s lacking governing 
legitimacy, then how can one explain the KMT’s embracing very similar industrial 
policies after 2008? The KMT had very little need to make political exchange with 
 25 
the business groups, for political foundation of the KMT has been very stable since 
2008. Not only has President Ma defeated the DPP candidate by a 17% margin in the 
2008 presidential election, the KMT also consisted of more than two thirds of the 
seats in the Legislative Yuan. Such a strong foundation made it less necessary to make 
political exchange with business groups. However, the KMT administration after 
2008 in fact adopted more ambitious actions in pushing those controversial agendas. 
Therefore, there may be another factor, other than political exchange, guiding the 
KMT administration to carry out these projects. 
Third, if the state were “kid-napped” by business groups, it would be odd to see 
politicians, both from the DPP and the KMT, make pledges in front of public 
occasions, since most political agendas within the state would naturally fulfill 
corporations’ demands. The reason that the political leaders had to echo with the 
business groups in public occasions was that they had difficulties to control the state. 
If corporations dominated the state, the political leaders did not have to debate with 
EIA members on the media such as newspapers. By the same token, the fact that 
corporations sought rents through electoral political leaders may imply the fact that 
they had difficulties having their interests well taken into consideration in 
decision-making processes within the state.  
Fourth, the “weak state” notion may over-simplify the interest struggles between 
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different development agendas within the state. For example, the establishment of the 
FSP would directly conflict with the China Steel, a SOE with monopoly status in steel 
production in Taiwan. It then brought a debate on the efficacy of establishing the FSP 
under a monopolizing market. In addition, the EPA’s concerns about the huge amount 
of carbon emission brought by these energy-intensive facilities may also reflect their 
take on economic development, since the upcoming carbon trade may create new 
markets for carbon quota and low-carbon products. Therefore, the short-term chaos 
on the policies may not be caused by the decrease of “state capacity,” but rather a 
shift of development agendas. 
Therefore, this dissertation argues that this weak foundation of the DPP 
administration was NOT equal to a weak state. It would take a learning process 
to adapt while various new interests flooded in. The state had to learn via a 
trial-and-error process. This learning did not compromise the value of the 
developmental state. 
In fact, the authoritarian KMT regime also experienced a long learning process 
after it migrated to Taiwan. As Greene stated, the top concern of Taiwan’s political 
leaders at that time was “political survival,” instead of “industrial development.” Yet, 
the developmental state still emerged gradually as a result of the combined efforts of 
technocrats and outsiders, including academicians and foreign advisors. Therefore, 
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the rise of a developmental state may require a long-term learning process for both 
political leaders and economic technocrats in the KMT era.37  
As a result, despite that one may conclude that, to some extent, the DPP may 
have shifted to a more “corporation-friendly” position; it did not necessarily mean 
that the developmental state was weakened. Thus, research proposes that the state 
can transform itself while preserving other important features of being a 
developmental state.  
The Puzzle: The Rejuvenation of the Developmental State? 
The author compared three grand industrial projects (FSP, CTSP, and ENP) 
promoted by both the DPP and the KMT administrations. During 2004 to 2010, 
different corporations and the MOEA (Ministry of Economic Affairs) in Taiwan have 
proposed these three major projects. Although they represented different industries, 
they did share similarities to remark the existence of the developmental state in 
Taiwan.  
These three projects were all planned to start in Central Taiwan, where 
agriculture remained the main sector in local livelihood. All of them were 
energy-intensive and capital-intensive industries (steelmaking, LCD, and 
petrochemical industries). Although the corporations had strong wills to migrate to 
                                                 
37 Greene, Megan. (2008). Ibid. 
 28 
China since all of these three industries faced problems of over-production in Taiwan, 
the MOEA still preferred to endorse these grand projects in central Taiwan. The 
cost-efficiency calculation and possible environmental costs caused by these projects 
soon became hot topics for public debate.  
The existing literature believed that the current Taiwan state was penetrated by 
special business interests through a two-step procedure. Business groups may try to 
influence the electoral politicians by providing political resources or donations. After 
being elected, the politicians then exerted their political power to acquire the 
compliance of the bureaucracy. The business interests compromised the state’s 
autonomy through this cycle. They author, however, has different propositions in this 
dissertation. 
First, in these cases, one did see the state was trying to block the industries from 
conducting important investments in China or Vietnam. During 2005 to 2010, there 
were five administrations, both from the KMT and the DPP; nevertheless, the policies 
toward these industries appeared very consistent. While those corporations strongly 
urged the government to grant their new investment in China, where the main future 
demands of their products would come from, the Taiwan government kept asking 
them to conduct a huge-scale project in Taiwan to avoid their capital outflow. 
The government postponed the corporations’ quests with various technical 
 29 
measures while this action would certainly violate the interests of these industries. At 
the same time, these industries also were not able to penetrate into policy-making 
processes even after exerting personal connections with politicians. The state 
bureaucrats determined that these industries were key elements in sustaining Taiwan’s 
development, and therefore had prepared “a road map” for these industry giants to 
follow. Even when one of the LCD corporation, AOU, finally received positive 
responds from Premier Wu on the migration, the MOEA director still refused to 
approve the AOU’s migration to China and claimed that the MOEA needed to review 
this capital outflow “article by article.38” In other words, the electoral politicians were 
not that powerful in delivering business interests into the policy-making procedure 
within the state.  
In addition, when the MOEA decided to promote these projects, the bureaucracy 
constantly exerted strong mobilization in the review procedures.39 They persuaded 
different Premiers to pursuit these goals and even adopted administrative expediency 
to avoid possible challenges from monitoring mechanisms. In fact, with some 
learning, the DPP administration became as experienced as the KMT in excluding 
“obstacles” in the review process. Both parties adopted several procedural measures 
                                                 
38 China Times, Dec 12, 2010. 
http://news.chinatimes.com/forum/0,5252,11051401x112010121300280,00.html 
39 For example, the Industrial Bureau has mobilized local factions to join the social campaign against 
environmental activists, and put advertisement on the newspaper in supporting the ENP. See PTT 
News, Dec. 14, http://pnn.pts.org.tw/main/?p=17192. 
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to guarantee the result of the EIA review.40 Therefore, this research argues that the 
MOEA remained strong in formulating industrial policies and wielding political 
influence even after democratic transition. 
Second, while the developmental MOEA has been interested in promoting 
huge-scale projects in Taiwan to realize their plans since the authoritarian period, the 
participation of civil and environmental groups into policy-making granted by 
democratic institutions strengthened the state’s checking mechanisms to avoid 
making mistakes. As most huge plans had to go though EIA reviews, the 
participation of environmental groups successfully corrected the state’s failures by 
including external costs into policy decisions.  
The environmental groups utilized institutional and media strategies to arouse 
social attention to these huge projects bolstered by the state and corporations. They 
even adopted legal approaches to cause huge troubles to the bureaucracy system. The 
widespread suspicions from scholars and local communities also lengthened the EIA 
procedure. Therefore, the extremely high costs from time-consuming EIA procedures 
made the state and business groups to abandon some controversial case like the FSP. 
In the long run, the massive participation from civil groups in the checking 
mechanisms enabled the state to self-correct and generate more cost-effective 
                                                 
40 For example, the EPA amended the rule of selection and excluded radical activists from being 




In brief, the conclusion of “a declining developmental state of Taiwan” in the 
literature seemed to overlook the strong dominance of economic 
techno-bureaucrats in Taiwan, because it assumed that it was the electoral 
politicians that mainly directed the economic plans. In opposite, the electoral 
features actually made the politicians more concerned with economic growth. While 
administrations under the democratic semi-presidential system may be more 
short-lived, the electoral politicians did not have enough expertise to guide economic 
growth. Rather, they were easily to be persuaded by strong techno-bureaucrats 
coming from the MOEA system. 
On one hand, the dominance of techno-bureaucrats was preserved since most of 
the MOEA directors after democratic transition were still selected from the MOEA 
system, particularly from the Industrial Development Bureau. On the other hand, the 
more institutionalized and open checking mechanisms shaped by the democratic 
regime have created more possibilities of deliberation in correcting the MOEA’s 
arbitrary decision-makings. 
Therefore, this paper argues that, though some parts of Taiwan’s 
developmental state were weakened by democratic transition, the core of the 
developmental state of Taiwan did not decline during the democratic transition 
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with the remaining strong power of the techno-bureaucracy in controlling the 
capital. Furthermore, the democratic transition even brought new momentum 
by reinforcing the monitoring mechanisms. The long and seemingly chaotic review 
processes may reflect the self-correcting process by adding external costs into policy 
deliberation. The purpose of this dissertation is to suggest that the developmental state 
in Taiwan remained very lively, while some adaptations have been made. The state 
even gained new energy and became more accountable in the democratic regime. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review on the Developmental State, Its 
Democratic Implications, Parameters, and Methods 
 
With the growing political liberalization, the Taiwan’s developmental state 
pillared by the authoritarian regime was challenged by growing business interests and 
other social grievances. The literature presumed that while the KMT authoritarianism 
was dismantled by democratization, its twin brother, the developmental state, would 
also be weakened. Wu Yongping thus believed that the developmental state was 
intrinsically “incompatible” with democratic regimes41. However, this proposition 
may be misleading, for it overlooked the ability of evolution of the developmental 
state. This dissertation argues that the developmental state, to some degree, can 
co-exist with a democratic regime, and even be strengthened by the democratic 
system. 
Developmental State and Democracy: Compatibility 
The reason that the developmental state may be incompatible with the democratic 
system was that the strong infiltration of short-term rent-seeking behaviors of 
corporations would jeopardize the long-term rationality of national development42. 
Olson particularly emphasized the potential danger of massive distributive coalitions 
                                                 
41 Wu Yongpin (2004). Ibid 
42 Schleifer and Vishny, 1997. “A Survey of Corporate Governance,” The Journal of Finance, Vol 2, 
No.2, 1997. 
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in the democratic system that would hinder economic growth43. These special interest 
groups representing small numbers of firms in oligopolistic industries would pursue 
monopolistic or protectionist legislations. Such legislations in democratic systems 
could damage the economy, especially for some groups (also called encompassing 
coalitions) unable to organize themselves due to their great size that would then have 
to “suffer in silence.” His work in 1996 with McGuire also suggested that democratic 
systems, in contrast with one’s intuition, tended to adopt a short-term perspective and 
limit economic redistribution44. Therefore, it led to the conclusion that authoritarian 
states were more capable to resist these special interests from private investors45.  
The previous developmental state theory seemed to be valid because authoritarian 
regimes in East Asia offered strong state autonomy to counter special private interests 
and consistently to provide public goods46. This insulation of the state to social 
sectors, assured by the authoritarian regime, eluded the infiltration of private interests 
into the state decision-making system. Therefore, democratic transition, by theory, 
may pose an immediate challenge on the capacity of these states. 
However, there are two problems with this notion. First, while the politicians may 
face the lure of private interests in any political system, democracy may be the only 
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system offering them a better incentive to look after the majority. Bueno de Mesquita 
argued that the need of politicians to form a winning coalition would inspire them to 
provide more pubic goods47. If politicians sensed that providing public goods such as 
economic development was crucial for their re-elections, they would have more 
incentives to resist special private interests and would grant more power to economic 
bureaucracy. Therefore, “contending for office” in the democratic system may be an 
advantage in promoting better economic policies. 
Przeworski’s research in 2000 revealed that contending democracies had superior 
economic growth outcomes compared with dictator regimes during 1950 to 1990. 
They also reported lower birth rates, lower infant mortality, and longer life 
expectancy48. It offered an empirical proof that contentions may hold the state more 
accountable in perusing the state’s encompassing interests.  
Second, another important feature of democracy is open participation of all social 
sectors into the political system. While an open political system provides more 
channels for rent-seeking interests, it offers equal opportunities for encompassing 
coalitions to enter the system. If there are equal institutional channels for civil groups 
to be viable in the decision-making system, the power of distributional coalitions can 
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be better restrained. 
There was cross-country research in India, Africa and Latin America suggesting 
that democratization may not better promote economic growth or human development. 
However, Sklar proposed that the deficiency of "developmental estates" in these 
countries such as professionals and government workers indicated failure of these 
countries in building a "developmental democracy49." In these countries, lacking of 
substantive civil participation into the decision-making institutions contributed to the 
weak connections between the democratic system and rational economic growth50. In 
other words, it was the absence of developmental capital causing the laggard 
development, not democracy per say. 
Particularly to the developmental state, meaningful participation of civil sectors in 
the decision-making process has two folds of functions: 1) it can form an 
encompassing coalition and help the state counter special interests; 2) it operates as a 
checking mechanism to correct possible decision mistakes made by developmental 
states. 
During 2004 to 2010, there were some facts suggesting that both features, 
contention and participation, of democracy, may cause a short-term chaos when the 
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developmental state legacy in Taiwan collided with an open political system. 
However, both features eventually drove the developmental state to a much more 
consistent and accountable direction after a short shock. 
Taiwan’s Implication: Democratic Contention as an Adjustment 
of the Developmental State  
While the literature made comments on inconsistent and unsatisfactory 
performance of Taiwanese governments as a developmental state after democratic 
transition, it may have over-estimated the chaos during policy adjustment in the early 
DPP administration. In fact, some facts during the late DPP administration revealed 
that the developmental state still functioned as policy guidance. The political turmoil 
during the democratic transition was actually the result, not the cause, of this DPP’s 
intervention in the developmental state. 
After the party turnover, the DPP tried to replace the political appointees from 
outside sources other than the bureaucracy. The appointment of a professional 
business manager, Lin Xinyi, from the automobile industry as the director of the 
MOEA was a clear attempt that the DPP would like to create a new decision-making 
network. Lin Xinyi also successfully implemented the “no-nuke” principle from the 
DPP, and announced to discontinue the construction of FNP. This decision stirred a 
great political struggle during 2001 to 2002, and Lin was forced to resign from the 
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MOEA director in January 2002. President Chen also faced a revoke voting in the 
Legislative Yuan because of this no-nuke decision. 
After Lin Xinyi resigned, the DPP tried recruiting another business manager, 
Chung Caiyi, as the MOEA director, but Chung could not survive two months 
because of strong resistances from the KMT-controlled Legislative Yuan and the 
MOEA inside. Ever since then, between 2002 and 2010, each MOEA director was 
promoted from within the MOEA system, both in the DPP and the KMT regimes. The 
DPP’s short attempt in breaking the core of the developmental state thus failed, and it 
was also assimilated by the MOEA’s advisory group when the DPP needed to deliver 
scoring sheets on economic growth. The DPP’s inclination to fundamental 
environmentalism at the early stage was soon transformed by their desire to form 
winning coalitions. During the transformation, the MOEA bureaucrats possessed 
significant power in influencing political appointees. While Wu Yongping considered 
that the economic bureaucracy’s subordination to political concerns should be mainly 
responsible for the low penetrative capacity of the Taiwan state during the early stage 
of democratic transition, the techno-bureaucracy in fact re-gained their dominance 
after a short period of adjustment.  
Due to techno-bureaucracy’s assimilation of elected politicians, the state’s 
performance in both the late DPP administration (2005-2008) and the early KMT 
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administration (2009-2010) on these industrial sectors were quite consistent. The 
MOEA dominated the agenda and tried to implement their plans by persuading the 
DPP administration that keeping the economy growing was the final solution to 
ensure the governance and that the MOEA was the only reliable advisor to operate the 
state’s economy. The DPP cabinet admitted that that “when it came to economy, the 
MOEA staff always gave us great pressure51.” 
In addition, since the DPP was not included in the policy network under the 
authoritarian regime, it introduced more participation of private sectors into the 
decision-making process. A research on the development of Nano-science in Taiwan 
suggested that the DPP administration, with no previous experience could be learned 
in Nano-science was able to build a partnership with private sectors through formal 
and informal channels52. The success of Nano-science in Taiwan thus proved that the 
inclusion of private interests into political realms may contribute to a satisfactory 
development. 
Tsai also believed that the statist legacy of developmentalism in Taiwan remained 
very active even after the state conducted a series of liberal reforms during 
democratic transition. Despite the MOEA drew more attention to semiconductor and 
electric industries, the previous connection between the state and some traditional 
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sectors remained strong53. 
Therefore, the DPP’s policy shift from “fundamental pro-environment position” to 
“inheriting developmental statist legacy” during their terms may reflect the evolution 
of the developmental state of Taiwan under a democracy. It proved that the 
developmental state can survive both democratic transition and partisan shift after a 
period of adjustment. 
New Development, New Developmental State 
A developmental state, by theory, is expected to pursue the state’s maximum 
national development. However, the definition of successful development may appear 
a constantly-changing parameter over time. In fact, the meaning of “development” 
has also evolved while including more and more externalities in the categories of 
development. For instance, a shift of value has happened as people in developed 
countries turned to pursue a new paradigm after achieving material abundance54. 
Similarly, in Taiwan, Tong observed that economic growth has provided two stimuli 
for emerging environmental activism. Not only has the fast industrialization caused 
serious environmental degradation, people also changed their priority of lives. There 
have been new social demands on the issues of development when some have reached 
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a certain level of material abundance.55  
Upon this century, Sen’s theory on “human development”, by adding various 
externalities into calculation, represented a wide array of life quality/environmental 
protection parameters of economy growth.56 In 1987, WCED (United Nations World 
Commission on Environment and Development) published “Brundtland Report” to 
introduce the concept of “sustainable development.” This document defines 
sustainable development as “development which meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.57” In 
2005, the United Nations 2005 World Summit Outcome Document gave a more 
concrete context of sustainable development. The concept of sustainable development 
should refer to “economic development,” “social development,” and “environmental 
protection.”58 Theses three parameters are pillars of sustainable human development. 
States’ efforts on promoting social equity and environmental protection thus are all 
considered efforts in fostering “development.” More concisely, any state that wants to 
be “developmental” needs to focus more intensely on people and their skills, instead 
of on machines and their owners.59 Therefore, the inclusion of various social groups 
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into the decision-making process in order to provide more services appears very 
crucial in pursuing the new form of development. 
If a state chooses to shift its development focus from some sectors to the others in 
different stages, it may be merely a “categorical difference” on national agendas. For 
example, a state, which finds it struggling in continuing previous expansive policies 
on the petrochemical industry, may suggest that some old principles have faced 
challenges, but it does not necessarily refer to a decline of national capacity.  
Therefore, it would be risky to argue Taiwan’s developmental state was declining 
based on the changes of policy consistency in one single sector. While the term of 
“development” in the above literature sometimes only refers to “growth” in certain 
industrial sectors, it may overlook the fact that the state may have different goals to 
achieve in ensuring its long-term national development. Economic growth based on 
depriving the minority and the ecosystem may increasingly face harsh social 
challenges. 
Therefore, a good “development” requires multiple lenses for judgment. However, 
the goals for development can sometimes be complex as they involve different 
categories of development as time changes. It requires consistently updating inputs in 
order for the state to choose developmental strategies wisely. A mechanism allowing 
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broad inputs may hence be essential in order to make sure that the information 
received was comprehensive enough. Sen argues that democratic governance is 
crucial on national development for three reasons.  First, democracy is intrinsically 
good insofar as it enables people to exercise their political rights and participate 
politically. Democracy is also instrumentally good, because democracies tend not to 
fight each other and in bad times democracies are more responsive than 
non-democracies to human needs and economic well-being. Finally, democratic 
governance is “constructively” good insofar as it provides institutions and processes 
in which people can define their own needs, well-being, and priorities.60 Therefore, 
in order to pursue a better development, democratic value and institutional 
arrangements seemed to be preferable.  
There has been a broad consensus among developmental experts, policymakers 
and aid donors to view “good governance” as a pre-requisite to sustained increases in 
living standards.61 With the evolutions of human services-oriented “development,” a 
developmental state also needs to evolve to redefine “development” within the state. 
By integrating various voices with elements of life equity and environmental 
protections into political institutions, the state can make wiser decisions through this 
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deliberative approach.  
In a research on Taiwan’s financial policies during the DPP’s term, Tang 
confirmed that the pluralization of rent-seeking actors in the democratization process 
has changed the outcomes of Taiwan’s financial policies. However, while the new 
actors have “politicized” the financial reforms, new interests created by pluralization 
also liberalized the black box of decision-making mechanisms in Taiwan.62 The 
process may appear messy to some extent, but the inclusion of more players has 
ensured citizens’ confidence to democratic regimes.  
Therefore, the inclusion of different voices within the state through these channels 
may help the state to make decisions that are more rational. With more participation 
from civil sectors into the mechanisms, the developmental state can be more 
“developmental” in looking after encompassing interests. In this sense, with the 
growing variety of developmental agendas, participation of non-state actors was 
crucial. A fine developmental state may be intrinsically connected with an opener 
political system.  
From the Developmental State to Interdependent Governance? 
 The concept of developmental state refers to a developmentalism mainly led by a 
strong state. This state remains their dominant status over rent-seeking behaviors and 
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possesses the power to resist these interests within or outside the state. It, by theory, 
does not have to be necessarily authoritarian nor exclusive. The critique against the 
developmental state theory often includes the state’s inability to deliberate. The state 
may fail to keep up with the fast-changing market demands or to efficiently distribute 
resources. 
To be more explicit, one of the common problems of the developmental state 
theory would concern “opportunity costs.” The state’s efforts on cultivating certain 
sectors may be profitable in the market in a given range of time. However, from the 
state’s perspective, it can be proven successful only on a comparison basis. For 
instance, although the investment in the petrochemical industry may seem less 
necessary since petrochemical products can be imported, the establishment of 
advanced petrochemical facilities in Taiwan may complete the supply chain and also 
provide infrastructures for other industries. Therefore, without assessing the 
opportunity costs, the evaluation of the state’s policy choice is flawed.  
Another important parameter often overlooked in a developmental state is 
“external costs.” While the support of a certain industrial sector would bring impacts 
on natural resources and the environment, the external costs brought by the 
production are easily overlooked on the market. The state’s capacity in making good 
choices can be easily twisted if external costs were left out. A state may be 
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economically beneficial to some sectors but “predatory” for the rest of the society. As 
an agent standing for collective interests, a developmental state needs to be evaluated 
from a collective cost/benefit perspective. The inclusion of external costs into the 
decision process was crucial for the bureaucracy to make rational judgment. 
 The biggest problem of the literature of the developmental state is their sole 
statist lens. Some argue that Taiwan’s developmental state has declined, mostly 
because they presumed a confronting dichotomy between a developmental state and 
participatory social actors. This research proposes that it would be unfair to adopt a 
pure statist approach to examine a state under a functioning democracy.                       
A powerful developmental state undoubtedly needs to remain its autonomy from 
constant intervention of distributional coalitions. However, the creation of 
encompassing coalitions by including more social voices into institutional channels 
may enhance the state’s capacity in blocking rent-seeking behaviors and allow the 
state to adjust its decisions and have better chances to reach optimal policy outcomes.  
In fact, while strong states may discourage investors because of absence of checks, 
weak states may also fail in providing necessary public goods. A balanced distribution 
of power between state and society is therefore necessary to encourage investments 
by both citizens and those controlling the state apparatus. 63  Therefore, the 
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participation of social sectors into the state through open political channels may not 
necessarily weaken the state’s autonomy. By actively integrating the various interests 
from societal sectors into the policy process, the developmental states may have a 
new evolution.  
While the private firms have to evaluate the cost/benefit upon conducting 
investments, the state has to create a good reputation in guiding the development. In 
this case, even “genuine” developmental states have to show their creditability to 
attract the capital of private sectors. 64  In other words, cooperation and 
communication with private sectors were always required in the policy process, even 
for authoritarian developmental states. Pemple thus used the term “developmental 
state regime” to describe the interactive relationship among state officials, institutions, 
capital and social actors65. 
Evans’s early works on “embedded autonomy” has illustrated the interactive 
nature of states’ autonomy, both in authoritarian and democratic regimes. For Evans, 
the embedded autonomy was a dense network of social ties enabling the government 
to negotiate national goals with business sectors,66 These developmental states, even 
under authoritarian regimes, did not gain their autonomy through complete insulation 
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from societal sectors. If the state bureaucracy had remained disconnected from 
industrial elites, it would have been ill‐informed and ineffectual. Therefore, unless the 
social ties were broken, democratization or globalization would not eliminate the 
foundation of the developmental state.  
Weiss believed that the dichotomy between state and society was no longer 
relevant after democratic transition. Though remaining autonomous and influential, 
the democratized states may still seek for partnerships with various social actors in 
terms of national development. Through this partnership, the state can be more 
capable of responding to global and domestic challenges.67 Weiss also believed that 
the path-dependent nature would make it difficult for Asian countries to adopt the 
American model of liberalization after democratization, for states still have the basic 
needs to control the capital.68 In other words, through a series of adaptations, 
developmental states in East Asian countries will be very likely to survive and 
transform to this “governed interdependence.”69 
To be more concrete, while democracy has introduced new forms and new 
dynamic elements to the politics and expanded the capacity of ordinary people to play 
a larger role in political life, the “state capacity mostly draws on old foundations.70” It 
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is difficult for the statist legacy to perish after the transition, and the democratic 
system also demands an effective state to lead the developmentalism. Therefore, it 
would be a wiser decision for democratic elites to sustain the developmental state 
instead of dismantling it. 
As Weiss and Evans suggested, the state’s autonomy was never a byproduct of 
authoritarianism. The developmental state may have to go through a process of 
adaptation in the democratic era, since both the players and tasks were very different. 
The process of adaptation may not be very smooth, but it seems quite risky to argue 
that the developmental state is declining based on the political chaos during the early 
democratic transition. 
Developmental States in Democratic Regimes: Deliberation and 
Accountability  
The democratic transition would inevitably pose challenges on current 
developmental states, since new interest and actors had emerged within the political 
system. Without sophisticated guidance, this transition could weaken the state’s 
capacity to develop. In fact, democratic transition in some countries was proven 
detrimental to social-economic development because the winners of the election rule 
the states without constitutional checks, accountability, or respect for the rights of 
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their people71.  
In order to accommodate possible conflicts between a democratic system and the 
state’ commitment to develop, White particularly argued that certain institutional 
design was necessary to prevent the partisan/social contestation from hindering social 
development. He believed a more deliberative form of government, which 
incorporates different parties, business organizations and civil groups, may contribute 
to a better democratic developmental state72. Evans also mentioned that, while the 
Western economic model has diffused globally, the monocropping of 
Anglo-American liberalism model would not succeed in transcending national 
boundaries. There has been discretion of institutional design on the monocropping of 
American’s liberal model. In local practices, public discussion and opinion exchange 
would be at the heart of deliberative development. The participation of civil sectors is 
essential in this trajectory.73 
While Evans emphasized that capacity expanding was the top priority for states to 
develop, he believed that, by quoting Sen, public deliberation was imperative to 
developmental goals. Since deliberation was both means and ends in reaching 
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developmental goals, treating the citizenry as passive recipients would very likely 
produce sub‐optimal or even counter‐productive results. Without multiple sources of 
information and opportunities for public deliberation, state agencies in the end would 
very likely make inefficient investment.74  
For new democracies, deliberation is particularly important because these 
countries can easily fall into the danger of political chaos and instability. Through 
inclusiveness of various sectors, the legitimacy of the various values can be mutually 
identified, and public preferences can be arrayed75.  To some extent these functions 
of deliberation were extremely crucial for non-Western countries, since Western 
mature democracies have developed mechanisms endogenous to deliberation that can 
structure interaction and prevented the state from reverting to arbitrariness and civil 
conflicts76. In addition, the accountability, as an institutional capacity within the 
public sector, also attributes to the state’s performance in developmental agendas, for 
the state needs to respond to a broad array of civil pressures for development. 
Therefore, a more delicate dimension of democracy, through increasing public 
deliberation and accountability, had incurably emerged as the core of state’s 
developmental plans. 
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Therefore, changes of the concept of development ought to shed lights to the 
concept of developmental states, since development was no more a unitary pattern. 
However, in terms of research on Taiwan’s developmental state, the previous 
“state-centric” view on developmental states still be widely adopted.77 This failure in 
capturing the contribution of social actors led to a straightforward conclusion that the 
developmental state under a democratic regime in Taiwan was “declining” because 
more interests were included in the policy-making process. 
Particularly on this matter, Chen Shangmao emphasized the significance of 
democratic features in the research of developmental states. In order to evaluate the 
levels of “contending office” and “civil participation,” he thus added two parameters 
“accountability” and “transparency” while examining the capacity of Taiwan’s 
developmental state. By adding both indicators, Chen had a different interpretation on 
the DPP’s performance after Taiwan’s democratic transition. His works particularly 
pointed out that the DPP’s policies, though seemed chaotic, were in fact strengthening 
the “accountability” of the state.78 The DPP’s contribution to the depth enhancement 
of the developmental state was often overlooked if “accountability” was left aside.  
Some may question that accountability could conflict with the state autonomy, 
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since an accountable state will have to receive institutional restraints. The author 
proposes that while autonomy refers to the state’s capacity to counter “special 
interests from distributive coalitions,” accountability refers to the state’s capacity in 
fulfilling the demands of “encompassing coalitions” by responding to policy 
stakeholder, civil groups, and supervising institutions. Therefore, a state can be 
autonomous as well as accountable at the same time. Furthermore, a state under better 
institutional monitoring can also lead to the enhancement of state’s autonomy. The 
state could use monitoring mechanism to avoid possible rent-seeking behaviors from 
the rent-seeking sectors, for the state officials may claim that their decision-making 
power was limited by monitoring mechanisms. This “limited power” would grant the 
states more bargaining chips in the negotiations with special interests. 
Following this perspective, this dissertation will adopt deliberation and 
accountability as additional indicators, combined with the state’s autonomy, 
penetrative power, and economic rationality, in reviewing the evolution of the 
developmental state in Taiwan. 
The Model 
Since expanding and building capacity in providing more human services is often 
the current goal of developmental states, these democratic elements are crucial in this 
capacity-building process. Based on traditional wisdom on state’s autonomy, 
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penetrating power, and economic rationality, a new model including deliberation and 
accountability will be formulated.  
A. Autonomy: Ability to Resist and Co-opt 
Autonomy has been the core of the developmental state notion. The state’s 
autonomy refers to the extent to which the state can act independently as external 
forces, both domestic and international, and co-opt those that would alter or constrain 
its action.  
As the author mentioned, absolute autonomy of a state is neither reasonable nor 
possible even in an authoritarian regime. The states have a wide array of social ties 
with different groups, and it would be unlikely for the states to neglect them. The key 
element of the autonomy is thus whether the states can resist “rent-seeking special 
interests from corporations,” and whether the state officials can co-opt those special 
interests in accordance with the state’s long-term rationality. The discrepancy between 
corporations’ demands and the state’s policies may serve as an important parameter. 
Theoretically, the biggest challenge against the state’s autonomy in democratic 
regimes may be “elections.” The need of being re-elected would drive politicians to 
introduce short-term political concerns into policies. Therefore, the consistency of 
policies during different terms of administrations may also seem a useful indicator to 
examine the state’s autonomy from rent-seeking behaviors. A relatively consistent 
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policy does not automatically make it an autonomous policy. However, it does 
illustrate the possibility that the policy may survive short-term political interventions, 
since policy networks in different administrations may be quite distinct. 
B. Penetrative Power 
The state’s penetrative capacity refers to the ability of the state to implement the 
policies. A strong state would have a better capacity in carrying out formulated 
policies, no matter in the authoritarian or democratic forms. This criterion includes 
the penetration into different levels of government agencies, social groups and even 
corporations. 
C. Economic Rationality 
This refers to the state’s ability to gather and evaluate information relevant to 
their interests and to make decisions maximizing the utility. Wu Yushan used “world 
market-conforming industrial policies” as the indicator. However, this may be a 
problematic parameter. This market-oriented parameter seems not significant enough 
in truly evaluating state capacity and efficiency in comprehensive national planning. 
Put it more clearly, the state’s developmental strategies can be dynamic. It may decide 
to transfer its resources into a different area given the change of social or economic 
conditions within the country at the moment. Schneider, however, adopted a more 
inclusive view. He believed that a successful/effective industrial policy had to 
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“remove major supply and demand bottlenecks, integrate the economy forward and 
backward, internalize within the domestic economy a particular technology cycle, 
serve as a motor to regional development, open new markets and supplies, or have 
significant externalities that contribute to industrialization.79” This dissertation will 
employ this view to examine the policy rationalities behind the decision-making 
process. 
In order to integrate different dimensions of development, this dissertation also 
intends to explore whether the policies can create other social well-beings by offering 
human capital such as social equity.  
D. Deliberation  
The deliberative approach was originated from Habermas. He believed that 
political deliberation was not restricted to political elites, and that both public and 
private spheres played a part in the political process.80 Habermas’s notion was further 
extended by Hendriks and Parkinson, who proved that deliberation in more formal 
institutional settings can be linked to informal public spheres, with delicately 
designed forums consisting of public and private actors, and thus can generate 
legitimacy in relevant public policies.81  
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Reciprocal communication is the key element of deliberation. In participating in 
deliberation, individuals reflect upon their preferences, and should be open to 
preference change. However, communication itself does not automatically lead to 
deliberative policy. The governments need to build structures to cultivate this 
institutional arrangement. To better evaluate the deliberative capacity in political 
systems, Marian points out the following features.82 
Inclusiveness: it refers to capacity of including every citizen in the policy process. 
Inclusiveness applies to the range of interests and discourses present in a political 
setting. It also includes state’s capacity of enabling communication between different 
social groups. Through the inclusion of all social actors, the participants are capable 
of identifying disparities and dissents.  
Scrutiny: it means that non-experts are allowed to question and challenge 
conventional sources and holders of knowledge and expertise. It would help ensure a 
greater public accountability and empower citizens with more leverage of 
decision-making.  
Developing Skills and Understanding: this criterion is to evaluate whether the 
participants learn from participating into the policy-making process. Time is 
distributed to all participants for discussing and comprehending the subject in 
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question. 
Creating Differences: by including people previously excluded from the 
decision-making process, it would create a difference on the decision. This criterion is 
to explore if that is the case in the decision-making process. 
E. Accountability 
The basic concept of accountability is “who should be responsible to whom for 
what?” The author suggests that the state should be responsible to policy 
participants, policy stakeholders, and monitoring institutions for decisions it 
makes. According to Schedler and Diamond, it includes two elements: 
“answerability” and “enforcement.”83 Answerability refers to the obligation of the 
government to provide information about their decisions and actions, because citizens 
need transparent and timely information to identity political and legal responsibilities 
of the government. It is fundamental to democratic governance. As Przeworski 
described in Sustainable Democracy: “Governments are accountable only when 
voters can clearly assign the responsibility for performance to competing teams of 
politicians, when the incumbents can be effectively punished for inadequate 
performance in office, and when  voters  are  sufficiently  well  informed  to  
accurately assess this performance.84” 
                                                 
83 Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and Andreas Schedler (1999), The Self-Restraining State: Power 
and Accountability in New Democracies, CO: Boulders. Chapter 1. 
84 Przeworski, Adam (1995), Sustainable Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 
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Enforcement suggests that the public or monitoring institutions are capable of 
sanctioning or punishing the offending party or fixing the contravening behavior. 
Schelder also examines two types of accountability: horizontal accountability and 
vertical accountability.85 “Horizontal accountability” refers to the capacity of state 
institutions (including the monitoring judicial system) to be checked by other public 
agencies and branches of the government; “vertical accountability” indicates the 
channels that the state offers through which citizens, mass media and civil society can 
apply their criteria examining and responding to agendas that the state makes. 
Therefore, accountability does not only illustrate a series of horizontal 
institutional arrangements, it also requires a direct and transparent report system to 
the public. In this dissertation, the author puts emphasis on whether the performance 
of The Executive Yuan and the MOEA staff can by checked by other policy 
participants—such as citizens and experts attending public hearings, policy 
stakeholders—such as farmers whose land is polluted due to the industrial policy, and 
monitoring institutions— such as the EIA, the APC and the judicial system. 
Methods and Case Selection 
In this dissertation, the author would focus on the above five parameters to 
reassess the impact of democratization on the “developmental state” in Taiwan during 
                                                                                                                                           
p. 108. 
85 Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and Andreas Schedler (1999), Ibid. Chapter 2. 
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2004 to 2010. To be able to better measure the adaptation of Taiwan’s economic 
bureaucracy in formulating policies, the author chose three major industrial projects, 
all of which were greatly promoted by Taiwan’s economic department, to evaluate the 
state’s performance in the policy process. During 2004-2010, the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (MOEA) pushed three capital-intensive projects, and these three 
projects all encountered challenges from the emerging environmental governance 
fostered by massive public participation. Because of the new mechanisms, the 
previous decision-making pattern of developmental state had to adapt in respond to 
the new trends. 
Table 2.1 List of the Cases    
Cases Time Frames Developers 
Formosa Steel-making Plant 2005-2009 Formosa Corporation 
CTSP’s second expansion 
(Holi-Chixing) 
2006-2011 AU Corporation 
CTSP’s third expansion (Erlin) 2008-2011 AU Corporation 
Guoguang Petrochemical Plant 
(ENP) 
2006-2011 Guoguang Petrochemical 
(semi-SOE) 
The rationales of choosing these case were based on the following reasons: First, 
these industrial projects were considered the three biggest projects after the 
democratization in 2000. The MOEA had listed them as the major investments and 
top priority in state’s developing agendas. To be able to smoothly start these projects, 
the MOEA exerted different means such as tax subsidy and land acquisition to 
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facilitate the process. The MOEA even imposed limitation of capital flows on those 
corporations in order to ensure the final outcome. The state’s strong operation on 
those industrial projects were the first typical character of developmental states. 
These three projects revealed the complicated web weaved by the MOEA in 
sustaining economic growth. 
Second, these three projects represented three major industrial sectors in Taiwan. 
The steel and petrochemical industries were both key sectors promoted by Taiwan 
state during 1980s, and the MOEA had well-established expertise on both industries. 
The LCD sector in Taiwan was the star sector initiated after the political 
democratization, and was the top leader in global LCD industry. These projects were 
either having a significant role in the industrial chain to bring snowball effect on 
economical growth (steel and petrochemical sectors) or creating considerable profits 
in the global markets (LCD). In these grand-size industrial investments, the MOEA 
focused on stimulating industrial production in exportation and tried to create markets 
for those new productions. All of these three projects shared both export-oriented and 
capital-intensive features, which were the typical pattern of East Asian developmental 
states.  
Third, these projects all aroused huge controversies since both energy efficiency 
and capital efficiency of these projects were widely questioned by environmental 
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groups and academic institutions while reviewed by the EIA committee and the Area 
Planning Committee (APC). Both agencies not only signify the inclusion of 
alternative perspective of “development,” but also characterize as “checking and 
monitoring mechanisms” because their approval of these construction projects and 
associated industrial policies is required before conducting the developing behaviors. 
Since these mechanisms were equipped with opportunities of public monitoring, these 
institutions make public deliberation possible within the institutions. By offering both 
vertical and horizontal checking and monitoring, these institutions appeared a very 
reliable test on the accountability of the state after democratic transition. This is hence 
a strong test on the ability of the new state to mediate various emerging developing 
agendas and to generate effective polices on national development.  
Fourth, the author chose to focus on the projects, instead of policies, because 
projects appeared to be better research targets than industrial policies per say in 
Taiwan’s case. On the one hand, the according to Taiwan’s practices within the EIA 
before 2010, the reviewed units in both the EIA and the Area Planning Committee 
(APC) were specific investments, not the policies. The EIA review on the policy 
scope did not occur until those projects encountered problems in the review system. 
In other words, it was the review on the projects at the first place drove more 
comprehensive retrospection on the policies. On the other hand, the MOEA’s policies 
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targeting on these sectors appeared to be very capital-driven. The policies were quite 
tentative and very much dependent on the final outcome of these projects. Therefore, 
in the completely decision-making process, the “projects” were the primary issue 
areas of the debates rather than policies. 
Fifth, in order to elude the DPP’s “novice factor” and neutralize the partisan 
difference in these projects, the author chooses cases starting from the late DPP 
administration (2005) to early KMT administration (2010). This design would elude 
the impact of “weak administration”. In all three cases, the state’s promotion was 
operated with continuity, despite of slight partisan differences. Therefore, the research 
would show the change in state’s decision-making pattern in a long-term scale.  
The analysis of the case of Formosa Steel Factory in Yunlin is in Chapter Three. 
The fourth chapter focuses on Central Taiwan Science Park in Holi-Chixing and Erlin, 
and the construction of the ENP in Zhanghua is in Chapter Five.   
In this dissertation, the author will observe the formal and informal channels in 
which the government officials (in different levels and agencies) and stakeholders 
interact. The meetings in the EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) committee, the 
APC, and the Executive Yuan, both at the central and local level, would be the 
primary foci. The informal interactions between state officials, local politicians and 
private sectors during the policy-making process would also be examined.  
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Table 2.2  Indicators 
Parameters Indicators 
Autonomy - Did the government agencies and politicians intend to resist special 
interests? 
- Did the government co-opt the corporations or negotiate with 
corporations to serve the state’s need? 
Penetrative  
Power 
- Was the government efficient in carrying out the policies and the 
following monitoring? 
- Did the different government agencies follow the same doctrine? 
Economic  
Rationality 
- Did the MOEA carefully evaluate the efficiency, innovations or both 
positive and negative externalities on the state’s economic agendas?  
- Did the government agencies include different developing agendas and 
possibilities in the decision-making system? 
Deliberation - Were different voices included in the policy institutions? 
- Did meaningful information exchange and mutual respect take place 
during the discussion? 
Accountability 
 
- Did the government release accurate and timely information to the 
public? 
- Did the state respond to opinions from vertical and horizontal agencies? 
- Were policy-makers sanctioned for their unaccountable behaviors if there 
were any? 
Research Methods 
Given the characteristics of the listed cases, the author intends to apply the 
following methods to conduct this research. 
1. Interviews 
The author would conduct interviews with the officials in the governmental 
branches taking charging with national economic development (for example, the 
MOEA and the National Science Council), the members in the government’s checking 
branches (for example: the EIA and the APC), the stakeholders (corporations, local 
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communities and environmental groups), local politicians, legislative representatives, 
and journalists who have participated into the policy process. 
While conducting the interviews, there are different tactics that one can employ in 
terms of the research method. Surveys, key informant questionnaires, community 
forums and focus group interviews are among the most widely used approaches. 
Among them, the survey approach does not serve well in this research, because the 
purpose of this research is not exploring public attitudes. Besides, the participants in 
the decision-making process and activism are relatively small groups with limited and 
specific networks. Therefore, the survey method appears to be inadequate for this 
research. In this research, person-to-person interviews and focus groups interaction 
will be adopted to complete this research.  
Due to politically sensitivity, in order to prevent pressure from peers and the 
public, the author will conduct interviews in depth with key informants, including 
government officials from the EPA, the CEPD, the MOEA, the EIA committee 
members, SOEs, environmental groups, and local action leaders, for they can provide 
insightful information directly correlated with the policy process. The interviewees 
will be asked to give detailed descriptions of the policy process and to defend their 
propositions in an approximately two-hour interview. To prevent bias, the author will 
interview people with different backgrounds and opinions toward these industrial 
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projects to verify the facts. 
Techniques including cross-examination and fact tracing will serve as 
complementary measures to verify the interviewees’ statements. While perspective 
discrepancies among different agencies and institutions are highly likely to occur, an 
impartial interview appears to be a more reliable and feasible method to understand 
the inside dynamics of these cases. 
The focus group approach will also be adopted when the author visits local 
communities, NGO meetings, where the information is more fragmented. This 
approach may stimulate the diverse interaction and help the researcher to 
conceptualize a more complex yet comprehensive picture. The reason that the author 
will adopt the focus group method rather than the community forum method is that 
the former provides a more optimal size to gather important information. It is also 
relatively inefficient in holding a community forum in order to explore the history of 
certain campaigns. For most interviews with social group members and journalists, 
the author intends to use the opportunity of NGO meetings; public hearings and EIA 
review seminars to form these focus groups, for these interviewees were more open to 
engage their opinions with different camps. 
2. Content/Document analysis 
The author will also collect government documents (in the EIA and the APC 
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meetings) and relevant announcements from government officials. These reports or 
announcements would then be analyzed based on the rationale behind them, the 
attitudes of the decision-makers, the actions of the government agents, and social 
impacts they aroused. 
 Through this research, the author intends to propose that Taiwan’s 
developmental state after democratic transition still exists, but in a very different 
appearance. Under the new lens adopting new parameters, the performance of both 
the DPP and KMT administrations can be evaluated in a more discreet manner. 
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Chapter 3 Formosa Steel-making Plant 
Introduction 
The Taiwan’s steel industry was developed during the 1970s. After the 
establishment of China Steel Company in the 1970s, Taiwan was basically 
self-sufficient on steel supply. Through a series of expansion, Taiwan’s steel industry 
reached its peak in the 1980s. After the 1990s, a decline occurred on domestic 
demands for steel products resulted from the migration of major downstream 
industrial sectors to China. In the effort to manage the over-production of steel 
products, most of the steel companies in Taiwan sought exportation increase as the 
solution. This harsh competition in this sector, to the disadvantage of some 
medium-sized companies, led to forced withdrawal from the market during the period 
from 2000 to 2003.  
 From 2004, the Formosa Group announced a construction plan for a huge-size 
steel-making plant in Yunlin County with the investment estimated up to 4.3 billion 
USD. Owing to the needs in stimulating Taiwan’s economy, the Ministry of Economy 
Affairs (MOEA afterwards) approved this colossal plan and listed the FSP as a major 
investment in Taiwan. Both the DPP and KMT administrations considered this 
investment an important parameter in economic growth, although the DPP had a long 
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history of criticizing the Formosa’s environmental performance before.86 
 However, the plan’s cost-effectiveness was extensively questioned due to its 
capital-intensive, energy-intensive and high-polluting features. Not only did it elicit 
an environmental dispute at the local level, but it also triggered a widespread 
suspicion on the benefits of increasing domestic steel productivity. In the EIA reviews 
during 2005-2008, there had been great challenges against this project, and one of 
which was from Chang Guolong, the EPA director during 2005-2007. As a 
well-known anti-nuclear activist, Chang’s “hardcore” background rendered him 
repellent to this project. Another great challenge arose from the local level. The 
county head in Yunlin, Su Zhifen, expressed refusal toward this polluting facility and 
exhibited reluctance in granting approval of the construction license unless 
“compensation fund” was provided by the Formosa Group to the local county.  
Facing these harsh obstacles, the state still attempted to implement this plan 
despite that the economic efficiency remained opaque. The DPP administration 
continued employing pressure on the EPA, and the President Chen also urged the EIA 
to have the FSP plan approved in his term. The collision soon ignited conflicts within 
the EIA committee and the DPP cabinet.  
With the impediment from the EIA and local resistance, the Formosa Group 
                                                 
86 Even the KMT administration declared the FSP case as the “major private investment” for the year 
2008, because the FSP consisted of 10% of total annual investment in Taiwan.  
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eventually froze this project in 2008, for the uncertainty on setting up the FSP in 
Taiwan had been elevated. The MOEA and some politicians started to blame the EIA 
as an “obstacle for investment” and believed that this monitoring system would 
eventually drive away domestic capital. As a previous developmental state, the 
capacity of Taiwan state in this event was worth-noticing, for it highlighted a 
transformation of developmental state in adjusting to state’s accountability in a 
democratic regime. 
State Autonomy in the FSP Decision-making Process 
During 2004-2008, the FSP project had been one of the controversial cases in the 
administration. Throughout the process, the goals of the Taiwanese government in 
this industry were relatively unclear, since there was little imminent needs in 
expanding steel productivity in recent decade. Furthermore, the state had been 
following Formosa’s steps and to some extent was fooled by this industrial giant. 
Although the founder of Formosa did reveal his strong intention to build the FSP in 
Taiwan, some believed that the FSP plan in Yunlin was a decoy to delay another 
industrial project from Formosa’s competitor, Guoguang Petrochemical Company 
(GP).87 While Formosa had been one of the top providers of petrochemical products 
in Taiwan, the group was unwilling to see their primary competitor catch up. This 
                                                 
87 See Business Today, Volume 599, June 11th, 2008 
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preemptive action from Formosa might successfully crowd out their competitor from 
Yunlin by depriving GP’s planned site for future facilities. 
Furthermore, the Formosa also delivered a series of strict terms to the state in 
ensuring that the FSP project would receive the least monitoring from both the EIA 
reviews and the land purchase deal. Since the MOEA officials were inclined to 
generate better economic stats on the GDP, the state was soon attracted by this 
enormous investment. The MOEA that was under the DPP administration therefore 
decided to promote this expansive policy without carefully verifying the efficiency of 
steel plant. The state’s autonomy was thus challenged by this corporation with rich 
political connections and bargaining power. 
The Land Struggles between the Two Corporations (Formosa and GP) 
There had been a heavy competition between the Formosa Group and the GP in 
the petrochemical industries. According to the MOEA’s initial design in 2004, the 
government would provide the south side of Huwei riverbank, located in Hsinhsing 
zone in Yunlin, to the GP for the Eighth Naphtha-cracking Plant (ENP plan 
afterwards). The government thus authorized preliminary construction in this area for 
the purpose of transferring this slot to the GP in the future. However, acknowledging 
the GP’s ENP plan might create new competition between these two petrochemical 
corporations, the Formosa Group decided to take a preemptive action by showing 
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their enthusiasm in establishing their steeling-making facility (FSP) in this area. In 
order to assist the Formosa, the MOEA thus changed the original plans and preserved 
a better spot in Yunlin’s industrial complex for Formosa Group’s FSP plan. This 
policy change forced GP’s ENP plan to move to a less convenient spot lacking of sea 
ports, and this decision undoubtedly annoyed the GP.  
Also, the fact that both corporations may share this slot would result in great 
troubles in the EIA reviews, since the concentration of two high-polluting facilities in 
the same site may arouse the EIA committee’s concerns on local environmental 
carrying capacity. Because “blocking the ENP plan” was part of the reasons that the 
Formosa Group delivered the FSP plan in this slot, the Formosa was willing to wait in 
the EIA procedure before the GP made any moves. In contrast to the Formosa’s 
lingering attitudes, the GP was not willing to bear the cost of endless waiting and 
finally decided to move the whole plan to Dacheng, Zhanghua in 2008. 
The interesting fact was that this was not the first time that the ENP was 
banished by the FSP plan. In 2003, the GP originally chose Yunlin as the designated 
site, though they concluded that Dacheng, Zhanghua would be a better place. They 
made this decision mainly because they recognized the fact that the MOEA may hand 
over Dacheng industrial complex to the Formosa’s FSP plan. To avoid confrontation, 
the GP thus decided to concentrate on Yunlin in cultivating the ENP plan after 2004. 
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Unfortunately, the FSP project eventually joined the battle in Yunlin and drove the 
ENP plan away even though the GP had tried to avoid direct conflicts. In fact, this 
was not a single event. According to Lu, during previous battles between the CP and 
the Formosa, the CP had been always asked by the MOEA to concede to the Formosa 
Group on site selection.88  
In 2010, the staff in the Formosa again admitted that it was the expansion of the 
Sixth Naphtha-cracking plant (SNP afterwards), not the FSP, served as the original 
purpose for the Formosa to seize this industrial slot89. The FSP plan in Yunlin was 
rather a smoke bomb. The MOEA staffs were aware of Formosa’s intension, yet it 
appeared too confident to have both the FSP and ENP plans start at the same time. As 
a matter of economic significance, the MOEA director asserted that the GP’s ENP 
plan would be much more significant than the Formosa’s FSP plan, in terms of the 
economic utilities created in Taiwan’s industrial chain.90 Nonetheless, the MOEA did 
not render higher priority to the ENP plan. Furthermore, the emission quota of VOCs 
in local area was granted only to the FSP plan; the GP did not get any piece of this 
emission pie.91 Why did the Formosa Group, as a private firm, constantly benefit 
from the government when competing with a semi-SOE? This was highly associated 
                                                 
88 Lu, Jirong, (2007) Local Factions, Social Activism, and Environmental Governance, Master Thesis, 
Taiwan Taipei: National Chengchi University. Chapter 2 
89 Apple Daily, June 11, 2010. 
http://tw.nextmedia.com/applenews/article/art_id/32577690/IssueID/20100611 
90 Epoch Times, May 11, 2008. http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/8/5/11/n2113354.htm 
91 UDN News, February 24, 2009. 
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with Formosa’s capacity to transfer their capitals oversea and to penetrate local 
politics. 
First, the investment plans of GP, as a semi-SOE, were controlled by the 
Taiwanese government. It was not necessary for the government spending extra 
resources to regulate this state-owned capital, since it would follow the state’s order 
anyway.92 However, in terms of the Formosa, the state may need “carrots” to tame 
this industrial giant because of the high mobility of the Formosa’s private capital. 
For example, the Formosa Group once attempted to conduct a “Haicung Plan” in 
China in 1989. The Taiwan’s KMT administration considered that it would bring 
severe damages on Taiwan politically and economically.  On the one hand, the 
Premier Hao threatened to terminate most financial support from Taiwanese banks to 
the Formosa Group; on the other hand, the state also promised to give the Formosa 
more favorable terms such as granting the licenses of power generators to this private 
company. By those efforts, the Formosa Group eventually relinquished Haicung plan 
and set up the SNP in Yunlin instead. In other words, toward domesticate private 
firms, the Taiwan government adopted” stick and carrot” strategy to prevent the major 
corporations from migrating. In the FSP case, it was the GP to be sacrificed. 
                                                 
92 Lu’s research indicated the reason that the MOEA kept chose the Formosa Group over the CP in 
term of site selection was that CP, as a SOE, did not have an investment branch. In 2006, the CP 
decided to invite six medium-size private firms to form the GP. After the GP was formed, the 
government can no longer ignore the demand from China Petroleum, because major players in 
petrochemical industry were included in the team. If the government does not take the ENP plan 
seriously, the private shareholders would exert more pressures on the government. Lu, Ibid, page 77. 
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Second, the Formosa Group possessed geographic advantage on efficacy in 
Yunlin. Since the Formosa had established a petrochemical empire in Yunlin, it would 
be more efficient to grant higher priority to the FSP plan in Yunlin. Also, the 
Formosa’s long-lasting social connections with local politicians may render the 
company much more success to overcome local barriers such as environmental 
grievances. With stronger social-economic foundation, it was much easier for 
Formosa Group to penetrate into local county office and acquire construction 
licenses. 
However, after chasing away the GP’s ENP plan, Formosa’s preparation of 
steel-making facility suddenly stopped. The Formosa began to refusing sending 
updated schedules on the FSP plan. While successfully weakening their opponents by 
taking the site in Yunlin in the first round, the Formosa intended to keep the site under 
ambiguity longer in order to remain flexible on future choices. Possessing the rights 
to develop this land also provided another opportunity for the expansion of Formosa’s 
main petrochemical facilities in Yunlin. This future expansion was referred to as the 
Forth Expansion of the SNP. 
Since this site was originally prepared for energy-intensive industries, there was a 
high threshold on the application for usage for this site. As a matter of fact, the land is 
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still left unused unto this day (2011).93 In February 2009, the MOEA threatened to 
release this industrial site to public auction in order to push the Formosa Group to 
take positive actions on investment in Yunlin. There were two folds of rationales 
behind this decision. First, it was to force the Formosa Group to realize the 
investment they promised to the Taiwan state. Second, the MOEA also asked the 
Formosa to be responsible for the government’s huge spending on land purchasing 
and the early development of this site. If the FSP cannot be realized, MOEA 
perceived that its best plan was to sell this land to the Formosa at an amount of ten 
billion NT dollars. The MOEA claimed that if the Formosa Group complied with the 
government’s requests, the government could offer some benefits in return, such as 
transferring the emission quota of water usage and VOCs emission to the future 
expansion of the SNP.94 
In June 2009, the Formosa Group officially turned down this offer. The first 
reason was because their competitor, the GP, has transferred their ENP plan to 
Zhanghua county; it would be less necessary for the Formosa to acquire this site soon. 
Second, the Formosa was waiting for the optimum timing to determine on whether to 
save the slot for the expansion of SNP or the FSP plan, especially when Taiwan and 
China were about to sign the Economic and Cooperative Frameworks Agreement 
                                                 
93 Liberty Times, August 08, 2010. 
94 UDN News, Feb 24, 2009.  
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(ECFA afterwards) in 2010. This agreement would drastically alternate the strategy of 
Taiwan’s petrochemical industry in establishing new facilities in Taiwan. 
In fact, the Formosa could afford the expenditure on land purchase, but the 
primary reason that the Formosa refused to comply with the government was because 
the state could not guarantee to prevent EIA’s monitoring on this project. The 
Formosa Group claimed that “it was the government’s duty to help the private sectors, 
not vice versa.”  The CEO of the Formosa Group thus stated: 
“Even if the Formosa Group purchased this land, the government still could not 
guarantee the approval of future EIA review. It is very awkward to ask private firms to 
purchase lands while nothing can be guaranteed.”
95
 (Quoted from the Formosa’s 
CEO)  
Having said so, in order to avoid direct conflicts against Taiwan state, the 
Formosa Group decided to initiate some small projects in planned industrial site to 
alleviate pressures from the government. In May 2010, they submitted a new 
application on the facilities producing polycrystalline silicon and silane (SiH4) on this 
site. Since these facilities did not require EIA reviews due to their small sizes, the 
construction could start any time once the MOEA approved them. Nevertheless, the 
MOEA would not allow the Formosa Group to get away so easily. The MOEA 
                                                 
95 UDN News, Feb 24, 2009. 
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rejected this initiation with the view that “this new application would interfere with 
forthcoming land auctions since it would decrease the quota for air and water 
pollution96”. The MOEA attempted to compel the Formosa to generate an equally 
important investment since this corporation had chased away the ENP plan from 
Yunlin. If the FSP could not be implemented, the state would demand another 
capital-intensive plan from the Formosa to balance the damage. 
 The facts above suggested that the Taiwan state, given its previous legacy of 
strong developmental state, still intended to control the private sectors, but began to 
lose bargaining power in the negotiation after the withdrawal of the ENP plan. Among 
the factors weakening state’s bargaining power, the state’s failure to adjust to the 
monitoring mechanisms turned out to be significant. 
 The Tight Politician-Corporation Relation in the FSP Case 
 In the FSP case, the shadow of the political-corporation relation was revealed in 
the policy-making process. The founder of the Formosa Group, Wang Yongching, 
who was one of the wealthiest businessmen in Taiwan, considered this project one of 
his personal dreams. As a long-term political patron to President Chen, he had been a 
significant figure in both business and political circle.97 The following example 
serves as an appropriate illustration of the influence of Wang and the Formosa Group 
                                                 
96 Economic Daily, May 7, 2010. 
97 In addition, the Formosa Group had been a great donor to major politicians in the DPP 
administration. Some even called themselves as “Legislators of the Formosa Group” in the Legislative 
Yuan.http://www.coolloud.org.tw/node/10996 
 79 
on the politicians. 
In July 2005, Wang’s brother arranged a personal meeting with President Chen 
and proposed seven terms on the FSP case before the President. These terms 
requested the government to grant a special status to the FSP case for reducing all 
possible costs in facilitating the FSP.98 
Table 3.1 the Terms Delivered by the Formosa on the FSP plan 
1.”Buy after Rent” on the land of designated industrial site 
2.CO2 emission from the FSP plan not monitored at new environmental standard 
3.Shortening the EIA review process 
4.Tax benefit included 
5.Compensation mechanized formulated by the government, if acceptable  
6.Acquiring the site as soon as possible 
7.Government taking the lead in the development of adjacent towns 
Source: Economic Times, July 14, 2005. 
Among those terms, the top three demands posted serious threats upon state’s 
autonomy. First, the MOEA’s ideal price to sell this land to the Formosa was ten 
billion NT dollars. However, the Formosa proposed to acquire this land by a “buy 
after rent” method, and was only willing to purchase the land at 7.7 billion NTD. In 
fact, the expense for preliminary land development on a 283-acred land had already 
cost the government six billion NTD99; however, the designated area of FSP plan was 
630 acres, roughly two and a half times bigger. This suggested that Formosa’s offer 
                                                 
98 Commercial Times, July 14, 2005. 
99 Economic Daily, October 27, 2005. 
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could barely cover the cost for the land development. Thus, this term was exactly 
requesting the government to undersell state’s properties to private firms. 
Second, because the EPA director, Chang, planned to include the threshold of 
CO2 emission into the EIA review on the FSP case, Wang directly asked for elusion 
of this parameter from the EIA review. In addition, he also requested for avoidance of 
full EIA review on the FSP plan. Wang claimed that, given the fact that the FSP 
would be located next to the SNP; the brand new EIA review could be omitted. 
According to the Formosa’s suggestion, the FSP could be considered an extension of 
the SNP, and the full EIA review could be waived if the Formosa submitted an 
analysis report on the difference brought by the design change. Both requests were 
direct interventions on the government’s authority, since the EIA review was almost 
the only monitoring mechanism in economic decision-making. These unreasonable 
terms suggested that the Formosa intended to exercise their influence on politicians to 
seek for their private interests. This rent-seeking action was a test on the state’s 
autonomy in maintaining state’s authority.  
In 2007, there was another event showing that the Formosa Group was capable of 
employing their powerful political connection on the EPA. In March 2007, 
environmental activists reported the Formosa’s SNP in Yunlin for the company 
changed their design on water usage in the operation process. To be more precise, the 
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SNP violated its previous commitment made in the EIA review in 2005: the volume 
of water usage from the SNP plan should be no more than 25.7 tons per day and could 
not exceed the new standard formulated in 2007. However, the Formosa Group 
simply disregards this commitment. The Formosa’s arbitrary action clearly violated 
the EIA Act, because according to this act, the Formosa Group had to send a 
preliminary report clarifying the difference of design changes before these changes 
can be made, but Formosa failed to do so. After a series of investigations, the EPA 
thus issued a seven million NTD fine (equal to 0.2 million USD) to the Formosa 
concerning their unlawful behaviors. 
Already being troubled by the uncertainty in the EIA review on the FSP plan, 
Wang was fairly bothered by the EPA’s decision. In order to fight against the EPA, he 
then invited President Chen to join a tour in the SNP to demonstrate their 
high-standard operation process. As an 89-year-old and sick man, Wang accompanied 
with Chen during the entire tour. By doing this, he conveyed a clear message to the 
government officials by showing off his political influence over the President.  
During the tour, President Chen in particular praised Wang’s determination in 
keeping the capital domestically by investing in Taiwan. The President soon publicly 
proposed that this investment (FSP) ought to pass the EIA reviews with certain 
technical conditions, for the government ought to consider both economy dimension 
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and the environmental dimension.100 In addition, he also urged the government to 
“sweep out the impediment of investments,” and to search for “a balance between 
economy and environmental protection” after meeting with Wang. A tight connection 
such as the one between Chen and the Formosa certainly posed a challenge against 
the state’s autonomy. 
In May 2007, the entire cabinet was re-organized. The EPA director, Chang, was 
forced to leave his position, partly because of his disappointment toward the close tie 
between the President and the Formosa.101 Although Chang had been a prestigious 
environmental activist siding with the DPP for decades, the DPP by then began to 
perceive Chang’s leaving as helpful for the state could regain supports from business 
community, since business sector had been grumbling against the long EIA sessions 
during Chang’s term. Therefore, Wang’s meeting with President Chen was the last 
straw to crush Chang’s position as the EPA director.  
Consequentially, the Executive Yuan soon voided the 7-million NTD fine on the 
SNP in July 2007 after Chang left the EPA.102 The EPA even also revised the 
emission standard after this event to prevent the SNP from violating the EIA Act 
again. 103  The speaker of the Executive Yuan, Hsieh, even claimed that the 
administration should not adopt acute means against the SNP such as imposing heavy 
                                                 
100 Economic Daily, April 21st, 2007. 
101 It was based on an interview with a former EPA staff. 
102 PTS News, July 18 2007. please see http://e-info.org.tw/node/24544 
103 http://e-info.org.tw/node/28944 
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fine or suspending operation. Regarding such accommodating actions, all three 
opposition parties believed that it was President Chen making this decision behind the 
scene.104 The connection between the DPP politicians and the corporations was 
therefore proved detrimental in weakening the state’s monitoring industrial sectors.  
Losing Autonomy? 
Although the Formosa Group remained active in manipulating politicians into 
protecting the corporation’s interests, there was little sign suggesting that corporation 
dominated over the state. Rather, it was the politicians, MOEA bureaucrats, and the 
corporations found their common interests in realizing this project. It was the desire 
to “keep GDP grow”, instead of the administrative pressures from hierarchical system, 
that drove the MOEA staff to support the FSP plan without immense needs on steel 
products. The bureaucrats found themselves obligated to promote those 
capital-intensive projects, since it was the previous pattern of Taiwan’s developmental 
state to reach economic success. In the bargains within the EIA, the 
techno-bureaucracy from MOEA constantly took side with the Formosa while there 
was no direct pressure on them105. They were excessively occupied with rather the 
vision of quick economic growth brought by capital-intensive projects than the 
concerns on politics. During 2005-2008, the MOEA’s attitude on the FSP plan had 
                                                 
104 Commercial Times, July 2007. 
105 Take the fine on the SNP for an example, it was the MOEA officials that came up with the 
suggestion of appeal and created the possibility to reallocate the water usage.  
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been very consistent, although different Premiers and Presidents had different 
positions on this project. 
In fact, the Formosa Group did not have very strong motivation to realize this 
project in Taiwan anytime soon. The FSP plan might be Wang’s personal fantasy, but 
the Formosa Group was more concerned with the overall efficiency of this project. A 
Formosa’s staff once proved that the FSP project in Yunlin was primarily a tactical 
move against the GP and the Formosa would not launch the plan without favorable 
terms granted by the government.106 Also, the Formosa had a back-up plan in 
Vietnam, and this oversea option made the Formosa less obsessed with the FSP plan 
in Taiwan. Despite the investor showed little interest in starting this plan in Taiwan, 
the bureaucrats were quite enthusiastic in carrying out the FSP plan. In order to keep 
the FSP in Taiwan, the MOEA officials were actively participating in pushing this 
case through the EIA review. 
According to the description from the EIA committee members, the Formosa was 
not very anxious in realizing projects during 2005-2007. Sometimes the Formosa 
representative even initiatively delayed the review schedule, for there was no urgency 
to start the plan during an economic recession.107 Nevertheless, the staff from the 
MOEA and the Council for Economy Planning and Development (CEPD) often 
                                                 
106 See Business Today(Jin Zhou Kan), Volume 599, June 11th, 2008. 
107 See Commercial Times (工商時報), April 5th, 2007. 
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defended for this project in the EIA reviews. To facilitate this case, the minister of 
MOEA, Chen Ruilong, and the chief of CEPA often negotiated with the EPA director 
in weekly cabinet meetings. Those economic bureaucrats convinced the Premier Su, 
who eventually intervened in the EIA procedure, to take more aggressive actions in 
dealing with the EIA committee. In other words, it was the politicians following the 
advices from techno-bureaucrats in the decision-making process on the FSP plan. 
Also, in terms of the fine against the SNP, although President Chen’s attitude did 
have some impacts, the role of techno-bureaucracy was proven even more significant. 
It was the Minister of the MOEA, personally visited the EPA director then 
successfully convinced the EPA officials to revise the standard of water usage.108 
Minister Chen claimed that the Formosa’s water usage was not the EPA’s decision to 
make. Instead, under a cap system, the SNP could disregard new standard if the 
MOEA was capable to find enough water to fit its new design. 109  He even 
encouraged the Formosa Group to appeal against this fine to settle the conflicts. The 
EIA committee members eventually accepted the principles that both “water rights” 
and “cap and trade” system were the solutions for the SNP’s excessive water use. 
Also, due to the MOEA’s extraordinary efforts, the EIA committee voided the fine 
                                                 
108 The MOEA proved that the government might be capable to provide enough water for the SNP 
since the development of another industrial park (Sihu) had been abandoned. Besides, Chen also urged 
the EPA to “assist the SNP to pass the EIA report regarding the new standard of water usage. UDN 
News, March 29, 2007. 
109 Commercial Times, March 29, 2007. 
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issued to the Formosa three months ago.110  
Therefore, to a certain degree, the state remained autonomous. The bureaucrats in 
the MOEA and the CEPD actually chose to defend for both the FSP and the SNP 
without receiving direct political pressures. Those bureaucrats were proven capable of 
formulating strong political agendas; however, they were quite uncomfortable with 
the time cost brought by the monitoring mechanisms. This lacking of expertise in 
integrating external costs into industrial policies resulted in their decreasing 
bargaining power during the negotiations with the corporations.  
State’s Penetrative Power 
As a matter of fact, the Formosa Group was a corporation with controversy in 
environmental ethics and was often questioned by civil groups before the FSP 
project.111 In 1990s, the Formosa’s SNP has triggered a powerful anti-SNP activism 
in Taiwan’s environmental history. Many environmental activists and the DPP 
politicians had expressed doubts against this company in terms of its dreadful 
environmental record. The local DPP politicians combined with environmental 
activists, both in Yilan and Yunlin, had a long history in challenging the Formosa 
                                                 
110 Commercial times, July 3, 2007. See http://www.coolloud.org.tw/node/9229 
111 The Formosa was involved with an illegal mercury-dumping scandal in Cambodia. In 1998, some 
Taiwanese activists worked with Cambodian residents to prove that Formosa Group was illegally 
trafficking and dumping mercury compounds in Cambodia. The image of the corporation was seriously 
damaged by this event. Under harsh international criticism, the Formosa Groups finally decided to ship 
the mercury waste back to Taiwan. Several years later, the mercury waste was abandoned again in 
Pingdong County in 2006. Both events indicated that this corporation had a very dreadful 
environmental record. 
 87 
Group in the local level. During early 1990s, the SNP was originally to be sited in 
Yilan county, where the DPP has the absolute control of local county office for 
several decades. The county head and his DPP comrades decided to boycott this 
project to preserve the natural environment of Yilan. After five years, the SNP 
eventually settled down in Yunlin and induced a huge amount of environmental 
disputes in this poor county. 
However, in order to realize the FSP project, the Formosa Group needed the 
permission of local county since the local county was in charge of issuing 
construction licenses. However, the central government could only exert very limited 
impacts on policy implementation at the local level. 
Weak Penetration from the Central Government into the Yunlin County 
Given prior cooperation with local politicians on the SNP plan, the Formosa had 
developed a good relationship with local faction leaders in Yunlin. In 1990s, the SNP 
was repelled by several counties, and eventually changed the plan site to Yunlin in 
1998. In order to reduce the opposition from Yunlin residents, the Formosa group 
announced that they would offer local fishermen and farmers compensation 
approximately in the total amount of 30 millions US dollars. This strategy contributed 
to the final success of the SNP’s establishment in Yunlin.  
Some scholars believed that the establishment of the SNP was highly associated 
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with local factional politics in Yunlin. Based on Tang’s research, the distribution of 
the compensation was through channels set by local politicians and mafia groups, and 
these “dealers” take 70% of the compensation money.112 This notion indicated the 
close connection of Yunlin local politicians and the Formosa Group. Because local 
politicians (and the mafia groups behind them) in Yunlin demanded contracting 
business to reproduce the faction financially, the corporation built a relatively stable 
foundation in this county by offering political and economical benefits to local 
factions. 
After former county head Chang was arrested in 2004 because of corruption, the 
KMT lost the county head election to the DPP’s Su Zhifen in 2005. Su’s being elected 
broke the harmony between the Formosa and local factions. When Su terminated the 
fifty-yeared rule of KMT polity in Yunlin, the Formosa  started to encounter the 
challenge from this female local county head. She believed that Yunlin county has 
been seriously contaminated by the Formosa’s SNP plan and suggested that the 
pollutions from the Formosa should be responsible for worsening public health 
records in Yunlin. Due to public health concerns, she strongly opposed further 
expansion of the SNP and the establishment of FSP or ENP. Because the construction 
licenses of FSP facilities and other supporting infrastructures had to be issued by the 
                                                 
112 Tang, Chingping, 1999, “The Institution and Strategy of NIMBY-Based Environmental Conflicts,” 
in Political Science Review (Zheng Zhi Ke Xue Lun Cong), Vol 10. Page 355-282, 1999. 
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local county office, the direct opposition from local county head would seriously 
hinder the progress of this project. 
In the attempt of impeding the progress, Su tried to establish technical thresholds 
to block both the ENP and FSP plans established in Yunlin. She then used carbon tax 
and compensation funds to raise the difficulties in establishing energy-consuming 
facilities in this county. During 2006-2007, Su Zhifen kept claiming that the central 
government ought to reconsider the distribution of tax revenue, primarily because 
most of the tax paid by the Formosa directly went to the central government while 
pollutions was left in local neighborhood.113 Su Zhifen claimed that she would not 
issue the construction licenses to FSP facilities if the central government failed to 
establish a reasonable “feedback mechanism”. In short, this was Su’s war against the 
high-pollution industry in Yunlin, especially the Formosa Group. 
Acknowledging that this local resistance led by Su Zhifen may create one of the 
biggest hindrances to this investment, the MOEA officials therefore were anxious to 
reach agreements with Su Zhifen. The MOEA particularly formulated a “Mechanism 
for Local Investment Service” in the cabinet meetings in 2006 in order to reward local 
counties capable of pacifying local resistance against national-level investments. In 
this mechanism, Yunlin County could acquire 2.3 billion NTD (equal to 65 million 
                                                 
113 The SNP in Yunlin paid more than 30 billion NT dollars in tax to the government annually, but only 
ten percent of them was appropriated to Yunlin in 2006. See: Commercial Times (工商時報), March 
27th, 2006. 
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USD) of subsidy in various forms of budgets, if both ENP and FSP cases eventually 
settled in Yunlin.114 
There was also another side for this “rewarding mechanism.” Although this 
measure seemed to be a positive incentive for the local county office to accept those 
investments, local politicians in Yunlin believed that the central government was 
actually using this “subsidy mechanism” to threaten them. The central government in 
fact was holding some of the annual budgets against Yunlin local office until the local 
politicians were willing to cooperate on the FSP. Since Yunlin County was one of the 
poorest counties in Taiwan, this threat/reward from central government did create 
great pressure on local office and factions,.  
However, Su Zhifen refused this offer. She announced that this reward was not 
sufficient to earn the support of Yunlin civilians. She then turned to demand a “crutch 
plan,” which demanded a privilege for Yunlin County to run lottery business and 
other recreational industries. This was the first time that the local county office 
demanding local privilege in running lottery. Surprisingly, the CEPD director, Ho, 
promised to include this crutch plan into government’s FSP policy during her meeting 
with Su Zhifen in Yunlin.115 Su also claimed she would endeavor to boycott the FSP 
plan if the central government could not properly handle both her crutch plan and 
                                                 
114 This reward for Yunlin’s accepting the FSP was 0.8 billion NT dollars. Economic Daily (經濟日報), 
March 29, 2007.  
115 UDN News (聯合報), March 31, 2007. 
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water supply problem. This fact suggested that the central administration had a very 
difficult time in assimilating Yunlin local polity into the state’ goal. While incapable 
of responding to local county’s vision of alternative development, the central 
government appeared powerless in realizing the project if local county office stepped 
in the way. In the end, the Formosa Group had to negotiate directly with the local 
office.  
State Left Aside? 
In Su’s “feedback mechanism”, she planned to initiate a local carbon tax 
imposed on energy-intensive industries. Su’s real intension behind this local tax was 
to use this measure to improve Yunlin’s financial status after this county was heavily 
polluted. Even if she failed to stop the FSP plan, at least the Yunlin government would 
receive a fair share of tax revenue. By law, Yunlin County had to submit this act in the 
County Council and then submit to the Ministry of Treasury (MOT). Since the MOT 
clearly denied the legitimacy of this local tax, a legal reform was the only way in 
realizing Su’s idea. Therefore, the support from local councilmen was quite crucial to 
the destiny of this local tax.  
Despite Su’s strong opposition, most local political factions’ leaders controlling 
the county council, farmer’s credit unions, and other local social-economic groups 
were closely associated with the Formosa. Because the land acquisitions and 
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contracting business brought by these major projects would generate huge profits, 
most politicians from local factions tend to support investments in the name of 
“development”, especially when the Formosa had build a great relationship with local 
faction leaders. 
In 2006, owing to the mobilization from Formosa Group, the Yunlin County 
Council, filled with local faction members, refused to schedule the initiation of local 
carbon tax into the legislative meetings.116 This political struggle in Yunlin forced Su 
to withdraw this local tax plan, and to start handling this issue in a more moderate 
way. Su then decided to collect “local contribution fee” on both projects to avoid 
legislative procedure117. Although it seemed very odd for local factional members to 
ignore this act since this tax may generate extra revenue for local county, it was 
actually quite rational because the profits brought by contracting business was more 
accessible than the tax revenue for local factions. It also illustrated the Formosa’s 
strong social influence on local politicians in Yunlin. 
To accommodate with local factions, Su publicly announced that she would give 
her approval of construction license to the FSP only if the Yunlin government could 
receive “reasonable feedback”.118 By this term, she referred to a local compensation 
system, which was equally appealing to local factions. According to a local 
                                                 
116 Economic Daily, August 29, 2006. 
117 Economic Daily, August 29, 2006. Two years later, Su was charged corruption because of this fee. 
118 Economical Daily (經濟日報), 2007 Feb. 13. http://e-info.org.tw/node/19724 
 93 
environmentalist: 
“In fact, Su Zhifen still opposed the Formosa’s FSP plan. However, why did she 
make public statement that FSP was welcomed to Yunlin if the compensation system 
can be established? It was because the local politicians made her to do so. She had to 
make compromise, at least on the surface, she needed to do that.” (Quoted from the 
interview with the local environmentalist) 
In rural Yunlin, the local politicians sometimes literally described “The Formosa 
owns Yunlin,” since the company generated most local revenues and provided 
business opportunities for local factions (and their enterprises). This enormous 
corporation generated huge resources to feed local factions and created great 
incentives for local faction leaders to participate in the policy-making process. The 
most extreme case occurred in 2007 during the EIA public hearings in Yunlin, the 
chairman of Yunlin county council, Su Jinghuang, a leader of one local faction, 
strongly intervened in the procedure, even by incorporating violent actions against 
one EIA committee members in expressing his support to the corporations.119 
For Chairman Su Jinghuang and several local town heads in Yunlin, the Formosa 
Group was their primary customer. Take Su Jinghuang for an example, his company 
                                                 
119 Su Jinghuang had a crime record of corruption, election bribery, and sexual assault. He is a typical 
example on the combination of local faction and mafia group. He and his brother had seriously showed 
their concerns to this case, and even attacked a famous EIA committee member, Rubin Winkler, in the 
public hearing to intimidate the activists. Su Jing Huang was convicted six-month sentence because of 
this assaulting action. UDN News., October 18th , 2008. See 
http://city.udn.com/54543/3066043?tpno=2&cate_no=72284 
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has been contracting the Formosa’s ash-cleaning service for a long time. He and 
several local town heads were even prosecuted in 2008 because of monopolizing the 
ash-cleaning business from the Formosa Group. The prosecutor believed that the 
Formosa Group had been using ash-cleaning contracting services to bribe local 
politicians, for the company distributed ash-cleaning services of their six chimneys to 
various local politicians based on their weights and positions. According to the 
prosecutor, the profits for each chimney cleaned per year was estimated more than 0.6 
million US dollars.120 It was the prosecutor’s suspicion that these local politicians 
thus provide “necessary services” such as acquiring necessary lands to Formosa in 
return for the FSP use.121 
This scandal reflected the complex political-business relationship in Taiwan’s 
local politics. Because most of the local factions operated companies associated with 
public infrastructures such as waste management, road construction, or truck 
transportation, they constantly needed new construction projects for maintaining their 
factions. According to a previous research conducted by Chen and Chu, more than 
ninety percent of the local factions in Taiwan possessed at least one oligarchy local 
business.122 In addition, Huang’s research on local factions in Yunlin suggests that 
                                                 
120 Liberty Times (自由時報), April 23rd. 
http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2008/new/apr/23/today-so1.htm 
121 Liberty Times (自由時報), April 23, 2008.  
122 Chen Mingtong and Chu Yunhan, 1992. “Local Oligarchy Economy, Local Factions, and Local 
Elections” in NSC Research and Social Science(國科會研究彙刊人文及社會科學), Vol 2, Period 1, 
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the local factions combined with mafia groups had dominated the public construction 
businesses, and most of the deals were negotiated among local faction leaders.123 The 
local factions were heavily depending on contracting, financing and cleaning services 
brought by these huge projects. While Yunlin was one of the poorest counties in 
Taiwan, the “tribute” from the Formosa Group thus enabled the Formosa to be more 
penetrative into the local politics.  
This tight connection between the Formosa and local politicians was the major 
force enabling penetration into the local decision-making circle. The Formosa Group 
even mobilized the local factions to oppose GP’s ENP plan in Yunlin. This animosity 
from the local factions against the GP contributed to a slow progress in GP’s initiation 
of ENP in Yunlin, until GP’s new president built his own personal connection with 
other local faction leaders after 2005.124 The facts suggested that, to developers, 
forming connections with local leaders seemed to be more effective than going 
through the central government. The central government appeared more incapable in 
managing local resistance and responding to local demands. In a way, the Formosa’s 
penetrative capacity may be stronger than the state in terms of implementation in the 
local level.   
                                                                                                                                           
pp23-70. 
123 Huang, Ronghui, 2005, A Research on Black-Gold Local Factions in Taiwan （台灣地方派系黑金
政治之研究）, Jiayi: National Chungcheng University, Master Thesis.  
124 Lu,Ibid, chpter 3. 
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State’s Strike Back against Local Resistances 
This weak penetrative capacity of the central government led to the fact that the 
corporations had to deal with local politics in the frontline. This, however, did not 
necessarily mean the state surrendered itself to local politicians. While there was a 
relatively stable relationship between the Formosa and the local politicians in Yunlin, 
conflicts occurred when mutual benefits could not be achieved. In this circumstance, 
the state exerted resources to punish uncooperative local strongmen.  
In 2008, there was a series of legal actions against local politicians to domesticate 
local politicians in Yunlin. The first target was the chairman of county council, Su 
Jinghuang. In April 2008, Su and some other faction members, most of whom were 
village heads, were prosecuted because of “threatening” the Formosa Group in order 
to monopolize ash-cleaning contracts of the SNP. While interests exchange between 
corporations and local politicians may be ordinary, the chairman’s brutal action broke 
this pact. 
The second target was the county head, Su Zhifen. In November 2008, Su Zhifen 
was prosecuted as well for involving with a bribery scandal, suggesting that Su 
demanded and accepted bribery in an amount 2 million NT dollars from the Formosa 
and other companies. There was a claim on the prosecuting party that Su Zhifen had 
demanded bribery from developers in the name of “contribution fee” and distributed 
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money to some council members. Some legal experts considered this prosecution 
flawed because it was confirmed later by the prosecutors that Su personally did not 
benefit from this contribution fee.125 
These prosecutions were targeted campaigns. The prosecution against Su 
Jinghuang was related to punishment on local factions, and the one against Su Zhifen 
was to give a lesson to her for her effort to establish an institutionalized “feedback 
funds” in impeding state’s penetration into local level. In both cases, different 
government agencies, even the local EPA officials in Yunlin were prosecuted126, but 
the corporations sending the bribery, the Formosa, were left untouched, which means 
the prosecutor aimed at the local resistance solely. The prosecutor also asserted that 
the purpose of this prosecution was to “clean up the dreadful environment in Yunlin 
for investors”127. Such a provocative statement indicated the intension of state’s 
actions. 
While the corruption charge against the former President Chen Shuibian was also 
launched at the same time, some DPP politicians believed that the prosecution against 
                                                 
125 These were serious legal flaws in this legal case. First, the indictment mentioned the vice chairman 
of County Council, Shen Zhonglong, was the one who actually received the bribery, or broker fee as 
Shen described. Shen also admitted he did receive 0.5-million US dollars from the Formosa Group. 
However, the prosecutor, instead of choosing to hold Shen into the custody, he decided to detain Su 
Zhifen without even conducting interrogations on her. Second, the prosecutor also admitted to the 
media that there was “no money falling into Su’s pocket.” The reason that he prosecuted against Su 
was that Su demanded money from corporations, although Su herself did not benefited from it. In other 
words, Su should not demand money from private companies in any way, even it was for public use. 
126 There were also two EPA officials, one trade union leader, and vice chairperson of Yunlin council 
prosecuted.  See 
http://www.tourtw.org/doc/1008/0/0/9/100800927.html?coluid=0&kindid=0&docid=100800927 
127 China times（中國時報）, November 15, 2008.  
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Su Zhifen was a part of partisan struggle since these actions occurred right after the 
DPP stepped down the office in 2008.128 Nonetheless, there was little sign to suggest 
Su’s case was part of the political conspiracy against the DPP, mostly because many 
KMT influential local politicians were also on the list of prosecution.129 
Therefore, the prosecution against Su Zhifeng and Su Jinghuang could be better 
perceived as a joint attempt by the state and corporations to domesticate local 
politicians who were not cooperating on the state’s agenda. Although building direct 
business-political relationship in the local level appeared to be more effective in 
penetrating local level, the state would reclaim their authority when the corporations 
failed to reach agreement with local factions. 
Economic Rationality 
As a national-level investment project consuming great amount of resources, the 
FSP plan was supposed to receive more attentions on the analysis of 
cost-effectiveness of this investment. However, the MOEA did not seem to evaluate 
the cost-effectiveness of this plan carefully. Hence, the rationality behind the FSP was 
arguable. 
                                                 
128 In fact, there were three major DPP politicians taken into custody in 2008 under the charges of 
corruption in 2008. They were former President Chen Shuibian, county head Su Zhifeng in Yunlin, and 
county head Chen Mingwen in Jiayi. Most of the DPP supporters believe that it was a political 
suppression against the DPP after the KMT regained its power. 
129 In Su Zhifeng’s case, the vice Chairman of Yunlin County Council, KMT-affiliated Shen 
Zhonglong, were also prosecuted. Considering the KMT-affiliated chairman , Su Jinghuang, was also 
prosecuted in April 2008 because of threatening the Formosa Group in order to monopolize 
chimney-cleaning contracts, the most powerful two KMT political figures thus both encountered 
criminal charges under the KMT administration. If this were a partisan struggle aiming on the DPP 
politician, it would also impair the KMT’s political influences in Yunlin. 
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The Necessity of the FSP Project in Steel Industry 
The role of steel sector in the industrial chain was a core issue on the FSP plan, 
because steel was considered part of the foundation in the formation strong industrial 
chains. Although the steel was an important raw material for industrialization, it was 
very arguable that steel production was a strategic industry for Taiwan. Aside from 
the energy-intensive and capital-intensive features of the steel sector, the cumbersome 
character of steel products rendered them domestic market-oriented. This industry 
was better suited for meeting domestic demands rather than exportation. 
Besides, the steel-making industry was less associated with industrial technology 
innovation. The Formosa had sought for tax benefit from the MOEA by framing the 
FSP plan as a “New Strategic Sector”. However, this request was soon rejected by the 
MOEA in 2005. The MOEA believed that steel-making was categorized as a 
traditional sector, for it was less involved with new technology. 130  Since the 
establishment new steel-making facility would not contribute to technological 
advantage, the necessity of the FSP plan may be dependent on its role in domestic 
industrial chain. 
The market demands of steel were determined by the character or business cycles 
of downstream sectors. Some countries, like Japan and Korea, developed huge 
                                                 
130 Having said so, the MOEA still granted the FSP another tax benefit because the FSP will be 
established in the rural and poor area. See Commercial Times(工商時報), July 14th, 2005. 
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steel-making plans primarily because there existing strong domestic demands from 
heavy industrial sectors. For instance, automobiles or electronics industries demanded 
constant supply of steel materials. However, most of Taiwan’s industrial sectors were 
based on light industry associated with household use or semiconductor industry. 
There were barely strong downstream sectors for steel-making industry. Besides, the 
further expansion of this sector was limited because most downstream sectors of steel 
industry in Taiwan had reached maturity stage. During 2000-2004, several Taiwanese 
steel-making companies were forced to be merged and shut down. It was widely 
suspected whether Taiwan needed more large-scale steel-making facilities. 
During the EIA reviews on the FSP plan, the competitor of the FSP, state-owned 
China Steel Company (CS) sent a memo to the EIA committee. This memo opposed 
the FSP project based on several reasons:  
First, according to the estimation of Taiwan Steel and Iron Industries Association 
(TSIIA), the growth of demand on raw materials was only 2.07% per year during 
2005-2009. Since Taiwan’s self-sufficient rate of raw steel had reached 75% in 2006, 
the needs for raw steel on Taiwan’s domestic market was not significant. Considering 
the MOEA has approved another two medium-size projects of steel-making factories, 
the gap between supply and demand of Taiwan’s raw steel market was not large 
enough to support the FSP’s huge productivity. In other words, the domestic market 
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of steel products was almost full in Taiwan.  
Second, the self-sufficient rate of steel products in Taiwan has already reached 
120% in 2006, which meant that there were about five million tons of steel products 
over-produced in Taiwan. Considering some domestic steel buyers had to import 
customized steel products from oversea sources, there were actually about eight 
million tons of steel products overproduced and needed to be digested since 2006. 
Third, although the Formosa Group claimed that the FSP would produce 
high-quality steel products to make market segmentation from other steel providers, 
the usage of high-quality steel products was usually adopted in automobile and 
electronic industries, which were quite insignificant in Taiwan. Such low domestic 
demand could result in future over-supply of steel products, and the Formosa will 
have to export their products. 
Fourth, concluded from above reasons, the FSP will inevitably digest their 
production by underselling the products oversea. This would create a huge 
inefficiency since the FSP would consume energy in Taiwan while producing unequal 
utility. This inefficiency of resources allocation in energy use may cause the waste of 
state’s opportunity costs.131  
Ironically, the Formosa Group also asserted that over-production would happen 
                                                 
131 See TSIIA website, http://www.forging.org.tw/forging_product_detail.asp?FN_Id=290. 
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after the FSP starts operation. Instead of improving the efficiency of this plan, the 
Formosa initiated a strategy to control the market through “joint pricing.” In the EIA 
reviews, the Formosa suggested that FSP and the CS should cooperate to employ 
price control on steel products.132 This absurd statement proved that the FSP was an 
inefficient investment, which will generate more barriers in the steel market. While 
the MOEA always claimed that the FSP plan might promote competition between two 
steel-making giants, the FSP’s proposition on joint-pricing made a best footnote in the 
FSP’s entrance into the steel market. 
Limited Domestic Demands on Steel Products 
According to the MOEA’s “Policy EIA Report on Steel Industry (PERSI)” in 2010, 
domestic needs for steel products in Taiwan have declined starting from 2003 due to 
saturation of domestic market. Therefore, while the self-sufficient rate remained 
unchanged, the exportation of the steel products had consistently increased since 
2003-2008.133 The numbers revealed that the overstock problem have constantly 
prevailed in Taiwan 
In this report, the scholars also made a prediction on the steel market in Taiwan. 
With normal economic growth, the domestic demand will only surpassed the total 
supply 5.15 million tons annually in 2025.134 However, the FSP plan would at least 
                                                 
132 Economics Daily, May 30, 2006. 
133 MOEA, Policy EIA Report on Steel Industry, page 26-27. 
134 MOEA, Policy EIA Report on Steel Industry, page 60-64. 
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produce 7.5 millions annually. Even the domestic market in 2025 will not be capable 
to afford digesting the FSP’s current production. In fact, in 2007, the self-sufficient 
rate of downstream steel products had already reached 119%, and Taiwan’s steel 
sector had to export six million of steel products to China.135 
In PERSI report, the MOEA also quoted the stats from the WSA (World Steel 
Association) and concluded that steel industry was inclined to be influenced by global 
market fluctuation. The MOEA proposed that, while the global demand for steel has 
gradually decreased, the primary goal in the development of the steel industry was to 
“meet domestic demands 136”. However, because there were very limited extra 
domestic demands on steel products, the establishment of the FSP based on the goal 
to meet “domestic demand” appeared to be a very controversial choice. 
In fact, operating the FSP plan without causing over-production is already a 
difficult task. It could only be realized with two conditions being fulfilled. First, the 
CS must reach agreements with the Formosa both on the price control and on the 
division of labor of steel products. However, this twisted mechanism would 
contribute to the Taiwan’s domestic market deviated from a competitive one. Second, 
the downstream industrial sectors must be successfully built to enlarge the market. 
Nevertheless, there was little sign revealing that both conditions could be met.  
                                                 
135 UDN News, October 13, 2007. 
136 MOEA, Policy EIA Report on Steel Industry, page 13-14. 
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The MOEA also acknowledged the potential risks of over-production problems 
because domestic demands on steel products were not significant enough to sustain a 
new FSP plan. In order to solve this fallacy, the MOEA promised to “nurture 
downstream industrial sectors” to transform current “sellers’ market to buyers’ 
market”137. In other words, their solutions were to create new domestic demands, 
which might result in more inefficiency for these newly introduced sectors were not 
originally targeted industries that the government wanted to develop at the first place. 
The MOEA created them only to digest forthcoming productions brought by the new 
FSP plan. This initiation was rather a provisional arrangement than a comprehensive 
economic plan. 
As a matter of facts, far from a decade ago, the MOEA had recognized that given 
the limited domestic demands, another grand-sized steel-making facility may not 
needed in Taiwan. In 2001, the CS attempted to initiate a new program very similar to 
the FSP plan. However, most of the steel-making enterprises expressed their doubts 
on this expansion because both global and domestic demands were quite weak. At 
that time, both the director and the vice director of MOEA disagreed with the decision 
of the CS since the expansion of steel-making industry was no longer appealing given 
                                                 
137 See the 2006 Annual Project Report: The Project to Enhance Competitiveness of Downstream 
Metal Industry. MOEA website: 
http://www.moeaidb.gov.tw/2009/ctlr%3FPRO%3Dfilepath.DownloadFile%26f%3Dexecutive%26t%
3Df%26id%3D738&sa=U&ei=YSrrTNbhCceecL6imfQO&ved=0CA8QFjAA&usg=AFQjCNHmAU
Wxhg_CU2-Se0n-_o1JUZ2pmA  page 138-139. 
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its uncertain future.138 The MOEA staffs believed that the investment on a new grand 
steel-making plan was not cost-effective considering the heavy financial costs (three 
billion USD) and environmental costs that the new plan would generate. The director 
of MOEA, Lin, thus asked the CS to conduct a “feasibility analysis” first, implying 
that the MOEA was questioning the overall utility of establishing another grand-scale 
steel-making facility in Taiwan.  
However, after four years, while there was very little change on the demand and 
supply in steel market, the MOEA transformed itself into a zealous supporter on the 
FSP program. The inconsistency of MOEA’s actions illustrated that MOEA’s political 
concerns in controlling capitals had compromised its rational judgment on the FSP 
plan. 
Inefficiency from the Perspective of Total Utility 
The other problem of developing steel industry was their detrimental 
environmental impacts. According to the PERSI Report, the Taiwan’s current steel 
industry had been responsible for a huge scale of environmental degradation. 
Especially on the energy use and carbon emissions, steel industry has been listed as 
the top sector among all industries in Taiwan. Therefore, whether or not to further 
develop steel industry was a very controversial issue. 
                                                 
138 New Taiwan News Magazine（新台灣新聞週刊）, July 5th, 2001. Vol 276.  
http://www.newtaiwan.com.tw/bulletinview.jsp?bulletinid=7151 
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Though the Formosa Group claimed that the FSP project would generate 
approximately 5% of GDP, some economist believed that the FSP could only add less 
than 1% of GDP to Taiwan’s growth.139 During the EIA sessions, the EIA committee 
members also proved that the contribution of the FSP was less than 0.5%, and they 
made a strong request for the FSP to conduct more analysis on future external 
costs.140 This was an indication that the FSP’s economical contribution may be 
over-estimated even in the sole regard of producing GDP. 
With huge negative impacts brought by the steel industry, the economic efficiency 
of a new grand-scale steel facility was an issue for further debates. In the PERSI 
report, the MOEA proposed three possible directions on the future development of 
Taiwan’s steel industry as follows: 
Table 3.2 the Possible Scenarios in Developing Taiwan’s Steel Industry 
 How to fill the gap between 




Proposal A Full Domestic supply 99 % New Grand Scale Facilities 
 
Proposal B 70% from domestic, 30% 
from importation 
94 % Structural Adjustment 
Facility Upgrade 
Proposal C Full importation 83.19% Regional Alliance 
Source: the PERSI Report, 2010.  
                                                 
139 Wu Zhaiyi（吳再益）, 3E Long-Term development, China Times, July 1st, 2006. Former Legislator 
Wang Tufa（王塗發） also believed that energy intensive industries in Taiwan only produced 5% GDP 
while consuming more than 33% of the energy resources. See environmental news: 
http://shuchuan7.blogspot.com/2010/07/blog-post_30.html 
140 Commercial Times（工商時報）, May 18th, 2006. 
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Among these three proposals, proposal C would effectively reduce current 
environmental degradation or prevent it from worsening in most aspects. Surprisingly, 
it will only cause a slight decrease in the regard of output value. From the 
environmental perspective, the proposal C would be a better choice.  
Most steel enterprises would agree the proposal B may be a more moderate and 
desirable solution since it was a compromise among all stakeholders. Generally 
speaking, this proposal could alleviate a small portion of environmental pressure 
while producing almost identical amount of output value compared to both the null 
proposal (the state does nothing) and proposal A. In fact, most of the scholars and 
steel enterprises considered that proposal B would be the optimal choice. Even the 
steel enterprises in Taiwan rather chose proposal B than A (fully self-sufficient). 
Most important, in both proposal B and C, a huge steel-making facility such as the 
FSP plan was not needed. It was only proposal A that included a possibility of large 
expansion to reach fully self-sufficient status. According to the PERSI report, the 
reason that a grand-scale steel-making facility was excluded in most proposals was 
because such plan was proven less effective in relation to energy efficiency and 
detrimental to the environment. In fact, most of the domestic steel companies 
believed that the entire steel industry would be better off if the 7.5 million of new 
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production brought by the FSP does not exist in Taiwan. 141  Furthermore, the 
difference of total output value between the proposal A and the null proposal was 
insignificant, which suggested that the FSP plan might not create much difference 
from state’s doing nothing on the steel industry.  
Therefore, the FSP appeared not an efficient investment considering there might 
be better alternatives in both economic and environmental perspectives. In proposal B 
and C, simply upgrading current facilities and conducting structural adjustment could 
attain very similar result in a much less costly way. 
Inefficacy of the Private Capital 
Throughout the period from 2004 to 2008, the true intention of the Formosa in 
building the FSP was quite uncertain. Other than the fact that the Formosa might 
choose to submit this program in Yunlin in order to delay the GP, Formosa’s tactical 
relationship with the China Steel and other steel enterprises also aroused more 
question marks. Most importantly, as a matter of economic efficiency, the FSP plan 
also posed inefficiency on the Formosa itself. 
Developing steel industry and automobile industry were both the fantasies of the 
Formosa’s founder, Wang. Starting in 1995, Wang had been searching suitable 
locations to set up steel-making plants. In pursuing his passion in entering steel 
                                                 
141 Economy Daily（經濟日報）, October 17th, 2008. 
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market, Wang also personally visited Zhangzhou (China) in 2003 and to Ningbo and 
Qingdao (China) in 2004 to explore the possibility in establishing steel plants in these 
places.142 From those facts, one could see that Wang’s desire in entering steel market 
was quite strong. 
However, most Taiwan steel companies still did not believe that the Formosa 
Group as a company, other than Wang in person, was that determined to implement 
the FSP plan in Taiwan, mostly because the domestic market had been full. In fact, 
the Formosa also recognized this limitation. During the EIA sessions, instead of 
submitting clear goals in entering steel market of Taiwan, the Formosa basically 
adopted China Steel’s abandoned plan made in 2001. Formosa merely presented a 
vague picture in describing possible profitability in Taiwan’s future steel market. 
While the EIA member pointed out a prevailing problem on over-production of steel 
products in Taiwan’s steel market, the Formosa‘s representative only expressed that 
new demands could be created after the construction of the FSP. As an 
interests-driven private firm, the Formosa’s proposition on the FSP’s profitability did 
not appear very rational. 
The gap between Wang’s passion and Formosa’s lingering attitude was resulted 
from the uneven distribution of demands in global steel market. While the steel 
                                                 
142 Business Weekly（商業週刊）, Volume 1077, July 14th, 2008. 
http://www.businessweekly.com.tw/webarticle.php?id=33717&p=1 
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markets in developed countries were considerably full, the new demands of steel 
products were very proportional geographically. Most new demands came from newly 
industrialized countries. Therefore, the best strategy for the Formosa Group was to 
enter these new markets instead of initiating the FSP in Taiwan. 
Therefore, when Wang passed away in 2008, the proposal of the FSP plan in 
Taiwan immediately froze because the Formosa finally had an opportunity to review 
this option without personal bias from their founder. In June 2008, the Formosa 
officially announced that the group would spend 17 billion USD, later raised to 23 
billion in 2010, to start a huge steel-making program in Vung Ang Economic Zone, 
Vietnam. The Formosa planned to build its first wharf in 36 months and an iron 
foundry and steel mill within 48 months. In the first phase, the iron foundry and steel 
complex would have a combined output of 7.5 million tons a year, while the Son 
Duong deep-water port will be able to handle 27-30 million tons of cargo.143 Once 
the steel facilities were fully operated, the annual production would be 300 million 
tons. The scale of the Formosa’s steel-making plant was four times bigger than the 
FSP plan in Taiwan. When completed, this iron and steel plant will be the largest in 
ASEAN and one of the 15 largest in the world. 
Although there was a certain level of market segmentation between the FSP and 
                                                 
143 Vietnam Business and Economy News, August 10th, 2010. 
http://www.vneconomynews.com/2010/08/formosa-group-to-lift-investment-in.html 
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its Vietnam counterpart, the Formosa decided to stop the FSP project because there 
was no apparent comparative advantage in starting it in Taiwan. Besides, the 
Formosa’s capital outflow, along with other steel companies, from developed 
countries into new industrialized counties was a global trend. For instance, Korean’s 
major steel company, Posco, also recently decided to spend 1.6 trillion won ($1.41 
billion) on building a new plant in India to expand its output capacity.144 The 
completion of the plant construction will be by the end of 2013, while Posco expected 
the demand for cold-rolled steel products in India to rise at an annual rate of 12.5 
percent through 2018. In addition, Japan’s biggest steel company, Nippon Steel Corp, 
also planned to spend 500 to 600 billion yen on the mill in the southeastern city of 
Cubatao, Brasil, to build a new production facility amid stiff competition in 
fast-growing economies.145 This trend suggested that the steel industry has been 
migrating closer to those new economies. 
The advantages for those steel giants to migrate to new economies were as 
follows. First, to alleviate domestic environmental pressures brought by the steel 
industry; second, to meet new market demands; and third, to nestle up against iron 
resources.146 Given growing new demands in Southeast Asia, South America and 
                                                 
144 JoongAng Daily, November 20th, 2010. 
http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2928628 
145 Financial Express, March 25, 2009. 
http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/more.php?news_id=28981 
146 Twenty One Century Economy Report (二十一世紀經濟報導), August 21st , 2010. 
http://nf.nfdaily.cn/nanfangdaily/21cn/200808210062.asp 
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India, the migration had become a very spontaneous action for these enterprises to 
follow changing trends in global steel market. Under this circumstance, the low utility 
of the FSP plan in Taiwan made it an unfavorable option even for the Formosa itself. 
Interestingly, after the Formosa started to implement their Vietnam plan, the 
China Steel expressed strong desires to cooperate with the Formosa in Vietnam.147 In 
2010, as a SOE, the CS had declared that they would spend 150 million USD to 
invest on Formosa’s Vietnam plan. 148  This cooperation between two rivalries 
illustrated that the migration to new economies in this industry was a prevailing and 
beneficial situation.  
Therefore, in terms of the economic rationality of promoting the FSP plan, the 
performance of Taiwan’s MOEA was very questionable. Not only its utility may not 
reconcile its environmental and other external costs, but the low profitability of the 
FSP in Taiwan also created internal inefficiency for both Taiwan’s steel market and 
the Formosa itself. While the MOEA clearly expressed their capacity in rational 
planning on the CS’s expansion in 2001, it failed to adopt the same standard to review 
the FSP plan. With strong intention to follow previous path in stimulating the 
economy by keeping these capitals-intensive plans in Taiwan, the state unfortunately 
may end up creating unsatisfactory economic benefit for Taiwan’s industrial 
                                                 
147 Economy Daily（經濟日報）, March 11, 2008. 
148 Apply Daily, August 27th, 2010. 
http://tw.nextmedia.com/applenews/article/art_id/32768072/IssueID/20100827 
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development. This inefficiency had not been corrected until the EIA committee forced 
the MOEA to deliver a “policy EIA proposal” (PERSI) on Taiwan’s steel industry in 
2010. In this report, the MOEA eventually admitted, though indirectly, that the FSP 
plan might not be as significant as the MOEA originally claimed in the first place, 
given its limited total economic efficiency. 
The Deliberation 
With massive interests’ conflicts and controversial facts, the establishment of the 
FSP plan required multi-lateral deliberation from different sectors. Even though the 
Formosa displayed reluctance in bringing the decision-making process out of the 
MOEA, public participation proved to be important in altering state and the 
Formosa’s decision-making on the FSP. 
Public Checks on the Formosa Group Took Off 
The Formosa had been quite reluctant to release any information on potential 
detrimental impacts on Taiwan’s environment and agricultural sectors. The 
unsatisfactory environmental record of the Formosa’s SNP also aroused widespread 
suspicion from local residents.149 Yunlin residents had been seriously troubled by 
their poor health condition caused by the Formosa’s SNP. However, the Formosa 
                                                 
149 Before the establishment of the SNP, the Formosa promised to provide zero-pollution industrial 
process and help to develop Yunlin County. However, after the SNP was built, most of the promises 
were abandoned. 
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refused to take responsibility on the pollutions produced by them.150 
In the 2010 public health evaluation conducted by the EPA in 2010, it was 
suggested that the cancer rate of males living adjacent to the SNP was 1.7 times 
higher than the national average. However, the Formosa claimed, “there was no 
causal linkage with the SNP” proved in this research, and proposed that most of the 
illness was mainly associated with local residents’ unhealthy living habits such as 
smoking.151 In the EIA reviews on the FSP plan, the Formosa again claimed that the 
FSP plan would not damage the local environment. Their EIA proposal even 
suggested that the air quality in central Taiwan area would remain unchanged after the 
FSP starts operation.152 
The Formosa’s EIA proposal also concealed the possible threats that the FSP may 
bring on local fish farming. The Formosa proposal described that the FSP would 
hardly create any negative impacts on local fish-farming business. Most EIA 
committee members could not agree with this notion and considered the numbers 
provided by the Formosa unacceptable.153 While the EIA committee kept requesting 
the Formosa to supplement more data, the Formosa refused to comply with the 
committee’s requests.  
                                                 
150 Before 2007, the Yunlin EPA branch had already fined the SNP more than sixty time for the SNP 
failed to regulate their toxic VOCs. Due to the poor air quality, the students in local elementary school 
had to wear masks in the classroom. 
151 See: http://www.nownews.com/2010/10/29/327-2659625.htm 
152 This was based on an interview with an activist. 
153 In Formosa’s proposals, they even calculated that the fish-farmers would benefit from the FSP 
since they tried to manipulate the data. See: http://www.coolloud.org.tw/node/10996 
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Furthermore, on CO2 issue, the Formosa also revealed its intention to evade 
monitoring from state’s supervisory institution. In fact, the FSP plan and the possible 
future expansion of the SNP combined would consist of one third of total CO2 
emission in Taiwan once they started operation. Although most of the EIA committee 
members asked the Formosa to submit solutions for this high volume of energy 
consumption, the Formosa pretended that these questions were non-existent. A 
committee member described that: 
“They refused to directly answer the questioned we posed. They repeated their 
tone again and again, but only filled with emptiness and vagueness. Every time they 
sent in the “revised” EIA proposal, the previous flaws were actually untouched. Both 
sides were in an endless cycle. They disliked the fact that we were asking the same 
questions every time, and we were unhappy that we did not get to see what we want 
even we asked for them every time”. (Interview quotes from one EIA committee 
member) 
The Formosa at least showed some respect to the EIA sessions, but they were not 
up to communicate when facing local residents and civil groups. In the public 
hearings on the “feedback mechanisms” held by Legislative Yuan in 2007, the 
Formosa’s delegation was absent. This evasive attitude gave very little room for 
further public deliberation. Furthermore, this lacking of meaningful communication 
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deepened the deliberation deficit since local residents did not have the luxury to 
participate in these meeting in Taipei on a regular basis. Therefore, the local 
stakeholders such as oyster fish farmers were seriously under-represented in the 
process. Instead, the local factions associated with the Formosa were quite efficient in 
providing mobilizing resources. This lack of meaningful public participation 
sometimes contributed to over-simplified conclusions. 
With the Formosa’s reluctance in communicating with local groups, it was 
difficult for the EIA committee to determine the extent to which the local community 
was affected by the future FSP plan. To solve this democratic deficiency, in March 
2007, some EIA committee members decided to hold an open-ended seminar in 
Yunlin and directly listen to the local community. This was the first time that the EIA 
committee members initiatively “go to the local.” 
In the seminar, the EIA committee members found that the Formosa had 
intentionally concealed the health risks of FSP and SNP from the local communities, 
and local resident were exhibiting much dissatisfaction toward the Formosa’s SNP. 
Most of the local participants expressed their grievances and criticized the Formosa’s 
disappointing environmental performance in Yunlin. However, most of the residents 
felt powerless in changing the situation. Some even considered selling their land to 
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the Formosa in order to restart their lives somewhere else.154 
Although disagreements existed in the seminar, this channel provided a platform 
for local participants in reviewing this policy. It empowered local oyster-farmers to 
compete with local factions in terms of interpreting local development, since local 
oyster farmers had chances to be brought into the policy networks. This local hearing 
held by the EIA committee was confirmed significant in later EIA reviews. 
In October 2007, under political pressure, the EPA attempted to manipulate the 
EIA process in approving the EIA reviews on the FSP plan to the soonest. The 
intervention allowed the FSP plan to skip a robust EIA review, and aroused the 
massive activism in Yunlin local communities. In the EIA sessions next month, the 
oyster farmers launched protests and submitted data to the EIA committee to prove 
Formosa’s unwillingness in collecting information on marine ecosystem. The EIA 
committee members thus officially decided that the FSP plan had to go through a 
robust EIA review, also called second-stage EIA review. Although violence against 
environmental activists did occur along with the EIA reviews, the public participation 
reversed the disadvantage of local resident for their opinions were included into the 
EIA review through a more institutional channel. Starting from the FSP plan, the 
public deliberation had been institutionalized via better practices within the EIA 
                                                 
154 This statement was based on an interview with an EIA committee member. 
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committee. 
State’s Accountability and Transparency 
The more intense conflicts on the FSP plan blew out during Premier Su 
Zhenchang’s term since January 2006. The EIA committee members began to 
complain about the “political pressures from above”. In 2006, some EIA members 
made an announcement--“EIA Is Dead”--against the Premier Su, in resisting his 
intervention in the EIA procedure. Through out 2004-2008, the state’s accountability 
on the FSP plan was quite shoddy, since the DPP administration and the MOEA came 
to intervene for the EIA reviews. 
State’s Political Intervention into the EIA 
While the Premier Su was regarded as a competitive potential candidate for the 
DPP in 2008 presidential campaign, the FSP plan turned into a touchstone in 
examining Su’s governing ability. Hence, Premier Su was quite ambitious in shaping 
the image that he has a diligent and resolute leadership. During his 12-years local 
governing as the county heads of both Pingdong and Taipei, he was quite famous in 
bolstering local economy by delivering grand-scale constructions in the amount of 
250 billion NT dollars (equal to 7.2 billion USD). He also tried to use those enormous 
public spending to acquire the friendship in different local counties and to earn a 
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positive nationwide image.155  
Although he received good reputation because of his fast achievements, his favor 
of grand-scale constructions in stimulating economies also induced criticism. His 
well-known statement “there must be sacrifices for major constructions” proposed in 
February 2007 as the government intended to demolish a historic health institute 
filled with leprosy patients in completing a metro-rail system might well reflected his 
priority of values in public policy.156 To make good use of his Premier position, Su 
thus proposed a slogan of “Great Investments; Great Warmness” to stimulate 
economic growth rate by posing huge public investments, including the FSP plan. 
Consequently, while he was determined to realize these capital-intensive programs, 
his conflicts with the EIA committee members and EPA director, Chang, thus 
occurred. 
In the early stage, Su formed a cross-department meeting to review the process of 
these major investments in a weekly base, which meant relevant government agencies 
had to report progress of each case to him every week. In March 2007, the MOEA 
director, Chen, disputed with the EPA director, Chang, in the Executive Yuan 
                                                 
155 Under his eight-year term as county head of Taipei, he turned a 15-billion TWD budget surplus into 
an 80-billion TWD deficit, and made Taipei County as the number one debtor among 23 counties. See 
UDN News, December 19, 2005. 
156 This institute, Lesheng, was a legacy of Japanese colonization. Japanese government used it to 
segregate leprosy patients. Most residents there have no place to go since they have lived here for more 
than 50 years. While the Culture Construction Committee suggest it could be a historic inheritance, the 
central government still plan to demolish it since it blocks the metro-rail system. 
http://www.wretch.cc/blog/htycy/6595967 
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meetings because MOEA has become very impatient with the slow progress of the 
FSP plan under the EIA review. 
In order to carry out Su’s determination, the vice Premier Cai Yingwen during 
2006-2008 (current DPP chairwoman) also made bleak comments against the EPA. 
She thus asked the EPA to establish a standardized mechanism based on the 
Administrative Procedural Act, and to give a concrete period to notify the 
developers.157 Cai believed that the administration ought to take actions to earn 
supports from the industrial sectors for the purpose of building a new 
business-friendly image. 
As an environmental activist, Chang actively delayed both the FSP and the ENP 
plans, for both plans were energy-intensive sectors with serious pollutions. Most 
MOEA officials believed that Chang was capable of persuading most EIA committee 
members into cooperating with the MOEA because he had been a prestigious 
environmental activist. However, Chang insisted that each committee member made 
one’s decision independently.158 Despite of the fact that each EIA committee member 
operated independently, Chang, like most EPA directors, was capable of influencing 
the members most of the time.159 Chang’s intentional inaction in the EIA review 
meetings on both the FSP and ENP plans through 2006-2007 particularly revealed the 
                                                 
157 Economics Daily, March 29, 2007. 
158 Economic Daily, March 27, 2007. 
159 Most of the interviewed EIA members suggested that the chairman (Chang, most of the time) can 
dominate the agenda in different ways. 
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fact that he personally would oppose both plans. 
However, with growing political pressure upon the EPA from Su’s administration, 
Chang had to make compromises. In June 2006, Chang helped another controversial 
case, Central Taiwan Scientific Park (CTSP) in Holi-Chixing to pass the EIA review. 
In fact, Chang was actually using the CTSP plan in exchange for the privilege 
impeding both the FSP and ENP plans. The reason was that he perceived that the 
latter two projects were much more detrimental than CTSP’s Holi-Chixing plan. The 
details will be given in next chapter. 
  Acknowledging that Chang’s antagonistic attitudes toward the Formosa Group 
might result in a great gridlock on the FSP plan, the Premier Su then decided to 
recruit someone that he could trust to operate in the EPA. In 2006, Su appointed 
Chang Zhijing, who has worked with him for more than a decade, as the deputy 
director of the EPA. Since then, Chang Zhijing began to actively participate in the 
EIA reviews. According to the EIA committee members, the deputy director Chang 
Zhijiang constantly supervised the EIA process and “passed the concerns of Premier 
Su” to the committee members. In the later stage of Chang Guolong’s term as the EPA 
director, his deputy director took a very firm position in the discussion within the EIA 
committee, and even provoctively dominate the EIA process.160 Chang Zhijiang’s 
                                                 
160 About the provocative behaviors of deputy director Chang Zhijing in the EIA, please also see Su, 
Sang-ying. (2008). The Research of Lobbying Strategy in the Environmental Assessment by 
Environmental Groups: Policy Network Analysis, Master Thesis, National Chengkung University: 
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behavior was so provocative that it even stirred prevailing resentment of the EIA 
committee members. 
Because of the intense political pressure, Chang Guolong decided to resign from 
the position of EPA director in 2007. Su also left his Premier position for he was 
about to run presidential campaigns. Nevertheless, their leaving office did not cease 
the manipulation; the MOEA staff soon recognized that the Formosa might start 
another plan in Vietnam if the pace of EIA review failed to meet the demands of the 
Formosa Group. 
Manipulation of the EIA Process 
To save this capital from outflow, the DPP administration made a “strategic 
move” to reduce the interferences from environmental groups. Through a series of 
struggles, the DPP administration concluded that some hardcore activists and experts 
in the EIA committee were the major obstacles shaping the gridlock. These grassroots 
activists were included into the committee during the term 2005-2007 because of 
Chang Guolong’s faith in promoting civic participation into the policy-process. 
Because the EIA members served only two years each term, the current term of EIA 
committee members at that time would be no longer in the position after August 2007. 
This indicated that a quick way to improve the “efficiency” of EIA review process on 
                                                                                                                                           
Tainan, Taiwan. pp176. 
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the FSP was to build a more “cooperative” EIA committee after August 2007.  
There were two steps for the DPP administration to implement this plan. First, the 
EPA staff started to delay current EIA reviews. The EPA unprecedently cancelled 
monthly EIA reviews for consecutive two months and postponed them to the timeline 
after August 2007. In the EIA meetings in June 2007, an EIA review session was 
finally arranged; however, the EPA staff refused to incorporate the FSP case into the 
agenda, claiming that the request of Yunlin local government was still pending and 
awaiting the explanation from the Ministry of Justice. 161  Although the EIA 
committee members urged the EPA to place the FSP plan on the discussion table 
before August, the EPA remained quite dormant. The intention for the EPA staff and 
the DPP administration was to avoid conflicts in the current EIA committee at that 
time.162 
Meanwhile, there was another disputing case, coal-powered generator in 
Zhanghua marine area. The EIA committee officially turned down the EIA proposal 
of the developer (state-owned Tai-power) in April 2007, which meant this project was 
not allowed to begin. Two months after the rejection, however, the MOEA requested 
to “withdraw” the case. Surprisingly, the EPA violated the EIA Act and permitted the 
MOEA and Tai-Power to do so.  
                                                 
161 UDN News, May 24, 2007. 
162 UDN News, June 6, 2007. 
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According to the EIA Act, there was an obvious difference between “rejection” 
and “withdrawal.” Once the EIA report from industrial plan was finally “rejected” by 
the EIA committee, it meant the plan could not proceed in any form unless there was 
a new design. However, with a status of “withdrawal”, this case could return to the 
EIA committee at any time if the developers were ready to give a shot. Presumably, a 
“rejected” case could not be withdrawn; otherwise the EIA review would be 
meaningless. Nonetheless, the EPA still approves this withdrawn, which made the 
first case of “withdrawal after rejection” in the history of EIA.163 The intension of the 
MOEA to withdraw the application was quite clear. What they had in mind was that, 
with a new EIA committee newly formed in August, there would be much better 
chances for most cases, like the FSP plan, to pass the EIA review. 
After the MOEA and EPA delayed existing agendas, the second step for the new 
EPA director, Chen Chongxin, was to ensure that the new EIA committee would make 
distinctive “progress.” To achieve this goal, the “trouble makers” ought to be 
excluded from the seventh-term EIA committee. According to the EIA Act, the EPA 
director was authorized to appoint the “selection committee,” the new director 
therefore had the privilege to influence the final list of EIA committee members. In 
August 2007, without surprise, the five former committee members coming from 
                                                 
163 UDN News, June 15, http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NAT1/3889143.shtml 
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environmental groups were removed off the committee.  
After the change in EIA personnel, the MOEA started promoting the FSP plan in 
the new committee. In the EIA session in October 2007, the EPA called for an 
unprecedented pre-session, for the EPA claimed “most members were newly 
appointed.” 164  During the session, the CEPD representative suggested that the 
previous reviews made by the EIA committee member last term on the FSP should be 
voided, since the composition of the EIA committee had changed greatly. He then 
suggested that, instead of having this plan to enter the endless robust review, the EIA 
committee should start a brand new review on the FSP case. This statement proved 
that the DPP administration had a clear plan to take advantage of administrative 
expediency and manipulated the EIA process. 
With MOEA’s strong solicitation, the new EIA committee decided to go along. In 
this pre-session, the new EIA committee overruled the previous decisions made by 
the last EIA committee and decided that the FSP could skip the two-step (robust) EIA 
review. The environmental groups and local oyster farmers thus launched a series of 
protests against this cursory decision. This strong local resistance forced the EIA 
members eventually to conclude that the FSP might have to go through the robust 
review. One month later, the EIA committee decided that the FSP plan had to go 
                                                 
164 http://www.coolloud.org.tw/node/10996 
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through the robust review any way, which meant it would take one year or longer to 
begin its construction. Particularly, the EIA committee asked the Formosa Group to 
conduct “sufficient communication” with local residents before sending further 
updated EIA proposals,165 since this company only communicated with local political 
factions without being accountable to communities.  
Transparency: A Black Box 
Before August 2007, all concerned stakeholders were allowed to participate in the 
EIA meetings in groups, though there were still some restrictions on their auditing 
status. After removing the “trouble makers” off the new EIA committee, the new EPA 
director, Chen, also amended the administrative codes of EIA meeting. The purpose 
of this amendment was to “facilitate” the review process through limiting the 
participation of civil groups into the meeting and through blocking information from 
releasing to the public. While this amendment served the name of “protecting the 
expert’s independence from auditing body”, the affected local communities were 




                                                 
165 UDN News, November 30, 2007. 
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Table 3.3 the Changes of Auditing Rules in the EIA in 2007 
Policies Chang (before 
August 2007) 
Chen (after August 2007) 
Numbers of review 
session 
7 the most 3 the most (plus 1 if 
necessary) 
Supplement of Data N/A Has to be completed in 30 
days. 
Audio Taping No Limit Only EPA staffs are allowed 





Assigned by the EPA 
director 
Source: Commercial Times, August 11, 2007 
In September 2007, a journalist intended to film the EIA review process on the 
FSP plan because the EPA kept the voting process under secrecy. She was soon 
banished from the EIA conference room and was announced as “unwelcome person” 
of the EPA. In October 2007, the EPA also initiated a draft of “Operational Codes on 
Auditing in the EIA” and set a stricter standard on auditing public. Some articles were 
seriously violating citizen’s rights of information and participation. Most import of all, 
according to this draft, the EPA could hold the right against all participating groups 
and media, since the EPA possessed the right to decide whether to open the EIA 
meeting to the public. In this black box, even the media was also deprived of their 
rights to report and to film the discussion in the EIA committee. These new rules 
illustrated that the EPA had treated civil groups, media and local communities as 
 128 
troublemakers, and decided to limit them from “intervening” the policy process. This 
arbitrary action induced widespread criticism, since it fundamentally violated the 
principle of EIA reviews. 
Table 3.4 the Draft of Operational Codes on Auditing in the EIA in October 2007 
 New Restrictions 
General 
auditing 
In a separate auditing room. Auditing groups can only watch images on 
the TV with no sounds. 
Participation A. Only one person can be invited to present in front of the EIA 
member per time, and the time limit was three minutes per person. The 
total presentation time is thirty minutes only. 
B. No oral presentations are allowed after first meeting. 
Transparency The EPA holds the right not to open the EIA meetings to the public 
when: 
A. The meetings were involved with business secrets of the 
developers, or the secrecy was requested by the developers. 
B. The EIA committee decided not to open them to the public. 
(removed in the final version) 
Media A. Journalists were not allowed to tape, film or photograph the 
meeting unless the chairperson approved the actions.  
B. All journalists have to leave during voting. 
C. All journalists were not allowed to clearly mention the names of 
the EIA members and their personal opinions. 
(removed in final version) 
Source: Compiled by the author 
In Feb 2008, the EPA announced the final version of the “Auditing Codes.” 
Although the EPA made some revision after a series of protests launched by 
journalists and civil groups, most of the restrictions related to the auditing still applied 
on civil participants. While the investor could participate into the EIA meetings as an 
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applicant, local communities and environmental groups found themselves very 
remote from the EIA decision-making process. As the media and concerned public 
were considered as impediments of EIA reviews, this threshold thus blocked public 
participation.   
Owing to this black box decision process, the media coverage of EIA news on 
the main media had decreased since then. Although the FSP plan eventually stop 
because the Formosa Group had little intention to start it in Taiwan, the impact of 
limiting civil participation in the policy process was enormous. It forced the civil 
groups to re-emphasize the significance of social activism and to adopt a more radical 
approach. The activists began to look for another battlefield in resisting state’s actions. 
In the following two chapters, the author will describe the consequence when civil 
groups gained experience in fighting against the state. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, some features could be drawn from the Taiwan’s FSP plan: 
First, though penetrated by the business interests, the Taiwan state had remained 
autonomous in shaping industrial policies. The techno-bureaucrats preserved their 
saliency in persuading the politicians in driving more development based on previous 
patterns. 
Second, with democratic transition, the penetrative capacity of Taiwan state into 
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the industrial sector and local polities by the central state was weakened. It had 
caused a huge amount of uncertainty in establishing new national plans. 
Third, while the legacy of developmental state still existed, the state bureaucracy 
was obsessed with previous developing patterns. They tended to promote 
capital-intensive plans in stimulating the GDP, but failed to evaluate the market 
efficiency of the FSP plan. The rational calculation was compromised by their 
political intention in increasing domestic capitals. The political leaders and 
techno-bureaucracy found their common grounds on this capital-intensive investment, 
while this investment may seem less cost-effective. 
Fourth, the emerging deliberation and public monitoring through EIA reviews was 
proven significant in delaying inefficient FSP plan. Although the legacy of 
authoritarian developmental state rendered the state less tolerant in coordinating 
different agendas in democratic regime, the state’s attempt in evading monitoring 
from public and checking mechanisms, though revealed state’s previous 
unaccountability in promoting the FSP plan in an arbitrary way, eventually triggered 
more local resistance. This coercive self-examination contributed a more 
comprehensive and responsible review of state’s policy on the steel sector.  
The FSP plan was a starting point for the Taiwan state to engage with the public 
through a deliberative institution. However, the politicians and bureaucrats found the 
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state apparatus incapable to remain efficient in front of public checks or local 
resistances brought by democratic transition. Therefore, the politicians decided to 
shut the policy door from the public. This retrogress in democratic transition proved 
that the Taiwan’s developmental state was forced to adapt, though the legacy of 
developmental state render the state more inclined to adopt a undemocratic measure 
to solve the problems occurred in a democratic regime. 
However, owing to the deliberative attempts from civil groups and EIA members, 
the Formosa Group eventually dropped this inefficient plan while expecting a long 
fight in the EIA ahead. At the end of 2007, with the swinging situation in the EIA 
reviews on the FSP plan, the DPP high-ranked officials asserted that the pressure from 
environmental groups was “very huge,” and the administration had expected a much 
longer battle for the FSP plan.166 In other words, it was the civil participation through 
the EIA review, though limited by the state, helped to correct the policy flaws made 
by the state. 
The resistance from environmental activist and local communities either within or 
outside the EIA channel was proven significant when the state decided to intervene 
for the EIA reviews. The challenges against the FSP plan eventually led to a 
comprehensive industrial policy EIA on the steel industry, because the MOEA was 
                                                 
166 Commercial Times, November 30, 2007. 
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forced to formulate an EIA report on a policy scope. The PERSI report filed by the 
MOEA in 2010, although was still criticized by the civil groups, later proved that 
building a grand-scale FSP was not Taiwan’s optimal choice. In contrast, a structural 
change in this sector may be a more important direction to go. 
That suggested that the previous developmental state had its limit while new kinds 
of development were emerging, especially when democratic transition had 
undermined the state’s control on local politics and private sectors. Due to the 
intention to control capital, the state render itself enthusiastic in promoting 
capital-intensive programs such as FSP with less concerns on economic efficiency. It 
was the civil participation and institutional monitoring complementing the “vacuum 
of deliberation and accountability” of developmental states.  
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Chapter 4 the Central Taiwan Science Park:  
the Holi and the Erlin plans 
 
Introduction 
Taiwan’s LCD industry started at 1997 by receiving technical assistance of 
Japanese corporations, and emerged as a key sector in Taiwan during this decade. 
This sector in Taiwan has consisted of more than forty percent of the total LCD 
production in the global market. In the 2008 financial crisis, Taiwan’s LCD sector 
was seriously hit by global economic recession. In order to overcome the problem of 
oversupply, most LCD enterprises in Taiwan believed that migration to China was an 
inevitable resolution, for China has increasingly become the biggest market of LCD 
products. 
To reduce the production costs, the LCD sector in Taiwan has gradually 
increased their investment in China in the past decade. According to Taiwan’s law, the 
capital outflow to China was an issue of national security, and therefore the 
Investment Review Committee (IRC, a coordination platform among government 
agencies) must review it. Because TFT-LCD industry was a strategic sector in 
Taiwan’s economic plan, Taiwan’s LCD industries were only allowed to set up 
assembling facilities, which was less associated with technical innovation, in China. 
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Any other direct investments of the LCD sector in China were prohibited by the 
Taiwan state before 2010. 
According to the research from the Industrial Economics and Knowledge Center 
(IEK), the growth of the LCD TV market in China was estimated to reach 45.7% 
from 2006 to 2011.167 To meet this grand demand, China has already started to 
develop its own LCD industry. Korean LCD corporations, which are the top 
competitors of Taiwan’s LCD industry, also began their industry migration into China 
in 2009. Therefore, the domestic LCD providers in Taiwan have constantly requested 
the government to lift the ban, since they planned to make new investments in China 
to keep up with their Chinese and Korean competitors. They asked the government to 
approve their direct investment by directly establishing brand new supply chains in 
China. Due to the great pressure from this industry, the Taiwan government finally 
opened a window. The LCD industry was allowed to send applications of their 
cross-strait investment plans to the IRC after February 2010. The biggest LCD firm in 
Taiwan, the AU Optronics Corporation (AUO Group) thus delivered the first 
cross-strait investment initiation in Kungshan, China. 
Due to urgent pressure of capital outflow, the Taiwan state launched an “N-1” 
policy to make sure that the government could keep a number of private capital and 
                                                 
167 www.itis.org.tw/rptDetailFree.screen?rptidno=591362006 
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the latest technology of this sector in Taiwan. The primary goal for the MOEA’s 
“N-1” doctrine was to ask those migrating firms to establish more advanced facilities 
in Taiwan before their investment in China could be approved. This would assure that 
the LCD industry in Taiwan would always lead “one generation gap” on technology 
innovation. However, it was quite inefficient to disperse manufacturing facilities in 
Taiwan AND China; furthermore, this” safe deposit” may take three or four years to 
be realized. The huge cost of time may lessen the capability of Taiwanese firms to 
embrace this emerging Chinese market. 
In order to legitimize the AUO’s capital migration to China, the Taiwan state 
reached an agreement with the AUO. The AUO had to conduct sufficient domestic 
investments in Taiwan before they could start their Kungshan plan in China. To meet 
AUO’s demand, the state thus set up two industrial plans in central Taiwan, allowing 
the AUO to conduct necessary “safe deposits” in Taiwan before they could leave. 
However, this haste policy meant to customize for the AUO neglected the 
environmental capacity and local livelihood in the designated sites. Both cases thus 
encountered huge challenges in the EIA and the APC reviews, for the external costs 
may be beyond the possible gain brought by both industrial plans made out of 
political compromises. 
Although the political leaders exerted political intervention and eventually 
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succeeded in evading the monitoring from the checking mechanisms, civil groups still 
filed a series of administrative lawsuits for the state’s failing to be accountable to the 
monitoring institutions. Despite that the state fought against the court from 2007 to 
2010, the final court order from the Supreme Court in July 2010 clearly commanded 
the state to stop both plans. The state was obliged to lift the ban in a faster pace, since 
the state seemed incapable of saving the AUO’s capital by offering supporting 
industrial plans. In December 2010, the Taiwan state approved the AUO’s Kungshan 
plan. Although the AUO still promised to continue their investment in Taiwan after 
Kungshan plan started, the nature of the developmental state seemed to be forced to 
transform in this event.    
The Nurturing Period: The AUO and the Holi-Chixing plan 
In 2003, the AUO one of the top producers of TFT-LCD panels, planned to 
establish new facilities inside the Central Taiwan science park (CTSP). Because the 
AUO has been a giant in the sector of advanced optoelectronics, the MOEA and the 
CTSP management unit were keen to invite the AUO to expand their production in 
the CTSP. This new expansion was referred as the second expansion (also called “the 
Third Period” of CTSP). Because this expansion mainly operated on two different 
farmlands (Holi and Chixing), this expansion was also called “Holi-Chixing plan.” 
This plan was a huge project with up to 246 operating hectares of land needed. The 
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state-owned Taiwan Sugar Company (TS afterwards) owned most of the lands. 
In 2002, the DPP administration delivered a grand national development plan: 
“Two Trillions, Twin Stars,” (TTTS) stating the government’s intention to support 
four industrial sectors: semi-conductors, TFT/Panels, biochemistry, and digital 
contents. The goals of this plan are to increase investment amount to “two trillions” 
NT dollars in 2006 for the former two sectors, and to develop the latter two as “star 
sectors” in the future. To reach this goal, it requires huge investment from local 
enterprises.  
Owing to the governmental patronage, the investment of the AUO climbed up to 
an amount of 0.2 trillion NT dollars, which made the AUO the most prominent role in 
the CTSP in 2003.168 From 2002 to 2005, the TFT/Panel industries financed 0.6 
trillion NT dollars from Taiwan’s banks. The DPP administration also asked the banks 
to continue their loans to the TFT industries even during financial difficulties in 
2005. 169  The fact showed the DPP’s intention in developing TFT Panel/LCD 
industries during their term. By persuading the banks to grant huge loans to these 
industries, the DPP was aimed to fortify this new star sector wielding its political 
influence. 
 
                                                 
168 Data from MOEA, http://w2kdmz1.moea.gov.tw/user/news/detail-1.asp?kind=&id=6665  
169 New Taiwan, Vol 473. http://www.newtaiwan.com.tw/bulletinview.jsp?bulletinid=21798 
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Table 4.1 Four Goals of TTTS regarding the TFT Industry 
 Goals of TTTS Results 
1 Taiwan as the biggest supplier in the global TFT market Top 1 since 2007 
2 Taiwan as the major developer in the TFT technology Considered done 
3 The output value of the TFT industry reaching 1.37 trillion NT in 
2006 
1.64 Trillion NT in 2007 
4 The private investment in the TFT industry reaching 0.35 trillion 
NT through 2002 to 2007 
Totally 1.4 trillion NT 
during 2002 to 2007 
Source: Data compiled by the author170 
In 2006, the AUO planned to build a 7.5th-generation (changed to 
8.5th-generation later) plant in Holi-Chixing to increase their market share. The 
rationale behind the Holi-Chixing plan was to boost the AUO’s productivity to 
decrease the average costs of LCD products. This expansive policy resulted from a 
price war between Taiwan and Korean occurring in 2005 and the outlook of a 
constant global economic boom.  
On account of the significance of the LCD sector in Taiwan, the MOEA and the 
National Science Council (NSC, which was in charge of science parks171) soon 
approved this investment. In order for the developer to realize this investment, they 
still required (1) the construction license issued from local counties; (2) the approval 
of the EIA and the APC reviews. The former was highly associated with the state’s 
                                                 
170 New Taiwan, Vol 631, http://www.newtaiwan.com.tw/bulletinview.jsp?bulletinid=78839 
171 In Taiwan, science parks are considered science-related issues and therefore are under the operation 
of the NSC. Despite the commercial characteristics of science parks, the establishment of a science 
park is associated with the state’s investment. (ex: economical rents and low taxes for certain business 
sectors.) In this case, the establishment of the CTSP was related to the NSC and CCP (Committee of 
Construction and Planning) based on the potential of incoming investments. 
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capacity to penetrate into local politics, and the latter was a task examining the state’s 
capacity in terms of deliberation and accountability. 
While local leaders in both Taichung and Zhanghua county were very 
enthusiastic in inviting the AUO’s capital into their borders, the checking reviews 
from the APC and the EIA committee turned out to be critical to the possibility of the 
realization of these industrial plans, for both institutions were set to examine the 
external costs and opportunity costs possibly produced by the these industrial plans.  
A series of disputes on environmental and area planning then were aroused 
because of the huge potential health risks and unjust rules of land acquisition.172 
Local farmers were suspicious about these developing actions, particularly because of 
the AUO’s previous unsatisfactory records on environmental protection. Besides, the 
local farmers and activists used the social justice issue brought by land acquisition as 
leverage to rally against these plans.173 In addition, the EIA committee during 2005 
to 2007 included some prestigious environmental activists and therefore possessed 
higher autonomy. This strong monitoring mechanism has conflicted with the state’s 
                                                 
172 Both farmlands were located in the upstream of Daan River and Dajia River, two primary rivers 
nurturing the agricultural lifestyle in central Taiwan. Therefore, the adjacent area was highly 
ecologically sensitive. The introduction of TFT-LCD industries into this area can be a very 
controversial decision, in the regard of protection of ecology and the agricultural sector. 
173 There was a justice issue behind land acquisition. The Taiwan government can acquire private 
lands coercively by law. According to Taiwan’s Land Acquisition Act, the acquisition of private lands 
can be done only for “public interests.” However, the objective of the creation of the CTSP was in 
dispute, since the establishment of the CTSP can be theoretically irrelevant from public interests. After 
all, the government was planning to handover the land to a corporation. Although the local county has 
the power to proceed the land acquisition, this action is hardly a legitimate mean under the name of 
“public interests.” 
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intention to nurture this sector. Therefore, the EIA became the biggest battlefield for 
this investment.  
Under Premier’s Su’s strong intervention, the EPA held five review meetings 
consecutively during the course of three months in 2006. With a series of political 
interventions and some political uproar, the EIA committee finally approved these 
plans. Some EIA members resigned from their positions and delivered an 
announcement to the public claiming that “the EIA review was dead,” condemning 
the DPP’s intervention to independent reviews. 
This arbitrary administrative intervention not only triggered serious antagonism 
between the DPP government and environmental groups,174 it also brought about 
unfavorable outcomes for the state developing this industrial sector in the future. 
After losing battles in the EIA, environmental groups filed a civil lawsuit to Taipei’s 
administrative court accusing the state failing in conducting necessary assessment on 
health risks probably caused by TFT factories in the Holi-Chixing plan.  
In January 2008, the Taipei court ruled that the EIA review made in 2006 was 
incomplete since the assessment of health risks of local communities was ignored. 
Therefore, the court rescinded the conclusion made by the EIA committee in 2006 
                                                 
174 When this review was over, some committee members resigned, and some of them announced that 
the “EIA was dead.” They put blames on the EPA head Chang, and Chang even filed a lawsuit against 
one of the environmentalists for this comment. 
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and demanded the committee to review the case again.175 Following the spirit of this 
verdict, the previous permission granted to the developer to start Holi-Chixing plan 
was also invalid.176  
In other words, according to the court order, the administration may need to stop 
the construction in Holi-Chixing until a robust review suggested that these activities 
were safe. This was the first lawsuit case in the Taiwan history that 
environmental groups successfully stopped the construction project through 
legal system. 
 By the moment the court made the order in 2008, the AUO has not conducted 
massive construction activities in Holi. If the EPA had put a stop on the developing 
actions, the Holi-Chixing could have been stopped immediately with fewer costs 
expensed. However, the EPA decided to appeal in 2008.177 The appeal took another 
two years, which allowed the AUO to proceed the construction for another two years.  
Limiting the Capital Outflow: the Erlin plan 
The TFT sector in Taiwan has grown as the top leader globally in 2007, while 
the Korean companies reclaimed the title since 2008. The competition between 
                                                 
175 The judge maintained that, according to the Article 14 in EIA Act, the second-step (robust) review 
might be needed if the EIA members considered that there was a public risk concern in the 
development activities. 
176 The Article 14 in the EIA Act says: “The industry competent authority may not grant permission for 
a development activity prior to the completion of an environmental impact statement review or the 
authorization of an environmental impact assessment report; permission granted in violation of this 
regulation shall be invalid.” 
177 The EPA claimed that they had done appropriate measures because the court decision was not final 
in 2008. 
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Taiwan and Korea has been particularly intense, with China chasing behind. The 
investment from the DPP administration in the TFT industry paid off, but the cost was 
also extremely high in the 2008 crisis. 
With China’s rapid economic growth, it appeared a potentially huge market for 
LCD products. The AUO has conducted a series of medium-sized investments in 
China since 2001, and it determined that the Chinese market had gained its salience 
after the global financial crisis in 2008.178 The Topo Research Institute has indicated 
that Taiwan’s LCD productions can manage to consist of 34% to 37% of the global 
market share “only if” they start to migrate to China. Otherwise, Taiwan’s LCD sector 
will soon be marginalized by Korean competitors.179 
Responding to the trend of capital migration worldwide, the Taiwan state seemed 
to be forced to open the opportunities for Taiwan’s LCD enterprises to “go west.” 
However, the state demanded the developers to conduct investment in more advanced 
facilities before investing in China. The MOEA thus facilitated the CTSP’s third 
expansion, trying to leave some of the AUO’s investments in CTSP before their 
migration. 
 
                                                 
178 The Chinese market only consisted of less than ten percent of the AUO’s sales of LCD products 
before 2008, but it started to surpass twenty-five percent after 2008. Wang News(旺報）, January 29th, 
2010. 
179 Marbo Magazine. http://estock.marbo.com.tw/asp/board/v_subject.asp?BoardID=&ID=5608709 
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 Table 4.2 the History of the CTSP 
The Evolution of the CTSP Starting Year Locations 
The Original CTSP 2003 Xitun, Taichung City 
The First Expansion 2004 Daya, Taichung County 
The Second Expansion 2006 Holi-Chixing, Taichung County 
The Third Expansion 2009 Erlin, Zhanghua County 
Sources: Compiled by the author. 
Again, after the MOEA approved this investment, the local counties did not 
seem to be obstacles implementing the state’s policies, since most local political 
leaders all showed their enthusiasm in welcoming this high-tech, capital-intensive 
investment.180 As the AUO’s preferred Erlin (in Zhanghua County) as its industrial 
base, it was chosen as the planned site for the CTSP’s third expansion. 
However, the history repeated itself in 2008. Because Erlin was also 
characterized for its fine agricultural production and ecological weakness, similar 
battles thus occurred in both the APC and EIA committees. Given the highly 
controversial environmental risks and assertive protests from the local farmers, the 
EIA review on Erlin encountered stagnancy after six sessions. Normally Erlin plan 
would have to go through a second-stage EIA review, since the EIA member failed to 
reach agreements. However, in October 2009, the new Premier Wu decided to ensure 
the passing of the EIA review of the Erlin plan by the end of 2009. With strong 
coercion manipulated by the Premier, the EIA committee did approve this case by the 
                                                 
180 Epoch News, August 16, 2008. http://www.epochtimes.com.au/b5/8/8/15/n2230134.htm 
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end of 2009, while with nineteen conditions for the AUO to follow. Just as what they 
did in dealing with the Holi-Chixing case, this time, environmental activists also filed 
a lawsuit. 
In February 2010, the Taiwan Supreme Court officially overruled the EPA’s 
appeal on Holi-Chixing case and concluded that the EIA’s decision on Chixing was 
invalid and needed to be rescinded. In July 2010, the Supreme Court gave a clear 
order that both Holi-Chixing and Erlin plans must be stopped since the EIA 
committee failed to conduct necessary reviews to complete this procedure. Although 
the EPA and the CTSP office tried to fight against the Supreme Court, the court order 
has created a crisis for the AUO: If the AUO could not complete the domestic 
investment in time, their migration schedule will inevitably be delayed. However, the 
clock was ticking for the AUO, since there were only two licenses on high-generation 
LCD manufacturing lines left issued by the Chinese government.181 The AUO thus 
revealed great grievances against the system’s inconsistency. In December 2010, the 
European Union fined the AUO and the Chimei, the top two LCD enterprises in 
Taiwan, because they violated EU’s Anti-Trust Act. The difficult situation of the LCD 
sector induced the state to lift the ban in a faster pace.182 In the same month, the 
Taiwan state announced that the AUO was allowed to start their Kungshan plan in 




182 Economic Daily, August 5th, 2010. 
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China, while the state expected the AUO’s investment plan in Holi-Chixing and Erlin 
still be realized. 
State’s Autonomy  
Throughout the last decade, the LCD sector has been the star sector in Taiwan. 
The state’s support of the LCD sector basically came from the previous legacy of the 
developmental state. Under four years of cultivation, this sector soon grabbed forty 
percent of the global market share in 2004 and remained strong ever since. In the 
initial stage of its development, the state exerted their political influence to give huge 
loans to this sector, provide inexpensive rents and credited tax bonus to this sector, 
due to its “high-tech” feature.   
With the end of the disastrous economic crisis in 2008, the market price of TFT 
Panels finally rose up enormously in 2009, mostly because China delivered an 
“electronics into the countryside” plan. This plan buffered the over-production 
pressure in the TFT sector in Taiwan and Korea and saved this sector from 
self-destruction. To put it more clearly, since the TFT/LCD market in developed 
countries has nearly been saturated, the new needs in rural China became an effective 
remedy for this sector. With the fast growing needs in TFT/LCD products in China, it 
was reasonable and rational that the TFT sector in Taiwan was eager to move their 
operation centers and manufacturing bases across the Strait. For the AUO, the market 
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in China appeared to be increasingly important; therefore, a large-scaled industrial 
migration to China is foreseeable. 
Table 4.3 the Ratio of the Chinese Market in the AUO’s Profit Structure  
2008 2009 2010 2012 
3% 25% 30% (estimated) The Biggest market 
Source: the AUO Corporation 
In mid-2009, the AUO has spread the news that they would establish three new 
facilities in China. At the same time, the TFT sector singled out that “migrating to 
China” was an inevitable tendency in the future. In February 2010, following the 
trend, the AUO became the first TFT company to apply for the cross-Strait investment 
plan (the Kungshan plan in China), on a facility producing the 7.5th-generation TFT 
Panels (the same facility as in the Holi-Chixing plan).  
In Taiwan, all grand-scaled investments from Taiwanese companies to China 
have to be approved by the Investment Review Committee (IRC). The IRC would 
make decisions based on the characters of that particular sector and the technology 
level of the facilities that the company would establish in China. Due to the fear of 
losing capital to China, the investment in high-technology products in China has 
always been a sensitive issue both politically and socially. 
The AUO urged the state to lift the ban without setting up any limitation on the 
technology gap between different facilities across the Strait, since the AUO supposed 
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that migration to China was the most possible survival strategy for Taiwan’s TFT 
sector. At the same time, the Taiwan government also realized that the requests of 
Taiwan’s TFT sector were pragmatic, since grabbing the Chinese market and 
excluding competition from Korea and the Chinese TFT industry would be very 
crucial to Taiwan’s TFT sector in the future. Viewing the fact that the Korean 
government began approving Korean TFT sectors for starting investment in China, 
and that China had started to nurture its own LCD industry, the Taiwanese 
government acknowledged that this “west-forward” move was inevitable.183 
The government then announced that the ban on Taiwanese TFT companies’ 
migration to China could be lifted only if these corporations promised to invest in 
better facilities and technologies in Taiwan. In order for the AUO and other TFT 
corporations to invest in China, the investors must meet two criteria: (1) no more than 
three new facilities can be established in China at a time, (2) there must be at least 
one generation gap between the newest facilities in Taiwan and the ones in China.184 
The latter was called “N-1 policy.” This deal can be considered an exchange of 
interests between the Taiwan state and the TFT sector. 
The AUO’s president, Lee, admitted that the Erlin plan was a bargaining chip, 
for the government’s top concern was to keep domestic capital and technology 
                                                 
183 China Times, February 10, 2010.  
184 http://news.cts.com.tw/cnyes/money/201002/201002260417509.html 
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advantage in Taiwan during the LCD sector’s migration to China. In March 2010, the 
spokesperson of NSC also admitted that the goal of the Erlin plan was to echo the 
policy “Leave the Roots in Taiwan185,” which was to prevent private investment from 
flowing to China. In other words, the government’s intention in bolstering Holi 
and Erlin plans may be associated with the state’s intention to control domestic 
capital from overwhelmingly fleeing to China. Therefore, both the Holi-Chixing 
and Erlin plans stood for a reciprocal optimal point for the Taiwan state and private 
investors in the negotiation of capital outflow. 
While the Premier Wu and the MOEA requested that the AUO fulfill its 
commitment, by launching the Erlin and Holi-Chixing plans in Taiwan, both plans 
needed the EIA’s approvals. The state realized that if these plans were held due to the 
gridlock in the EIA or the judicial system, the government would run out of 
bargaining chips negotiating with the AUO. This will also further legitimize a series 
of potential migration decisions of Taiwan’s LCD companies to China. Therefore, the 
Taiwan state was anxious in excluding environmental concerns from the decision 
process in order to allow the Erlin plan to begin as soon as possible.186 This anxiety 
                                                 
185 Central News Agency, March 16, 2010, 
http://www.cna.com.tw/ShowNews/Detail.aspx?pNewsID=201003160199&pType0=aALL&pTypeSel
=0 
186 Although the cash inflow of Taiwanese corporation to China requires the approval of IRC; the fact 
is that corporations can sometimes evade these rules by exploiting loopholes, such as setting up a new 
company registering overseas or seeking for alliances with Chinese enterprises. The Taiwan 
government, nonetheless, can pick on certain big enterprises in certain occasions if politicians 
determine to punish the corporations, which “smuggle” their capital into China. This sort of 
punishment happened several time during the DPP’s term since the DPP constantly held a more 
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to control capital contributed to the state’s zealous support of the CTSP’s expansion.  
Within 2010, the AUO’s investing project in China, estimated three-billion USD, 
was rejected by the MOEA twice, for the MOEA claimed that the AUO had been 
vague about its preliminary investment in Taiwan. The MOEA suspected that the 
AUO was actually using the Erlin plan as a stepping-stone to China without making 
credible pledges on investment in the Erlin plan. The Taiwan state would like to make 
sure that the AUO had made most of the deal, since the state understood that the 
AUO’s top goal was their market in China. It was very likely for the AUO to make a 
fake promise in Erlin in trade of a free pass to China.  
In fact, some found it likely that the AUO “bluffed” on the Erlin plan, because 
the AUO removed its business branch in Erlin after the MOEA’s official approval of 
the Plan. The rumor inside the TFT sector indicated that the AUO channeled its 
resources to China, focusing on setting up their China branch. There was no recruiting 
based on future facilities in Erlin undertaken, and the company showed few interests 
in starting the Erlin plan. Rather, the AUO paid more attention to preparing for 
migration in 2010 even when their Kunshan Plan in China was still on hold. 
  Although the AUO often claimed that they would have the facilities finished 
as soon as possible, they did not make great efforts in getting the new facilities in 
                                                                                                                                           
conserve and more hostile attitude against China. 
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order. After delivering the application, the AUO re-arranged the agenda and the staff 
in 2010. The construction in Holi-Chixing was on hold, and the Erlin plan was even 
removed from the main agenda of the company187. The AUO group seemed to put 
most of their efforts on the expansion in China rather than to continue both plans in 
Taiwan. 
When questioned, the AUO appeared very reserved on the operation of the Erlin 
plan. In March 2010, the AUO announced that the construction in Erlin, “would not 
happen this year, and maybe next year to the soonest. We will see!188” In fact, far 
from one year earlier, the AUO has already indicated that the AUO would delay the 
construction of Erlin facilities for from six months to one year.189 That means the 
AUO did not plan to proceed the construction anytime soon.  
The Taiwan state was also aware of the intention of the AUO. In July 2010, the 
vice Director of the MOEA, Huang, claimed that the AUO needed to “clearly 
understand that the original 12.5 billion investment the AUO promised to offer could 
not shrink” before the state would lift the ban on capital migration.190 The AUO had 
to comply with the government’s terms and submitted a new plan which included the 
construction of four 10th-generation plants and two 11th-generation plants, plus two 
                                                 
187 It was based on the interview to the employees in the TFT sector. 
188 Economic Daily, March 18, 2010. 





solar power plants. The amount of these new investments will cost the AUO totally 17 
billion USD in the CTSP Erlin plan. Although the AUO has made a huge compromise, 
the MOEA was still very reluctant to approve this resolution, since there were no 
agreements on the feasibility of these plans.  
In December 2010, the AUO and two other Taiwanese TFT corporations were 
fined by the European Union because of their violation of the Anti-Trust law. As a 
result of this “cold winter” of Taiwan’s TFT sector brought by EU’s heavy fine, a 
notable TFT entrepreneur in Taiwan criticized the Taiwanese government for their 
slow response to the EU’s anti-trust investigation. To alleviate the pressure from the 
TFT sector, the state finally approved the AUO’s migration plan, because the legal 
problem of EIA review for the Erlin plan had kept the AUO from starting their plans 
in time. In order to stand along with the TFT sector, the Premier and the MOEA 








Table 4.4 Timeline of the AUO’s Application for the Kungshan plan 
2010. 03. The AUO sent the application for building two 7.5th-generation LCD 
facilities in Kungshan, China. The investment amount was estimated 
around three billion USD. This was the first cross-Strait application in the 
TFT sector. 
2010. 04. The MOEA requested the AUO to clarify their preliminary investments in 
the CTSP. 
2010. 06. The IRC considered that the object of the AUO’s investment in Taiwan 
unclear and asked the AUO to suffice the terms. 
2010.08. The AUO promised a bigger plan in the CTSP: Two 11th-generation plants 
and two solar power plants would be built. 
2010.12. The AUO was fined by the EU. 
2010.12. The IRC approved the AUO’s Kunshan plan. 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
For the Taiwan state, this deal may help to preserve most of the AUO’s capital 
and its most updated technology in Taiwan. However, the state’s delaying capital 
outflow may cost Taiwan’s TFT sector a preemptive status within the competition in 
the Chinese market. From the AUO’s view, Holi-Chixing and Erlin plans were just 
stepping-stones on its way to the Chinese market. Starting new prospects in China 
would as soon as possible would give the AUO a far better opportunity to grasp the 
new Chinese market since its Taiwanese opponents were forbidden to migrate 
identical technologies to China.191 By limiting the AUO’s capital mobility, the state 
succeeded in showing their autonomy in regulating the powerful TFT sector.  
                                                 
191 For an example, the AUO’s top competitor in Taiwan, Chimei, was only allowed to set up 
6th-generation facilities in China. That gave the AUO an advantage to stand a more competitive 
position. 
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State’s Penetrative Power 
Like in other major industrial projects, local factions and political strongmen 
also played a role in these CTSP struggles. However, it was very fortunate for the 
state in the CTSP case since most local counties in central Taiwan appeared very 
positive toward these development plans. 
Weak Penetration to Local Politics and the Myth of Science Parks 
Earlier in 2004, the head of Taichung County, Huang Zhuongsheng started to 
show his interests in having the CTSP expanded in Holi. Through 2004 to 2006, 
Huang was keen in competing for the CTSP’s second expansion and promised that 
the Taichung County would clear out all obstacles by May 2005. To compete with his 
counterpart, the head of Zhanghua County, Zhuo, has also been zealous in having the 
third expansion of the CTSP settling in Zhanghua. Both counties had to compete with 
five other candidate sites in the selection process. Both county heads promised to 
tackle all the local administrative measures and to make their counties sites that are 
more suitable for the corporations.  
Both Huang and Zhuo considered the CTSP’s expansion crucial points for their 
counties’ prosperity. In 2006, fearing that the Holi-Chixing plan might encounter 
environmental gridlocks in the EIA review, Huang decided to defend the Holi plan in 
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the EPA.192 Huang argued that the initiation of the Holi Plan would effectively reduce 
the unemployment rate in Taichung County.193 Likewise, Zhuo also endeavored to 
promote the Erlin plan.194 When the Erlin plan faced challenges in the EIA review, 
Zhuo paid visits to different agencies to makes sure that this case could come through. 
He not only repetitively urged the Premier to facilitate the process, but also visited the 
CEO of the AUO, Lee, to stabilize this major developer.195 
In fact, Huang and Zhuo were not the only county heads that never doubted 
about the benefit of having high-tech industries within the county borders, and the 
state also has paid for that myth. To be more concise, the establishment of science 
parks was managed by “The Developing and Operational Fund for the Science Parks” 
in the NSC. However, due to the continuous spending on the construction plans of 
science parks in rural counties during 2000-2008, the funds were in deficit up to 0.112 
trillion NT dollars in 2009. Furthermore, the NSC still expected to have another debt 
of 7.3 billion NT dollars in 2010. According to an estimate from the EIA members, 
the government had to pay 0.2 billion NT dollars for each acre of land providing to 
the developers, not yet including the interests generated from the debt (up to 3 billion 
per year196). However, the usage of science parks was not well-planned and thus not 
                                                 
192 UDN News. http://pro.udnjob.com/mag2/it/storypage.jsp?f_ART_ID=24806 
193 The CTSP website. http://www.ctsp.gov.tw/kids/06ctsp/06_a_main.aspx?sn=113 
194 Premier Liu said that during his tour in Erlin Site. 
http://www.eycc.ey.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=44345&ctNode=1096&mp=1 
195 Economics Daily, September 19th, 2009. 
196 New Taiwan Magazine, “EIA Was Silenced in CTSP,” Vol 524, April 06, 2006. 
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necessarily cost efficient. For example, there were still two science parks (in Yilan 
and Tonlou) waiting for their first clients.  
The chairman of the NSC, Lee Luochuan, stated that the establishment of the 
science park could be very manipulative in the decision-making process. According to 
him, there were consistent interventions from Premiers and Presidents in the planning 
process of science parks.197 Therefore, the professionalism in site selection was 
sometimes overwhelmed by political concerns, mostly because of local demands for 
having their own science parks. Although Lee promised to change the pattern of 
decision-making, the Erlin plan still repeated the previous pattern. 
In the CTSP, the usage of this grand facility seemed not paying off. Up to 2010, 
the original and the following two expansions of the CTSP were NOT well utilized. 
The ratio of land usage by developers reached only 41.04%.198 It indicated that the 
Erlin plan might not be necessary in this regard, since the funds were in great deficit 
and the slots in the CTSP were not full yet. Nonetheless, the CTSP claimed to the 
media that the land usage of the CTSP has reached 90%, and therefore the expansion 
to Erlin was a necessary move. However, the indicators could be manipulated by 
creating industrial plans that did not exist. 
The myth about science parks led to the competition among local political 
                                                 
197 China Times, May 24th, 2008. 
198 From the CTSP’s report submitted to the Legislative Yuan, 
http://www.peopo.org/shuchuan/post/46518. On the CTSP’s website, there was only 54.95 % of land 
usage in the CTSP in 2009.  
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figures for establishing industrial projects, especially for the Erlin project. In a series 
of EIA reviews held in 2008 and 2009, Zhuo and most Erlin political figures always 
claimed that “almost 100% of the Erlin residents welcome this project.”199 They 
treated this investment as a breakthrough to prosperity. Although environmental 
groups have been very suspicious about the amount of job opportunities that can be 
created by the AUO’s new plans, given the fact that job positions in high-tech 
facilities may not be available for local farmers, having a high-tech science park in 
the county was considered a fashion in reaching prosperity. Furthermore, job 
opportunities might not really be the politicians’ concern; instead, the potentially 
soaring value of land was. 
Both the realty business circle and the county would benefit from the land 
appreciation caused by investment. Not only would the county impose more taxes on 
more expensive lands, local county heads could treat the increase of the tax revenue 
as one of his “credits,” showing his political performance. In fact, both Huang and 
Zhuo did consider the CTSP’s expansion a great achievement in their political career 
and continued to publicize it during the 2009 election. 
Land Speculation by the Investing Plans 
In terms of the Holi Plan, Huang stated that the CTSP’s first expansion has 
                                                 
199 Taiwan Lihpao, December 28, 2009. http://books.sina.com.tw/article/20091228/2612416.html 
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brought a wave of ‘prosperity” in Taichung County, since the land price in some areas 
almost doubled.200 According to the “Urban Land Price Index” published by the 
Department of Land Administration in Taiwan, while the land price in the rest of 
Taichung County stayed stable through 2003 to 2007, the land price in all Holi went 
up extraordinarily, and the number of realty purchases in this area also grew fast201. 
Table 4.5 the Change of Industrial Land Prices in Holi (Compared with another Four 
Major Cities in Zhanghua) 
 March 2003 March 2005 March 2006 March 2007 Sep. 2007 Growth 
Rate 
Holi 15927 17100 19326 21576 23679 48% 
Fongyuan 26790 26263 26993 27471 27560 2.8% 
Tangzhi 25938 27711 28040 27422 27476 6% 
Daya 21732 24339 23795 23420 22892 5.3% 
Shenggang 21544 21065 20651 19782 23679 10% 
Source: http://www.land.moi.gov.tw/filelink/uploadlink-548.pdf  
Unit: NT dollars per one square meter (1 US dollar equals to 32 NT dollars roughly) 
From the statistics above, we do see an influence of the CTSP on the land price 
in Holi area. Even most of the land in Holi area was acquired from Taiwan Sugar, the 
land prices for industrial use still increased up to 50% within four years, particularly 
after 2006, when the Holi Plan was approved by the EIA review. Compared with 
other cities, the big investment seems to be a very effective way to booster land prices 
and shape an image of prosperity within a very short time. The effect occurred even 
                                                 
200 It was based on the interview in the Central News Agency with Huang in 2005. September 06, 
2005. 
201 Please refer to the Urban Land Price Index Report published by the Land Administration, 
http://www.land.moi.gov.tw/filelink/uploadlink-545.pdf  
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before the developer threw the first penny in the project, since local speculators had 
smelled potential business profits. 
Holi and the previous CTSP plans provided examples of quick development 
exploited by speculators. It became a panacea for the development of poor areas. 
When the CTSP was planning for its third expansion, given the successful example of 
Holi, some political figures in rural Taichung urged the county head to have Taichung 
County to be chosen as the site again. The adjacent counties also strived for this cure. 
The AUO’s expansion cast similar spell on Erlin, too. Ever since the AUO 
declared that Erlin would be the site for the CTSP’s fourth expansion, the price of 
land in Erlin area has risen in considerable rates. The director of land administration 
office in Erlin indicated that while realty investors showed very few interests before 
the CTSP’s announcement, the price of farmlands as mortgage has doubled.202 
Because Erlin has been a relatively low-income agricultural area, the increasing land 
values caused by the Erlin plan played significant incentives for local businessmen to 
support this project, especially for those who have invested in farmlands. 
Myth beyond Local Factions and Elections 
In the head election of Zhanghua County in 2009, the DPP candidate Wong 
claimed that there was a partisan conspiracy behind Zhuo’s enthusiasm to attract the 
                                                 




CTSP’s expansion to Erlin. According to Wong, the CTSP’s expansion to Zhanghua 
has been planned in Wong’s term as the county head during 2001 to 2005; however, 
the planned site was Hemei, where water and electricity appeared to be less a problem. 
Wong accused that Zhuo’s dedication to changing the plan site from Hemei to Erlin 
was closely associated with the land profits of KMT-controlled factions.  
Because the KMT-affiliated former county head Ruan Gangmong had a “College 
Town” program in Erlin ten years ago. This action drove many investors to purchase 
lands around Erlin area. Unfortunately, the failure in realizing this program in Ruan’s 
term caused considerable damages to the investors. From Wong’s argument, Zhuo, as 
the vice county head during Ruan’s term, thus made this effort to help those investors 
after he got elected in 2005.203 Therefore, the intention of promoting the Erlin plan 
was to provide a good opportunity for those investors to reclaim their profits on lands. 
Wong believed that most of the landowners in Erlin were investors ten years ago. The 
AUO’s Erlin plan was the chance they had waited for so long in order to cash out 
their investment. That was why Zhuo remained confident in acquiring lands on a very 
tight time schedule.  
Wong’s statement illustrated a typical landscape of local politics in Taiwan; 
some environmental activists also showed the same concern in the interview. Most of 
                                                 
203 Epoch Times, October 20th, 2009, http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/9/10/20/n2694307.htm 
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the developing projects would benefit local factions, since most of them were 
founded on local contracting, financial, or infrastructure businesses. However, that 
did not necessarily mean that the interests of local factions influenced the decision of 
local county heads. The reason that Zhuo changed plan sites from Hemei to Erlin was 
simple: because the AUO wanted the latter. In order to grasp the AUO’s capital, the 
local county head had to play along. 
The reason that the author used the term “myth” in this section was that the 
decision to welcome the CTSP was NOT totally based on self-interests. Erlin was a 
very good example suggesting that Zhuo’s efforts on the Erlin plan did not really 
transfer to electoral votes. If getting reelected was the primary task for a politician, 
then introducing the Erlin plan may not be a rational decision. 
Compared with the votes in Zhuo’s won in the 2005 election, facing the same 
opponent, Wong, Zhuo received 30,000 fewer votes in 2009. The percentage of the 
votes obtained by Zhuo in Erlin and Bito (next to Erlin) only changed slightly.204 
(From 59.45% to 57.36% in Erlin, from 54.6% to 50.33% in Bito) This slight decline 
even showed that Zhuo did not greatly benefit from his Erlin plan in Erlin area. 
Ironically, in Fushing Village, where the fish farming might be seriously affected by 
waste water from the Erlin facilities, Zhuo’s percentage of votes grew drastically 
                                                 
204 Please refer to the data in Central Electoral Committee in Taiwan, 
http://210.69.23.140/cec/cechead.asp 
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from 43.95% (2005) to 54.77%. Therefore, it was not clear whether Zhuo attained 
political advantages by introducing the CTSP to Erlin. 
Besides, the struggles between local factions and political parties did not appear 
very relevant at the local level. Despite the fact that local politicians have been active 
in introducing capital into certain areas in Zhanghua and Taichung County, we can in 
fact see very similar trajectories in terms of the decision process in both counties. The 
local partisan distinction on the attitude toward the CTSP was not apparent in both 
Holi and Erlin cases. In Zhanghua County, even the DPP’s candidate, Wong, was 
supportive to the CTSP’s expansion to Zhanghua, though he preferred Hemei. 
Therefore, it suggested that this prevailing myth on high-tech science parks was 
deeply rooted at the local level. In consequence, local resistance against the CTSP 
can be mostly alleviated. The state’s patronage on the CTSP’s Holi and Erlin plans 
thus successfully penetrated into local levels.  
Economic Rationality 
A developmental state would make active moves with clear goals in terms of 
development strategies. In this section, the author will evaluate the performance of 
the Taiwan state, probing if it had clear goals of development in mind when it decided 
to ask the AUO to enlarge investment in Taiwan. Did this action help to achieve 
economic efficiency in the supply chain or in the market? 
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A Key Sector to Taiwan? Some Risks 
Based on the government’s response to migration of Taiwan’s TFT/LCD sector, 
it appeared that this industry was key to Taiwan’s industrial chain. Did the Taiwan 
government intentionally bolstering these projects because of its industrial 
significance for other domestic industries? 
Some asserted that the DPP’s TTTS plan in nurturing the TFT sector was very 
problematic. First, the semi-conductor and TFT industries were by no means “new 
bloomers” in 2002. Instead, they were both very mature business sectors in Taiwan. 
Both industries were already ranked top in the global market and have consisted huge 
amounts of economic productions when TTTS was proposed. It did not make much 
sense for the government to shelter both sectors. Besides, the market fluctuation in 
both industries was quite high. The global economic boom could easily affect it than 
state policies, since these industries have already built their own global supply 
chain.205 
The second reason that the TFT sector may not be a good sector for the state to 
nurture was because of its high risks. According to Ye’ research on Taiwan’s TFT 
sector, while attracting most of the capital from the stock market, the TFT sector in 
Taiwan carried an extremely high ratio of loans.206 Ye also pointed out that this 
                                                 
205 Xu Mingyi (2002), “The Analysis on TTTS Policy, ” commentary from National Policy Foundation, 
http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/TE/091/TE-C-091-033.htm 
206 Ye Yinghua and Qiu Xianbi, “A Study on Agent Cost Theory: Capital Structure, Equity Structure, 
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“capital-intensive, low profitability” character of Taiwan’s TFT sector made this 
industry an inappropriate target to invest in. The state’s supporting this sector would 
force the banks to take great risks, and thus jeopardize financial security of Taiwan.207 
Lin’s research on Taiwan’s LCD sector suggested that the intensity of capital 
was negatively correlated with the profitablility of this sector. Unlike the LCD sector 
in Japan and Korea carefully selected a certain amount of advantageous technological 
generation to invest, the blind pursuit of increasing production of next-generation 
supply line by Taiwanese LCD sector was proved inefficient.208 Shin also believed 
that the difficulty encountered by the Taiwanses LCD sector was resulting from 
over-production through previous huge investments. This was a long-term structural 
problem rather than a short-term market fluctuation. Giving the uncertain profiablity 
of LCD sector, it was quite risky for the government to concentrate on this sector209. 
Table 4.6 Some Suspicions of the Cost Effectiveness of the LCD Industry 
Problems Descriptions 
Huge Loans - The loans from the five major TFT companies were estimated 
more than one billion USD, and consisted of 63.8% of their 
revenues. 
- The Ratio of debts of the five companies ranged from 47% to 
62%. 
Low Profitability - Only two companies remained profitable, and their profit 
margin ratios were less than thirteen percent. 
- The net profit of this sector was in deficit overall.  
From: Ye Yinhua, Economics Daily (Taiwan), May 10, 2006. 
                                                                                                                                           
And Cost Efficiency,” Taiwan Financial Quarterly, Vol 8, Period 3, pp 45-64, 1996. 
207 Economics Daily, May 10th, 2006. 
208 Lin Ting-Ru, Shen Yung-Chi, and Hong Ren-Tsai, Using Structure--Conduct-Performance Model 
to Explore Taiwan’s TFT-LCD Industry, paper presented in New Paradigms of Management, The 77h 
Annual Academic Conference, 2008. Taiwan: Taiwan Technology University. 
209 CPA News, January 02, 2009. http://n.yam.com/cna/fn/200901/20090102291449.html 
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In addition, in the crisis in 2008, it seemed again to prove that the TFT sector 
was not an efficient sector in terms of profitability. According to the analysis from JP 
Morgan Chase, during the cycle between 2001 and 2010, the global TFT sector can 
barely keep their financial balance, let alone making profits. It was mostly because 
this sector had to bear huge loans in the early stage.210  
During the financial crisis, major companies in electronic sectors in Taiwan 
suffered severe losses and had to seek for financial aids from the state. These 
corporations contended that they would lose this cutthroat battle against Korea if the 
Taiwan government stepped aside. 211  The corporations’ catchphrase was 
straightforward enough: DRAM and LCD were “too big to die.” To put it from 
another angle, the huge amount of investment in the LCD sector during the DPP 
administration seemed to be proven as a failure. The expansive policy on the LCD 
sector may also be confirmed as a risky sector, given its grand capital size and 
unstable profitability.  
However, the crisis in 2008 gave the KMT administration an opportunity to 
discover the limit of the future of the TFT sector in Taiwan. In 2009, President Ma 
announced a new “Diamond Plan,” pointing out new star sectors that the Taiwan 
government would focus on. This time, the LCD sector was removed off the list. 
                                                 
210 Yuanjian Magazine, Vol 285, March 2010, page 127 
211 http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/8/12/4/n2351920.htm 
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Fill Gap between Supply and Demand? 
Far from 2005, there was a suspicion that the over-expansion of the LCD sector 
may lead to serious danger since over-competition in this sector may reduce the 
profits and over-centralization of capital on this sector may generate social risks. The 
manager of the CTSP, Lee, therefore urged the Taiwan state to regulate the investment 
of the LCD sector, for it may cause a waste of public resources.212 
Lee’s prospect was quite correct, for there has been a very serious problem of 
over-supply of LCD products after 2005. In 2008, the global financial depression 
traumatized the DRAM and TFT sectors in Taiwan. According to the Economist, 
Taiwan was the country whose economy has been hit hardest by the global slump in 
2008 (32% decrease of economic outputs in 2008), mostly because the 
semi-conductor and TFT sector failed to export during this great depression. The total 
loss of four major TFT/Panel companies in season four alone in 2008 was 0.8 billion 
NT dollars.213 Nonetheless, the economic slump was not the only reason responsible 
for the shock, the previous over-investment in both sectors, which resulted in 
over-production, was the primary reason causing the disastrous loss of TFT and 
semi-conductor sectors.214 The Economist also stated that the electronics sectors 
(flat-screen monitors and semi-conductors) in Taiwan “were in oversupply even 
                                                 
212 Liberty Times, July 24th, 2005. http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2005/new/jul/5/today-e1.htm 
213 Zheng, Zhichao, “Avoid Previous Mistake on DRAM Sector When Promoting New Sectors,” 
commentary from National Policy Foundation. http://www.npf.org.tw/post/1/5787. 
214 Central News Agency, Jan 2nd, 2009. 
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before the global financial crisis215.”  
The fact that the KMT administration removed the TFT sector off the “main 
sectors” revealed that the state eventually perceived that it might be an unwise 
decision to continue promoting the TFT sector, at least not by solely boosting more 
production. Given the fact that over-production and low gross profit were both the 
biggest problems that the TFT sectors in Taiwan shared, more supply and production 
would cause more harm. A Japanese industrial consulting institute, Display Search, 
concluded that the global over-supply of LCD products would occur in 2012 since 
major LCD enterprises would start their production in China simultaneously.216 Also, 
according to The Photonics Industry and Development Association in Taiwan (PIDA), 
the prime time of the Taiwan’s LCD sector in the photonic industry has passed. The 
ratio of LCD production in the photonic industry has decreased, and is expected to 
keep decreasing (from 70% in 2010 to 65% in 2013) in the future.217  
In terms of the 11th-generation facilities that the AUO promised to establish in 
Taiwan, the AUO also admitted that it was a goal in the long term. Since the market 
response to the 11th-generation products was not certain yet, most of the LCD 
providers felt reluctant to conduct this investment any time soon. In other words, the 
AUO also comprehended that the risks for operating the 11th-generation facilities 
                                                 
215 http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13109874 
216 Tech on Line, http://big5.nikkeibp.com.cn/news/flat/52055-20100624.html 
217 Liberty Times, January 6th, 2011. http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2011/new/jan/6/today-e21.htm 
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were very high. Therefore, it has hesitated to initiate the construction of production 
lines in Taiwan despite of its promise to build them.  
The MOEA’s vice director, Yen, has recognized in 2010 that, the “N-1 Policy” 
may seriously jeopardize the competitiveness of Taiwanese firms. While Korean LCD 
manufacturers have conducted massive capital outflows to China, this rigid policy has 
become a significant barrier for Taiwan’s LCD industries. Taiwanese firms did not 
only enter the Chinese market relatively late, but also had to produce less competitive 
products in China in order to comply with Taiwan’s N-1 policy. Besides, there was 
another disadvantage for the firms failing to migrate to China early. The Chinese 
government was planning to raise the tariff of LCD products, and it would build 
another barrier for companies whose main bases were outside of China.218 
The MOEA promised to re-evaluate this policy and considered opening the door 
for Taiwanese LCD industries to move their capital to China via joint-ventures or 
merging Chinese firms. However, there will be “no time table for the change of 
the‘N-1 policy.’219” In other words, the Taiwan state also acknowledged that the “N-1 
Policy” was inefficient and even detrimental to the development of Taiwan’s LCD 
industries. However, the inclination of self-protection of the developmental state has 
driven the state to set the limits on possible substantial capital flow.  
                                                 
218 Southern City News (南方都市報), December 22, 2010. 
http://digital.china.com.cn/a/11737678.shtml 
219 UDN News, December 31, 2010. http://udn.com/NEWS/FINANCE/FIN3/6066145.shtml 
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 Structural Adjustment and Strategy Selection instead of Expansion 
During 2008 to 2009, specialists have determined several structural weaknesses 
of Taiwan’s TFT sector. First, the developing strategy of Taiwan’s TFT sector was 
quite outdated. The failure in building their own brands and downstream sector 
chains made them more vulnerable encountering the economic depression. Instead of 
establishing their own downstream industries to alleviate potential harms resulted 
from overproduction and thus retain their competitiveness, the TFT sectors in Taiwan 
focused on the OEM operation behind big brands. This decision made Taiwan’s TFT 
sectors low value-added assemblers rather than high value-added providers. 220 
Especially in the 2008 crisis, while the Taiwanese TFT companies suffered a loss up 
to 0.8 trillion NT dollars within Season Four, their Korean counterparts only took 
0.25 trillion deficit. This difference of profitability was associated to the discrepancy 
of developing strategies. While the capacity utilization rate for Korean LCD providers 
remained above 80% during the 2008 crisis, that for Taiwanese counterparts was only 
staggering from 30% to 40%.221  
Based on the research of Topology Research Institute, the Taiwanese TFT 
companies’ biggest disadvantage was that they were incapable of building their own 
                                                 
220 Lan Chunseng, research article in “New Society for Taiwan”, Vol 7. 
http://www.taiwansig.tw/images/stories/journal/0912/20091223.pdf 




brands. And that leaded to great losses in the 2008 crisis.222 Another researcher from 
National Policy Foundation, Zheng, similarly indicated that the failure in building 
their own brands and developing new technologies had resulted in the laggard of TFT 
sectors in Taiwan.223 Besides, the TFT sector was also criticized for its incapability of 
probing global market demands, which seriously weakened its competitiveness 
compared with their Korean competitors.224 
“Fragmented structures” were also specified as one of the weaknesses of the 
TFT sector in Taiwan. Unlike in Korea, where only two giant providers were 
running the TFT industry (Samsung and LG), there were five major TFT corporations 
in Taiwan, let alone medium-sized ones. The fragmented structure caused the 
inefficiency of investment and over-competition. This fragmented structure also 
contributed to LCD manufacturers’ OEM strategies. The AUO once claimed that there 
were too many TFT companies in Taiwan, 225  and it was this structure of 
over-competition that caused the dead end of Taiwan’s LCD sectors.  
In 2005, the DPP-affiliated President Chen and Premier Hsieh initiatively asked 
the TFT industry to “merge” in respond to its serious competition against Korean 
Samsung. This was a very rare statement since the DPP administration did not 
                                                 
222 Yuanjian Magazine, Vol 285, March 2010. This was from an interview to Li qiupu, a researcher in 
Topology Research Institute. 
223 Zheng, Ibid.  
224 Zhan Quankai, “The Limit of Taiwan’s TFT Industries in the Global Exchange System,” article 
presented in Annual Conference of Taiwan Sociology Association, 2006. 
http://soc.thu.edu.tw/2006TSAconference/_notes/2006TSApaper/3-4.pdf  
225 Economic Daily, October 1st, 2004 
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intervene too much in a single sector in terms of giving guidance of technology 
policies. However, the government did not set up measures of financing constraints 
for the incompetent enterprises. Most of the mergers did not occur until the second 
biggest Taiwan LCD manufacturer, Chimei, conducted a merge with Foxxcon in 
2010. 
With many structural problems ahead, the TFT sector required a structural 
adjustment, instead of the N-1 policy, to compete with their Korean opponents. In this 
sense, the priority was to enhance both competitiveness and the profitability of 
Taiwan’s TFT sector, particularly when the sector was highly dependent on bank 
financing and the government’s support. However, there was very little state’s 
intervention in the structure or strategies of Taiwan’s TFT sectors. Rather, the state 
paid more attention to keeping capital and technologies, whose profitability was still 
uncertain, in Taiwan. 
Political Concerns: Controlling Capital 
Since the state acknowledged the fact that the LCD industry’s investment in 
Taiwan would not help enhance the competitiveness of this sector, why did the 
Taiwan state still insist that the AUO initiate both Holi-Chixing and Erlin plans? 
Based on the interviews and the statements from a few government officials, this 
dissertation argued that keeping private investment in Taiwan may be a far more 
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important concern for decision-makers.  
Given its capital-intensive feature, the production of the TFT sector was 
responsible for 13% of the total GDP in Taiwan ( 1.8 trillion NT dollars), and it 
provided 0.2 million job positions on the job market as well. This sector, given its 
size of capital input, was too important for the government to neglect.226 To put it 
differently, the extremely high ratio of GDP produced by the TFT sector was a 
dominant factor in shaping politicians’ mindset. By the same token, it was this 
“capital-intensive” character of the TFT sector that made it attractive for politicians 
who aimed to create short-term economic booms. Because the flow of a large amount 
of capital would lead to an instant stimulation of GDP, this quick bonus would make a 
positive credit as a responsible administration with efficacy. 
How sensitive were Taiwanese politicians to the fluctuation of GDP? From the 
DPP to the KMT administration, in the occasions of propaganda, the GDP growth was 
always the top issue in terms of the performance of government. The government 
officials particularly concerned about economic figures when they intended to prove 
their economic policies were working, to the extent that sometimes they would even 
forge the data. According to the author’s interviews with previous cabinet officers, 
one of them mentioned that: 
                                                 
226 Economics Daily, June 5, 2008. 
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“During the meetings in the Executive Yuan, we were all very sensitive in 
“numbers” related to economy. The MOEA constantly reminded us that certain 
policies would cost us several percentages of GDP. The Premiers and all the cabinet 
had been led to a trap of financial digits. They all considered it a critical issue.” 
Correspondingly, an environmental activist argued that 
“I have been in the APC review meetings all the time. Most officers in the 
bureaucratic system were neither bad nor corruptive. In my perspective, they were 
just believing that boosting economy is “a must.” When their supervisors stated that 
a huge employment can be generated by a certain investment plan, they were easily 
convinced.  They were not convinced that this investment was environmentally sound 
though, but they viewed it as a necessary evil for Taiwan.” 
By keeping both plans in Taiwan, the state officials assumed they would increase 
GDP any way despite the fact that profitability of this sector was unstable. However, 
even both plans would probably become burdens for economy in the future, the 
preliminary constructions such as land investment and engineering contracting would 
create the image of prosperity, and that was what governmental officials anticipated.   
Deliberation 
Given the significance of this industrial policy, both from economic and 
environmental perspectives, it was quite central to have deliberation in the 
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decision-making process. However, deliberation was not realized until the 
environmental activists filed lawsuits in administrative court.  
CTSP’s Expansion: A Regional Plan or Expediency? 
In order to hold both plans in Taiwan, the Regional Planning Act (RPA) played 
an important role, since industrial policies cannot conflict with the grand design of 
regional development. A regional plan was a guideline for regional development and 
was created to prevent discordant developing behaviors at the local level. Therefore, 
when plans for local development violated this grand principle, the developing 
proposals, by law, needed to be reconsidered. From a macro perspective, the regional 
plans should be integrated into the national plan as a whole. Therefore, the regional 
plans could be treated as the extension of the state’s capacity in carrying out 
development schemes at the regional level. In other words, regional plans were 
supposed to come out of a deliberative process where various categories of 
development agendas were discussed and evaluated by the state. In the case of the 
CTSP, however, the livelihood of local agriculture and the fishing industry in central 
Taiwan would be challenged by the state’s coercive decision on the AUO’s 
investment in Holi and Erlin.  
Right from the beginning from the Holi-Chixing plan, the state and the 
developers found them encountering a major difficulty: this industrial plan has 
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violated the principles of Central Taiwan Regional Plan (CTRP). There were two 
main problems in terms of the Holi-Chixing plan. First, the two designated lands were 
originally categorized as agricultural land. According to the RPA in Taiwan, both 
farmlands were for agricultural use only. Therefore, industrial use of the land was 
prohibited by law. If the government officials would like a change in category of land 
use, they had to amend the CTRP first, which made it a complex option. 
Second, the CTRP has stated that Central Taiwan, as “a fine living circle,” 
should exclude industries with possible risks to health. There has been a great amount 
of organic agricultural industries in this region, and the potential pollution produced 
by high-tech factories may strangle thriving local organic businesses. Based on this 
principle, this region would only allow industries associated local livelihood, 









Table 4.7 the Guidelines of the Central Taiwan Regional Plan  




 of  
Holi and Erlin 
Holi belongs to the category of “a fine living circle,” in which 
1. the developing plan is “to conserve agriculture and marine resource and to 
provide a sustainable environment for farming and fishing.” The top 
priority is to develop advanced agricultural technologies accompanied with 
ecological tourism. 
2. “for mountainous areas in Holi, agriculture and recreation infrastructures 
should be developed in order to improve the living conditions in the remote 





The guideline states that 
1. “the developing costs (both internal and external costs) should be paid by 
users and beneficiaries. (page 2-1) 
2. “the land owned by Taiwan Sugar Company with good farming conditions 
should be divided into special farming preserved exclusively for 






Several pollution control measures were suggested to be used against the 
expansion of the CTSP. 
1. “For industries with heavy pollution, the government needs to encourage 
their migration by subsidies or bans.” (page 5-16) 
2. “In odder to improve the utility rate in existing industry Parks, the 
government needs to promote the upgrading plans.” (page 5-24) 
3. “Any over-developing actions should be prohibited in the water-collecting 
area and river basins. (page 6-2) 
4. “Industries with high-volume water consumption should be established in 
areas with abundant water resources.” (page 5-22) 
Source: the First and Second Comprehensive Review of Central Taiwan Regional Plan, Taiwan. 
Therefore, in order to legitimize the Holi-Chixing plan, the state had to redefine 
the objective of the CTRP, especially the term “a fine life circle.” To solve this 
problem, the state under the DPP administration asked the APC to compose a “Second 
Comprehensive Review of Central Taiwan Regional Plan” in 2006, and then 
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arbitrarily removed the term “a fine living circle.” It also stopped indicating Holi as 
an agricultural area. The state even changed the land category of Holi and Chixing 
without much discussion held in the APC meetings, from agricultural to industrial use; 
trying to further legitimize the Holi-Chixing plan.  
To evade further legal disputes, the NSC also declared that the CTSP’s Holi Plan 
technically aimed to establish “a manufacturing zone” around the Holi area, which 
was theoretically associated with local livelihood. Following this rationale, in the 
version of the Second Review in 2006, Holi-Chixing plan was included into the 
“manufacturing zone.”227  
This dispute could have been a great opportunity to review options for 
development for central Taiwan area. However, the state only focused on tackling 
technical and legal matters in facilitating Holi Plan other than conducting a 
comprehensive, deliberative discussion on the CTRP itself. The stated decided to 
leave the chief framework of the CTRP intact in this “comprehensive review,” but to 
make minor wording changes to serve the Holi-Chixing plan. 
When the CTSP began the Erlin plan in 2008, the KMT administration also 
encountered the limits of regional planning. Since the revision in 2006 was only to 
seek for a temporary outlet to break the Holi-Chixing gridlock, it was expedient. 
                                                 
227 See meeting records of the 188th APC meeting. 
http://www.cpami.gov.tw/web/filemgr/committee/apc/185.doc 
 177 
Therefore, when the Erlin plan was on the way, same conflicts occurred. Following 
the measures in 2006, the state did not hesitate to adopt similar revisions. Only this 
time, the state wanted to do it more efficiently and even more arbitrarily. 
Because the CTRP defined Erlin as a “unit for tourism and agriculture,” the state 
under the KMT administration needed to remove the wording which caused disputes. 
In 2008, the KMT administration rejected the Second Review inside the Executive 
Yuan meeting simply because the revision in 2006 could not break the gridlock of the 
Erlin plan. In May 2009, the KMT administration called six meetings for the APC 
within two months and eventually arbitrarily revised the CTRP based on the CEPD’s 
idea without asking the APC, which was responsible for conducting deliberative area 
planning meetings, to amend the regional plan. 
In the first APC meeting about the Erlin plan, the policy memo indicated that the 
progress schedule of this project was “supervised by the Executive Yuan.” (Please see 







Table 4.8 the Progress Schedule of the Erlin plan 
Progress Scheduled Deadlines 
Water and electricity to be provided 1/31/2009 
The EIA review to be passed  6/15/2009 
The development of non-city land to be reviewed 6/28/2009 
The construction license to be issued 7/29/2009 
The design of the science park by the CTSP office to be completed 02/2009-08/2009 
Acquisition of lands to be completed 08/2009-12/2009 
Source: Based on the briefing report in the first APC meeting. http://e-info.org.tw/node/46990 
Due to the delay of the EIA review, the CEPD decided to revise the CTRP 
without the APC’s direct involvement. The central administration only asked the APC 
to recognize the revision made by the Executive Yuan. By law, the APC should be the 
apparatus that made decisions on any changes as to regional plans. Therefore, the 
DPP administration, despite its eager to revise the CTRP in 2006, still allowed the 
APC to propose the new revision although it returned the proposal to the APC in 2007. 
Compared with the DPP, the KMT administration’s strong dominance about the 
revision without the APC’s involvement seemed an inappropriate intervention. 
Throughout the revision process from 2008 to 2009, the APC was only informed of 
those changes made by the CEPD, instead of being authorized to do so..228 
In the revised version of the CTRP in 2009, the KMT administration removed 
Erlin’s agricultural character, and clearly stated that the CTSP’s Erlin plan was “a 
                                                 
228 It was quoted from a blog of an independent environmental journalist. 
http://shuchuan7.blogspot.com/2009/05/blog-post_22.html 
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strategy for local development.”229 The officials in the Construction and Planning 
Agency (CPA) admitted that “the Executive Yuan has set the deadline, and asked us to 
approve the revision by June 29th.” 230  The CPA indicated that, with strong 
suggestions from the NSC, features of science parks had been successfully integrated 
into the CTRP, and therefore the new CTRP should be legally compatible with the 
Erlin plan.231 However, the “comprehensive” review was not comprehensive at all, 
since it again only paid attention to removing obstacles for the construction of the 
Erlin plan. Besides, the state again granted no time for deliberation for the debate of 
local development. 
Table 4.9 the Timeline for the Revision of the Central Regional Plan 
Time Progress of Revision 
June 2006 The APC cancelled the agricultural feature of the Holi area. 
December 28, 2006 The APC approved the Second Review and submitted to the 
Executive Yuan. 
June 2007 The CEPD returned the Review to the APC because the Review 
needed to be “in coordination with the state’s big development 
projects (Erlin, namely.).” 
September 2008 The NSC officially asked the APC to add the Erlin plan into 
discussion. 
May 22, 2009 The Executive Yuan revised the Second Review and added the 
CTSP’s Erlin plan in it. The APC was only “informed of the 
changes.” 
Source: Compiled and organized by the author. 
                                                 
229 See http://e-info.org.tw/node/43321 




 From the facts above, one observed that the state, both the DPP and the KMT 
administrations, exploited their administrative expediency at the risk of violating the 
area planning procedures, which would compromise the state’s capacity in 
deliberative planning of development. Because of that, the CTRP had to be amended 
whenever a major investment squeezed in. From 2005 to 2010, the Second Review of 
CTRP constantly came back and forth between the Executive Yuan and the APC, 
mostly because new needs resulted from the CTSP’s expansion kept coming into sight. 
Each revision of the CTRP had to be inclusive of the CTSP’s expansion schemes. 
Therefore, the final version of the CTRP has not been officially approved by the KMT 
administration by the present, because new concerns about the new industrial project 
seem likely to keep emerging in this area.  
In conclusion, the author suggests that the state’s failure to conduct 
substantive comprehensive reviews based on deliberation should be mainly 
responsible for the time waste. The economy and area planning were both impacted 
by the state’s irresponsible short-term expedient manipulation of the CTRP. Both the 
DPP and the KMT administrations failed to propose a deliberative framework as a 
long-term agenda. Rather, they only focused on eliminating minor legal obstacles to 
serve short-term goals. The expediency thus caused a fragmented regional plan and 
more waste of time. 
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Arbitrary Site Selection 
The site selection for the AUO’s industrial plans was an important indicator 
examining the state’s capacity in deliberation, for site selection was involved with 
various interests among different sectors and stakeholders. However, site selection for 
the Erlin plan left very little room for public deliberation. According to the NSC’s Site 
Selection Guideline, site selection of science parks should meet the parameters of 
regional planning, and it must avoid environmentally sensitive areas. However, when 
the NSC announced their selection parameters for the AUO’s TFT facilities, 
environmental concerns only weighed 28 % of the evaluation, and Erlin’s sensitive 
ecology and geology were totally removed from discussion throughout the selection 
process.232 
With regard to the site choice during the third expansion of the CTSP in 2008 
and 2009, an APC committee member, who was also a professor, revealed: 
“Although the NSC announced that there would be seven candidate sites for 
selection in the new expansion (Period Four) of the CTSP, we all knew that the final 
decision would be Erlin.
233
 It was not that Erlin was the most suitable place to 
establish this new industrial plan; rather, it was because the AUO had publicly stated 
                                                 
232 This statement was proposed by professor Liao, who was a member of the APC. See Peopo News, 
http://www.peopo.org/shuchuan/post/46518 
233 The third expansion of CTSP would be located in Erlin, Zhanghua County.  
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that they had chosen Erlin as the plan site.”
234
  
By law, the NSC had to nominate a number of candidate sites considering 
environmental concerns. In 2008, the NSC did ask local counties in central Taiwan to 
submit a list of suitable sites for the CTSP’s third expansion. Zhanghua County 
submitted Hemei as the candidate site then, since Hemei possessed the advantage of 
easy electricity access, a shorter distance to the CTSP main complex, and fewer 
environmental costs in setting up supporting industrial facilities. However, before the 
NSC made decisions, the AUO sent a message to Zhanghua County head, Zhuo, 
stating that the corporation preferred Erlin to other possible candidate sites.235 Zhuo 
thus showed great enthusiasm in introducing the CTSP program into Erlin, and then 
listed both Hemei and Erlin as the candidate sites for winning the CTSP’s expansion 
project. 
In August 2008, with little surprise, among seven candidates, the NSC 
announced Erlin as the location for the new expansion of the CTSP.236 Despite the 
fact that ecologically sensitive Erlin had suffered from water shortage and therefore 
might not meet the need for industrial development, the committee in NSC still 
insisted that Erlin was the optimal choice and ignored Hemei, which was also a 
candidate site submitted by Zhanghua county and would probably be a more suitable 
                                                 
234 Interview with an APC committee member. 
235 Epoch Time, June 17, 2008. http://www.epochtimes.com.au/b5/8/6/17/n2158046.htm  
236 Epoch Times, August 30, 2008, http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/8/8/20/n2235220.htm 
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choice environmentally as well as socially. To be more explicit, Hemei was 
designated for industrial use during early city planning of Zhanghua. 
Why did the NSC insist to choose Erlin as the site for the expansion? According 
to Zhuo, the property ownership for designated lands in Erlin was relative simple. The 
AUO’s original target was Wuri-Kuaiguan area in Taichung County because it was 
adjacent to the Taiwan High-Speed Railroad Station. However, the status of the 
property ownership in that area was more complicated. Most of the lands in that area 
were privately owned, and it would also take more time to change the category of 
land use from residential use to industrial use.  
 
Therefore, to meet the preference of the AUO, the County head Zhuo delivered 
Erlin plan, which included two farm lands under the TS (Taiwan Sugar) operation. 
Because most of the lands in this area were owned by this SOE, there were only 21 
private land owners in this area, and it would make land acquisition far easier. In the 
guiding tour arranged by Zhuo in 2008, the CEO of the AUO admitted that he was 
“very satisfied” with the size of land (more than 1000 acres) and easier procedures in 
acquiring the land.237 Two months after the AUO’s showing interests in Erlin in 
public, the NSC decided that Erlin was the best site for the CTSP’ third expansion. 
                                                 
237 Economic Daily, June 6, 2008. 
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The participating scholars and activists foresaw the result before the NSC announced 
their final decision. This fact suggests that facilitating investment has overruled the 
efforts of deliberation undertaken by the state. 
Table 4.10 The percentage of lands owned by the SOE in the CTSP Cases 
 Sites Percentages of lands 








Holi 72% NA Selected by two 
TFT Corporations 
Third Expansion 
( Base 2) 
Chixing 99% 0.01% Selected by the 
AUO 
Forth Expansion Erlin 78% 10% Selected by the 
AUO 
Source: collected and organized by the author 
The rationales behind the AUO’s preference to Erlin are conceivable, since the 
complexity of private property ownership would affect the process of land acquisition. 
The longer the realization of the Erlin plan took, the later the AUO would be allowed 
to migrate to China. Nonetheless, since the NSC conducted its decision-making 
process in a black box, rival interests could not be revealed just by viewing the final 
decision. The NSC was supposed to select an optimal site taking environmental 
protection, industrial efficiency, and area planning into account. However, in the end, 
Erlin emerged as a competitive candidate mostly because of its sole advantage on 
local property status. Compared with the other sites, Erlin did not seem very suitable 
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for such a large-scaled industrial development, considering its ecological sensitivity. 
To be concluded, the state did not allow much room and time for site selection 
for the AUO’s industrial plans. The decision was made solely based on the state’s 
strong intention to promote both projects without the participation of a wide array of 
conflicting interests. This administrative expediency actually twisted the external 
costs, and it was resulted from the state’s N-1 policy and its intention to keep capital 
in Taiwan. 
Degrading Deliberation: Reducing Public Participation 
The EIA members by law undoubtedly should monitor decisions related to 
environmental concerns. According to the EIA Act, there were nine 
government-assigned members representing involved governmental agencies. 
Therefore, the central administration held nine “iron votes” out of the total of twenty 
one, while the rest fourteen members were selected from a list of names 
recommended by environmental experts and environmental groups. 
During July 2005 to July 2007 (the sixth term), the EIA committee was reformed 
by Chang, who was used to be an anti-nuclear activist. He allowed more activists 
from civil groups, though without the scientific background, to be selected into the 
committee. Some grassroots activists entered this institution via his reform. The direct 
involvement of grassroots activists into this monitoring institution made the EIA a 
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battleground.238 Their hardcore position also triggered a few struggles in the EIA 
reviews. However, this diversity also symbolized the possibility of public 
deliberation. 
Yet, the rivalry among the EIA members in some highly controversial cases soon 
caused a deadlock in the EIA. One of the EPA officials who had been deeply involved 
in the anti-nuclear movement with Chang described that:  
“We do respect these EIA members, since most of them were our comrades 
before. Having said that, with their hardcore attitude in the EIA committee, there was 
no degree of differentiation among different cases. Once there was a concern of 
environmental risks, the case would be immediately denied. As a result, in the EIA 
meetings, we were where we were each time, and no progress could be anticipated.” 
The political leaders were not satisfied with the stagnancy in the EIA. In order to 
break the stalemate, the Premier asked Chang to initiate voting in Holi-Chixing cases 
and thus had it approved in July 2006 without much discussion. This strong position 
soon triggered a series of legal actions from environmental activists. 
  The EIA committee was therefore again regrouped in July 2007 (the seventh 
term). In order for the DPP administration to exclude those hardcore activists, the 
civil delegation was removed off the selection list. Environmental activists thus lost 
                                                 
238 It was based on the interview with the EIA members. The consulting company kept delivering the 
same reports without revising the problematic parts, even some EIA members has serious criticism 
against it. 
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access to this institution. In the re-selection in July 2009 (the eighth term), 
environmental groups were further alienated from the decision-making process, since 
most of the candidates recommended or endorsed by environmental groups were not 
selected into the committee at all.239  
These changes wielded impact on different dimensions. First, the EIA committee 
became much “quieter” after the grassroots activists were excluded from this 
institution. Compare with the fiery noises made by the committee in reviewing 
Holi-Chixing plans in 2006, the EIA reviews on the Erlin plan appeared to be more 
moderate. In 2006, the EIA members openly criticized the intervention from the DPP 
administration in the Chixing plan. However, in 2010, the EIA members were very 
quiet when the KMT administration was trying to set the tone for the Erlin plan. The 
“quieter” EIA committee definitely resulted in less news coverage on conflicts in the 
EIA review, and most of the conflicts were in fact well kept inside the committee. 
Second, losing the political leverage to influencing policies, environmental 
activists began to adopt legal approaches in “arousing troubles.” This strategy indeed 
put pressure on the Executive Yuan, and the court verdict did recapture the attention 
of the mainstream media. The lawsuit against the flawed EIA review on the Chixing 
plan was a remarkable success. Given this encouraging experience, environmental 
                                                 
239 China Times, August 1, 2009. 
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groups and local residents decided to file another administrative lawsuit against the 
EIA review on the Erlin plan in March 2010.240 This strategy turned out to be very 
influential as well. 
Accountability and Transparency 
In order to realize the N-1 policy on the LCD sector, political leaders decided to 
intervene for the operation of the EIA committee in facilitating the EIA process. 
These interventions had undermined both the deliberative capacity and accountability 
of the EIA committee. However, this authoritarian manner also triggered great 
resistance from environmental groups. Their social campaigns and legal lawsuits both 
posed tremendous impacts on the EPA system. Although the EPA and central 
government attempted to evade the monitoring from the civil groups and judicial 
system, they were eventually forced to make adjustments. A series of policy reforms 
had been made, and government’s accountability was improved from those reforms.  
Politicians’ Intervention in the EIA Procedures 
In the early stages of both cases, the central government was able to remain its 
respect for the checking mechanism such as the EIA review. This attitude allowed the 
EPA and the APC to act on their will. The attention paid to the review progress was 
dependent on cabinet members. The county head, Zhuo, once complained that after 
                                                 
240 PTS News, http://news.sina.com.tw/article/20100316/2887941.html 
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the resignation of a cabinet member, Zhu, in 2009, the Executive Yuan seemed to lose 
the capacity to coordinate the Erlin case. Even so, the author suggests that the 
political intervention seemed likely to constantly step in whenever there were 
dominant Premiers in office. When political leaders sensed that it would be difficult 
to reach agreement through the EIA or APC procedures in a short time, their respect 
for the checking mechanism could easily vanish. Both the Holi-Chxing and the Erlin 
plans went through dramatic changes in the EIA review right after two strong 
Premiers, Su and Wu, began their new terms. Just like Su’s support to the 
Holi-Chixing plan in 2006, the Erlin plan was convoyed by Premier Wu in 2009 when 
they were just nominated as new Premiers. In other words, the intervention was not 
entirely institutional, but rather a personalized fashion.   
Table 4.11 the Effect of Premier Su and Premier Wu on the AUO’s Plans  
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Source: collected by the author based on the EPA data. 
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From the table above, one can observe a tendency that the Premiers’ attitudes 
were main interventions in the EIA reviews. While the EIA committee tended to 
adopt “the time-delaying strategy” to force developers to give up environmentally 
controversial cases, the Executive Yuan’s powerful intervention changed the routines. 
In order to freeze further reviews, Premier Su in 2006 and Premier Wu in 2009 both 
set clear agendas to have the EIA committee approve both cases within a given 
schedule. With high expectations from strong Premiers, the EIA review, as an 
autonomous checking mechanism, thus became “a big obstacle” for the state’s 
economic plans and thus was removed by the state on its way to control domestic 
capital. 
A. Premier Su’s intervention in Holi-Chixing 
 Most of the Holi project was operated under the DDP’s administration. As the 
review was procrastinated by the antagonism in the EIA committee during 2005 to 
2006, the DPP politicians decided to jump in, particularly Premier Su. Premier Su 
gave an explicit order, asking all the governmental departments to help the AUO to 
pass the EIA review.241 Premier Su and his staff complained that “the EIA had 
become the biggest obstacle for Taiwan’s economic growth” in the Executive Yuan 
meetings and even reprimanded the EPA director, Chang, for Su believed that the EIA 
                                                 
241 The vice Premier, Cai, also set a clear timeline of 45 days, asking the EIA committee to finish the 
EIA review of the Chixing plan. See Epoch Times, March 29, 2006. 
http://epochtw.com/6/3/29/24676.htm 
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review was biased.242 With Su’s strong support, the director of the MOEA and the 
AUO publicly stated that the Holi-Chixing plan “must be passed.243”  
The vice Premier, Cai, also personally contacted one of the EIA members to rally 
for the Holi-Chixing plan. Cai’s behavior was highly associated with Su’s anxiety to 
push the Holi-Chixing plan into practice, and that seemed not wise, because the 
apparent intervention into the EIA procedure, which was considered direct 
compulsion on EIA members, caused a political drama. As a result of this intervention, 
nine EIA members initiated a public announcement to protest “invisible hands from 
the Executive Yuan.244” 
Three months after Cai’s call, the EPA initiated a quick vote with no media and 
auditing people aside, which was very rare. With unanimous support from some 
government-assigned EIA members, the Chixing plan was approved with a 10 to 8 
margin in June 2006. Some EIA members thus claimed that “the EIA was dead” 
because of the manipulation of political hands behind the scene.  
In fact, Chang was indeed making compromises with the Executive Yuan since 
he believed that the Holi-Chixing plan was less harmful than the other cases such as 
the FSP plan. To be able to effectively block more environmentally harmful cases like 
the FSP and ENP plans, Chang believed that some sort of trade with the MOEA and 
                                                 
242 http://e-info.org.tw/node/4470 
243 Economy Daily, March 10, 2006. 
244 UDN News, March 29, 2006. 
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the NSC might be needed.245 Although Chang successfully accomplished the mission, 
the conflict between Chang and Su eventually led to Chang’s resignation in 2007.  
B. Premier Wu’s intervention in Erlin 
When the Erlin plan encountered slow progress in the EIA reviews, Premier Wu 
and his secretary, Lin, also decided to “give a hand.” Before the EIA review in 
October, Lin held a coordination meeting, directly asking the EIA committee to 
approve the Erlin plan in October. The statements from the NSC and the EPA both 
proved that Lin gave direct order to the EPA, asking the EPA to break the gridlock in 
the EIA committee.246 
Recognizing the fact that waste emission under the Erlin plan would be the top 
concern in the EIA review,247 Lin called for a trans-departmental meeting (the EPA, 
the NSC, and the MOEA). He asked the future ENP plan in Yunlin to receive waste 
water from Erlin as cooling agents.248 In September 2009, Lin also announced that 
“through his coordination, the Erlin plan would be approved by the EIA committee in 
October, and the construction could be expected to be started in November.”249 After 
knowing that the ENP might not be an appropriate source to deal with wastewater, 
                                                 
245 This was based on the interview with Chang’s staff. 
246 http://e-info.org.tw/node/48084 
247 The AUO originally delivered two proposals dealing with the issue of their wastewater discharge: 
the first solution was to release waste water into the old Zhuoshui River in Zhanghua; the second one 
was to release it into the new Zhuoshui River in Yunlin. Both Zhanghua County and Yunlin County 
have clearly indicated however that they would reject the wastewater discharge. Therefore, none of 
these solutions could work. Because local farmers concerned much about the issue of waste water 
release, it has been the top issue in the review. 
248 China Times, October 3rd, 2009. http://ecolife.epa.gov.tw/blog/post/840683 
249 http://e-info.org.tw/node/48054 
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Premier Wu initiated another solution: “the marine discharge pipe program.” Wu 
publicly pledged that wastewater produced by the Erlin plan could be released to the 
outer sea directly through a two-mile long pipe, to reduce its negative impact on 
costal fish farming and agriculture along the riverbank. 
However, the political intervention caused at least two huge problems. First, 
when making the solutions public, Lin and Premier Wu also sent a deadline for 
approval of the Erlin plan to the EPA. This coercive force has seriously deteriorated 
the EIA’s deliberation and independence. Secondly, since the ENP case was still under 
review by the EPA, Lin’s suggestion seemed actually irresponsible. However, these 
two arbitrary statements by Lin and Wu revealed that, under the strong pressure from 
politicians, the independence of EIA review has been seriously challenged. 
Even when one assumed that Lin’s or Wu’s solutions were both feasible 
technically, the biggest problem of their solutions was that both of them had altered 
the existing institution in an arbitrary fashion. According to the EIA Act, each project 
needs to be reviewed in smaller panels before it can be submitted to the review 
committee. In the panel meetings, the AUO has proposed two solutions handling 
waste water emission, and the suggestions from Lin and Wu were nowhere near these 
programs. Therefore, if the AUO and the CTSP really decided to adopt these solutions, 
by law they had to re-submit the proposal to the panel, which would then start a brand 
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new review process.  
In fact, in the panel meetings in July 2009, the panel has discussed the 
possibilities of installing a marine discharge pipe, but the AUO was not interested in 
this alternative, since it would cost extra 1.6 billion NT dollars to install the pipe.250 
The CTSP office therefore removed this option in the EIA report. In the early EIA 
review in October 2009, the deputy head of the CTSP, Guo, asserted that “a marine 
discharge pipe was never considered a potential solution.251” 
With Premier Wu’s coercion, the EIA committee made a final decision in 2009 to 
adopt the pipeline initiation. The EPA director, Shen, claimed that it was legally 
acceptable that Premier Wu made the announcement “without the approval of the EIA 
committee.”252  In explaining why the EIA committee adopted the new marine 
pipeline solution without restarting a brand new EIA review, Shen and his staff, Ye, 
stated that both the ENP or the marine discharge pipe program were “far better than 
the AUO’s original plans”. Hence, “there was no need to restart the EIA procedure 
from the beginning.”253 
The feasibility of Premier Wu’s pipeline proposal did not matter as much as its 
implication did to the EIA committee. The action from Premier Wu has sent a 
                                                 
250 Liberty Times, October 22nd, 2009. 
http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2009/new/oct/22/today-life7.htm 
251 http://shuchuan7.blogspot.com/2009/10/blog-post_06.html 
252 Taiwan Lipao, October 29th, 2009. 
253 Liberty Times, October 22nd, 2009. 
http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2009/new/oct/22/today-life7.htm 
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message to the EIA committee that the state would take any actions, to hold the 
capital in Taiwan. By showing how determined the state was in facilitating the Erlin 
plan, the EPA and the EIA committee eventually violated the EIA rules and complied 
with Wu’s doctrine. 
In fact, most of the supporting infrastructures or pollution-abating solutions for 
the Erlin plan were simply built on illusions. The water sources for the Erlin plan was 
solely dependent on a dam to be built five years later, with the fact that this dam (the 
Hushan Dam) still has not passed the EIA review. According to the Water Bureau’s 
statement in the EIA meetings, the shortage of water supply in Zhanghua has 
constantly been an issue for attracting industrial investment. The over-extracted 
underground water in Zhanghua has resulted in serious land subsidence. However, for 
the Erlin plan, the CTSP would “borrow” 0.48 ton of tap water and 6.65 tons of water 
from agricultural water on a daily basis. It even required another small dam in the 
future to keep it fully functioning.254All the facts suggested that the EIA committee 
seemed to hold reasonable doubts on the desirability, viability, and feasibility of the 
Erlin plan. One of the EIA members even confessed that the report on the Erlin case 
was “the worst that he has ever seen.255” 
One would expect that the Erlin plan would enter a robust review, given the huge 
                                                 
254 See the mail respond from the water Bureau to local environmental group. 
http://antictsp.wordpress.com/2010/02/19/ 
255 Taiwan Lipao, October 29, 2009. 
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environmental concern. Surprisingly, in November 2009, with many concerns and 
existing pollution complications, the EIA committee members made an unordinary 
decision. They still approved the Erlin plan with “nineteen” preliminary conditions, 
including establishing the health fund in Erlin. While some of the EIA members 
believed that it would be more appropriate to conduct a robust review, the chairman 
decided to let go of this case while he claimed that this decision was made by all EIA 
members.256 
From the observation above, one noticed that the EPA’s function as a checking 
and deliberation mechanism was undermined when the state was determined to 
endorse a big investment. The bureaucracy in the EPA thus had to create an 
atmosphere in upholding it through the EIA procedure. Ironically, the AUO never 
officially promised to install the costly marine discharge pipeline, even in the EIA 
meetings.257 Although Premier Wu promised it, the final decision of the EIA review 
(i.e., installing a long marine pipe to release wastewater from Erlin) was never 
officially affirmed by the AUO. 
To sum up, both the Holi-Chixing and the Erlin cases suggested that the 
checking function of the EIA might be effective in the routine. However, when the 
powerful state leaders decided to take in charge, these checking institutions could 
                                                 
256 Taiwan Lipao, October 29, 2009 
257 According to the EIA Act, there is no such an institution as “experts meeting.” It was meant to 
create to skip EIA panels and committees when CTSP encountered unsolved water problem. 
 197 
soon be marginalized. The Premier Wu led the state’s resistance to the Supreme 
Court’s order. With the support of Premier, the EPA and the CTSP office thus took a 
risk in challenging the court institutionally. This political intervention, to some level, 
deteriorated the function of the EIA committee. 
Emerging Monitoring from the Judicial System and State’s Counter Back 
In the CTSP cases, the EIA reviews on both the Holi-Chixing and the Erlin plans 
were eventually brought to the court as politicians tried to intervene in the review 
process. However, the Taiwan state tried to avoid this monitoring mechanism from 
resorting to the legal approach and constantly ignored the advice from the court. The 
neglect of court orders eventually contributed to a crisis of state’s accountability. 
The interventions from politicians in 2006 directly led to a reckless EIA review 
on the Holi-Chixing cases. The EIA committee approved the Holi-Chixing plan 
without asking the developer to conduct the necessary assessments. Due to this 
procedural flaw, environmental activists brought this case to the administrative court; 
arguing that the EIA review was incomplete since the AUO failed to conduct a health 
impact assessment. In 2007, the Taipei administrative court revoked the decision of 
the EIA review made by the EIA committee in 2006 and stated that the final EIA 
review made in June 2006 was invalid. Therefore, the construction of Holi-Chixing 
plan needed to be on hold until a final valid EIA review could be completed. However, 
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the EPA (under the DPP administration) decided to appeal instead of restarting a 
robust EIA review integrating a proper health risk assessment. 
The EPA could have learned a lesson from this court verdict when reviewing the 
Erlin plan in 2009. In late 2009, the Erlin plan was expected to enter the 
second-staged review since there were great environmental risks. With the experience 
of the Holi-Chixing legal disputes, it seemed not legally appropriate if a robust review 
on the Erlin plan was not conducted before any final decision can be made in the EIA. 
However, the EIA committee still skipped the procedures and allowed the Erlin plan 
to be passed with political interventions. The environmental activists thus filed 
another administrative lawsuit on the EIA’s misconduct on the Erlin plan.  
In January 2010, after the Supreme Court reconfirmed the revoke administrative 
order on the Holi-Chixing plan, the EPA (under the KMT administration) still 
hesitated to stop the construction of the facilities. The EPA director, Shen, even held a 
press conference; condemning the judicial system’s intervention into the EIA. He 
even commented that the court order from the Supreme Court was “meaningless.258” 
The EPA officials gave three responses accordingly trying to evade the accountability. 
First, the EPA claimed that Article 14 and 22 in the EIA Act should not be 
applied to the Holi-Chixing plan, since the principles of these two articles were 
                                                 
258 http://e-info.org.tw/node/51842 
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focusing on the developing activities “without any EIA reviews.” The EIA believed 
that there were at least some EIA reviews held in this case although they were 
revoked by the court years later. Therefore, the Holi-Chixing plans should not 
applicable to these two articles, since the AUO did follow the EIA procedure. Shen 
even argued that the more proper law applicable to this situation would be the 
Administrative Procedure Act. According to Article 117 to 121 in this Act, developers 
had rights to request an administrative remedy if the liability was on the 
government.259 From this perspective, the AUO did proceed the project based on a 
valid and legal permission (at that time), and thus their rights should be protected.260  
Second, the EPA claimed that the fact that the review in 2006 was revoked by the 
court could not lead to the conclusion of stopping the developing activities. The EPA 
had the “rights to interpret the EIA Act according to different circumstances,” since 
this law was proposed by the EPA. The EPA could ask the AUO to submit more 
information and to conduct a robust review in the future reviews. In short, it was an 
administrative imperfection, not a procedural error. Therefore, the failure in 
completing an intact EIA review was irrelevant with the decision of stopping the 
Holi-Chixing plan. 








Third, this developing project was under the jurisdiction of the NSC and the 
CTSP offices, thus the EPA was not a direct governing authority to the AUO 
regarding its developing action. The EPA was only responsible for holding the EIA 
review tackling environmental impacts. It was the NSC’s call to decide whether the 
plans should be terminated or not.261 
The EPA’s statement was quite tricky: it insisted that investors’ rights needed to 
be protected since they had followed the procedures, even the procedures were not 
completely followed. It claimed that any punishment against developers based on the 
court order made after the EIA reviews would intimidate investors from investing in 
Taiwan. The most important of all, it asserted that it was not the EPA’s responsibility 
to make any decision regarding the developing behaviors after the approval. The 
EPA’s officials even claimed that the EPA was considering filing a judicial review on 
the Constitution because of this case.262 However, according to Article 22 in the EIA 
Act, the EPA was in fact legally obligated to notify the developer and to suspend the 
construction if the EIA review was not completed.263 
In July 2010, to avoid further confusion, the Supreme Court clearly indicated 
                                                 
261 See the Press Conference held by Taiwan EPA. http://e-info.org.tw/node/51650 
262 Ibid. 
263 The Article 22 in the EIA Act says: “Those developers that, prior to receiving the authorization of 
the competent authority pursuant to Article 7 or Article 13, directly pursue a development activity in 
Article 5, Paragraph 1 shall be fined NT$300,000 to NT$1.5 million; for such a developer, the 
competent authority shall notify the industry competent authority to issue an order for the suspension 
of the implementation of the development activity. When necessary, the competent authority may 
directly order the suspension of the implementation of the development activity; for those that fail to 
comply with such an order, the statutory responsible person shall be punished by a maximum of three 
years imprisonment, detention and may be fined a maximum of NT$300,000.” 
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that both the Holi-Chixing and the Erlin plans “needed to be stopped immediately” 
because of their status of incomplete EIA reviews. The Supremes Court sent a very 
clear message to show their intention to hold the government accountable for their 
actions. However, the KMT administration still refused to comply with the court order. 
The Executive Yuan decided that both plans would “stop the construction, but 
continue the operation” in responding to the court’s order.264 This was an intentional 
misinterpretation of the court order. 
In September 2010, the EIA committee re-conducted a health risk assessment to 
complete the previous flawed EIA prodecure. The EPA believed this late action would 
legitimize the state’s decision on the principle of “stop the construction, but continue 
the operation” on the Holi-Chixing plan. However, in March 2011, the Taipei 
Superior Court ruledd that the new EIA review still did not go through the robust 
review as the EIA regulation suggested. Thus, given the fact that the developing 
actions may carry great environmental risks, the court ruled, “there is a necessity to 
approve the suspension of any developing behavior in the designated site.”265 
This statement was like a direct punch in the face of the Executive Yuan.  
The series of decisions made by the EPA aroused the anger of environmental 
groups and legal experts, because the EPA did have their chances to settle this issue at 
                                                 
264 Liberty Times, August 11th, 2010. http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2010/new/aug/11/today-t1.htm 




a lower cost. By following the court order in the beginning, the developer’s rights 
could have been preserved since the construction did not begin at all. Besides, the 
EPA did have the power to reclaim their authority in supervising developing 
behaviors since they did have interpretative power on some articles in the EIA Act. 
Aside from fines or suspension of the projects, there was still a wide array of 
administrative measures that could have been done to protect the developer’s rights 
without undermining the integrity of the EIA. However, from 2007 to 2011, there was 
no apology in the EPA’s statements for their flawed review procedures, but a 
repetitive tone insisting, “This developing behavior could be continued.” 
Having said that, the court’s order, though encountered strong resistance of the 
government agencies, still constitute a great constraint on the administrative branch. 
Anticipating a very long fight over both the Holi-Chixing and Erlin plans, the Taiwan 
government had to loosen the N-1 policy and to permit the AUO’s investment in 
China. Also , the EPA also conducted reforms on the regulation on toxic substances as 
follows. 
Increasing Regulative Capacity of EPA’s on Free Information  
There were two-folds of environmental concerns on the Erlin plan. The first 
issue was about the control of toxic substances. While there were estimated more than 
four hundred kinds of toxic substances used in the AUO’s future facilities, the AUO 
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only listed twenty of them in the EIA report.266 It even refused to conduct an 
environmental impact assessment on its toxic substances because the AUO claimed 
that “there would be no influence on local environment.” Nevertheless, this was not 
an isolated case. The AUO’s failure to manage toxic substances could be traced back 
from 2006 to 2008. From 2006 to 2010, the monitoring from the EPA and 
environmental groups on the corporation’s social responsibility has improved, based 
on their learning through the EIA procedures. 
In the EIA review on the Holi Plan in 2006, the developer was asked to conduct 
a health risk appraisal “before the operation” with a condition that the operation of 
facilities must stop immediately if this assessment failed to pass. However, while the 
developer ignored this condition, the health risk assessment conducted by politicians 
suggested that more than twenty percent of the local residents were found poisoned 
by Dioxin.267 The failure of conducting health risk assessments before the operation 
by the AUO thus was proven influential. 
In 2008, there was another event posing challenges on the EPA’s capacity to 
counter business interests in protecting public health and free information. In June 
2008, the residents in Hsinchu County testified that the water in Hsiaoli River was 
seriously contaminated. The EPA concluded that the AUO’s facility in Hsinchu was 
                                                 
266 http://gaea-choas.blogspot.com/2009/10/blog-post_1848.html 
267  Nevertheless, the EPA never suspended the operation of the facilities in the Holi plan. 
http://gaea-choas.blogspot.com/2010/01/blog-post_24.html 
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partly responsible for this pollution. This facility, along with Chunghwa Picture Tube 
Company, has contaminated the river for seven consecutive years. Ironically, these 
two companies had promised, before the EIA reviews, that they would set up emitting 
pipes “below” the drinking water intake point, in order to protect the quality of 
drinking water. However, the evidence showed that they actually broke their promise 
and set up the pipe “above” the intake point, which was the reason leading to water 
contamination. Because of this deed, there have been more than three thousand lives 
threatened by contaminated drinking water.  
Because of this event, the EPA had to change the water treatment standard in 
2009268 because the toxic ingredients (“indium” and “molybdenum)” were not even 
listed in the EPA’s toxic substance list.269 However, the EPA still had no idea why the 
other two toxic substances (PFOS and PFOA) existed in the river, because the AUO 
would not reveal its production process.270 The Hsiaoli event has proved that the EPA 
was unable to monitor the toxic waste if the corporations wouldn’t provide correct 
information about production process and waste disposal in the name of “business 
secrets”. Although the EPA issued fines on both corporations, the amount was 
insignificant to these giant corporations.271  
                                                 
268 UDN News, September 13 2009. 
269 Because the corporations in high-tech business are reluctant to release any information about the 
raw material, out of the concerns of business secret, the government did not know these materials has 
been used for panel manufacturing. 
270 From Pots Weekly, http://www.pots.com.tw/node/3636. 
271 For this serious pollution, the EPA issued AU Corporations a fine for only less than twenty 
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Based on this weak governance on information release, the court found it very 
crucial in conducting health risks assessments in public. The EIA review on the 
Chixing plan was voided by the court was mainly because that the information on 
toxic release remained in a black box. In fact, in the public hearings and health risk 
conferences held in the local area in 2007, the EIA members stated that they were 
incapable of reviewing the issue of water discharge because “there was nothing to be 
reviewed in the report.” The AUO did not provide information about water emission 
to be reviewed.272 
In the review process on the Erlin plan, these dreadful environmental records 
regarding toxic substance management by the AUO induced the suspicion of the EIA 
committee. With the pressure that the Erlin plan had to pass the EIA review by the 
deadline, the EIA members had to list most concerns as conditions if the result was 
given. In other words, the “conditional approval” actually indicated unsettled 
environmental disagreement in the EIA review process. The “nineteen” conditions in 
fact revealed that the EIA committee’s only hope is “to monitor in the future.” 
However, with the appalling environmental records in Hsiaoli and Holi, one seemed 
hard to be optimistic toward the government’s monitoring practices on the Erlin plan. 
A successful “conditional approval” would be highly based on the AUO’s willingness 
                                                                                                                                           
thousand US dollars. (0.6 million NT)  
272 This proposition was proposed by Dr. Tu in the conference session held in Legislative Yuan in 
March 18, 2009, and recorded by an environmental journalist. 
http://gaea-choas.blogspot.com/2010/03/blog-post_18.html 
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to comply with their previous environmental commitments made before the EIA 
reviews. However, the AUO’s action was obviously not the case.  
Nonetheless, owing to the lawsuits filed by the environmental activists, the EPA 
began to pay attention on regulating the toxic substances in the black box. In order to 
cause similar legal conflicts, in April 2010, the EPA imposed the “Technical Codes on 
Health Risks Assessment.” This act asked the developers to report all possible toxic 
substances, which will be used during manufacturing process to the EPA and local 
public hearings. If the developers choose to conceal the information, the EPA could 
order the developer to restart the health risk assessment or impose fines on the 
developers if the developing actions have already been completed. Although the 
monitoring afterward by the EPA remained challenging, this was a beginning in 
enhancing people’s rights on the information and extending the state’s 
environmental governance on corporations.  
Having said that, the environmental groups were still unsatisfied with this new 
act and complained that the existing local pollution was not included into this 
evaluating system. The EPA director asserted that this new act was imperfect, but he 
refused to the revise this new act because it was highly associated with “political 
interests among stakeholders273”. His attitude indicated the fact that political interests 
                                                 
273 PNN News, December 15, 2010. http://pnn.pts.org.tw/main/?p=17271 
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on the EPA were still huge and thus every reform requires political compromises.  
In addition, the self-protection feature of bureaucracy also made the EPA more 
inclined to deny hidden risks behind those projects. In Hsiaoli event, the EPA officials 
announced in public that the aqua-biology in the Hsiaoli River was “normal as it used 
to be274” without mentioning the fact that the EPA had to send drinking water to 
Hsiaoli in 2008. Furthermore, the EPA’s announcement even concluded that “there 
never had been any serious pollution jeopardizing life quality in neighborhoods 
around all operating scientific parks in Taiwan.” 
These events suggested that the progress of EPA’s accountability in regulating 
toxic waste, though valuable, was still limited. It was the public monitoring via the 
EIA review driving this reform on policy transparency. Had not been the lawsuits 
against the EPA in both CTSP cases, the reform would not have happened. 
Experts Meetings: Two-Faced Sword 
Starring from 2008 in Shen’s term as EPA director, he decided to adopt a 
supra-institutional mechanism: “the experts meetings.” From the EPA’s perspective, 
the purpose of experts meetings was to narrow the gap between the AUO and the EIA 
committee when feasible solutions were not handy. In order to close the gap, the EPA 
invited more experts to attend the meetings and tried to find a solution breaking the 
                                                 
274 See Liberty Times, November 3rd, 2009, 
http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2009/new/nov/3/today-o9.htm 
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gridlock. Since “the experts” might provide extra knowledge in guiding the developer 
to reduce environmental impact, it theoretically could be a useful method even if the 
developers and the EIA committee could not reach agreement. The experts could offer 
their expertise particularly when the developers were incapable of conducting 
relevant research by themselves. The other institutional advantage of conducting these 
meetings was to have the developers’ proposal reviewed without the risk of being 
officially denied by the EIA members. In this occasion, a wide array of solutions can 
be discussed. The consulting company and the developers would have more 
opportunities to correct possible mistakes. 
There was also another purpose for the EPA to hold the experts meetings. Since 
public participation in the official EIA procedure was somehow restrained in order to 
facilitate the review after the EPA set limitation on public auditing, the experts 
meetings may serve as an outlet for public grievances. This platform may be 
considered a preliminary session of EIA in terms of shaping consensus for debates in 
depth. 
Nevertheless, the experts meetings could also be a big loophole if the state 
intended to maneuver this mechanism. Institutionally, the experts meeting was not a 
legally binding procedure within the EIA reviews, but rather an internal 
administrative measure listed in the EPA internal code. That is to say, the experts 
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meetings were not part of the EIA officially. The grey area made this mechanism 
more available for politicians to manipulate. If the developer had no intention to be 
socially responsible, simply working on narrowing the gap of expectations and 
finding out a halfway solution was not adequate. The halfway solution from the 
experts meetings might ignore the great picture of social accountability, for it only 
concentrated on searching technical solutions to survive the given developing agenda. 
Moreover, due to the unofficial feature of the experts meetings, the selection of 
participants was solely upon the EPA’s call275. The EPA was authorized to invite 
supportive governmental agencies and local politicians, with their consent, to 
participate in the meetings. While environmental groups were also invited, they could 
become a disadvantage minority among interest-driven stakeholders and supportive 
governmental agencies. In addition, the character of “experts” may, to some extent, 
exclude the participation of local residents, while they were the most direct victims. 
In consequence, this elite-centered arrangement would dilute the monitoring from the 
EIA committee and local residents. 
In the CTSP case, the “experts meeting” was a supra institutional channel when 
the institutional channel of the EIA fail to meet the state’s demand. While facing 
questioning and criticism from some EIA members in “the experts meetings” held by 
                                                 
275 The local communities and environmental groups were allowed to send lists of experts they 
recommended or trusted, but the EPA made the final call. 
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the EPA, Ye Junghong, the head of the Comprehensive Plan Agency in the EPA, 
spoke up: 
“In the experts meeting, let’s assume that the Erlin plan “has to be done,” and 
assume that it “has to emit waste water to somewhere.” We can not make it nowhere 
to go”.   
From Ye’s statement, one can see that this mechanism may create a loophole in 
the government’s accountability, since the conclusions can be made by those experts 
without being held accountable. The experts meetings have turned the EIA members 
into a technical advisory group that guided the developer to pass the forthcoming EIA 
review. In fact, after the first practice of the experts meetings on the TNP upgrade 
plan (the Third Naphtha-cracking Plant) in 2008, environmental groups had lost 
confidence to this supra-mechanism. One of the officials on MOEA described that: 
“The experts meetings had helped to facilitate the EIA process in the TNP plan. 
However, after that, the environmental groups had recognized the tricks we had 
played in the experts meeting. They started to paralyze the experts meetings by 
making speeches in succession. Ever since that, there is no use for the experts meeting. 
(Quoted from a MOEA official)” 
In sum, the experts meeting can be a platform to shape social consensus and to 
broaden deliberation in the EIA. However, it can also become a supra-channel 
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averting institutional monitoring. Unfortunately, The experts meeting in the CTSP 
case appeared as the latter, since the EIA report was approved in a very haste way. 
Conclusion 
The legacy of the developmental Taiwan state still functioned while the state 
tried to nurture and develop the TFT sector as a new star from 2002. With the 
intention to control the capital from this sector, the MOEA decided to use the Erlin 
plan in trade of the capital migration of Taiwan’s TFT sector to China. The investor, 
the AUO, had to make promise to Taiwan state in realizing the Erlin plan, of which 
the destiny still uncertain, in 2010. 
The demand of Taiwan’s MOEA was proven somehow inefficient and risky, 
since the profitability of this sector was declining. While some experts suggested that 
a certain structural adjustments should be made in improving this sector’s 
competitiveness, the MOEA in Taiwan decided to promote more productivity in this 
sector in stimulating GDP growth. 
 The long struggle in the EIA review process on both of the AUO’s domestic 
investments reflected the fact that both plans might be inefficient since both the 
internal and external costs would over cede possible gains. However, with the myth of 
scientific park prevailing in the local counties, the Taiwan state adopted expedient 
measures to reduce public participation and finally had both the Holi-Chixing and 
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Erlin plans approved by the EIA committee. However, this strong manipulation of 
laws and EIA rules triggered the resistance from the civil groups. The environmental 
groups filed the lawsuit against the EPA and acquired a milestone victory. The court 
finally ruled that the EIA reviews on both plans were invalid since health risk 
assessments were missing in both reviews. 
The EPA and the central government decided to confront against the judicial 
review by making appeals. These attempts to avert the monitoring from the court and 
the public eventually failed in August 2010 when the Supreme Court overruled the 
EPA’s appeals. The court then ordered both plans to stop because of their flawed EIA 
procedure. Acknowledging that there was still great uncertainty in the future EIA on 
the Erlin plan, the Taiwan state decided to let go of the AUO’s investment in China in 
December 2010.  
 Those facts suggested that the public checking mechanisms based on the EIA 
reviews effectively corrected the deficiency in MOEA’s policies. Although dominant 
political leaders promoted both plans by intervening in the checking mechanism, the 
lawsuits against the procedural flaws in the EIA review eventually prevented the state 
from wasting more public and private resources on delaying capital outflows. 
 During these struggles, the massive participation and activists’ strategy in 
adopting legal lawsuits improved the government’s accountability. Chang’s 
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restructure of EIA committee in 2005 indeed had a very profound impact on state’s 
policy, since the environmental groups gained expertise from being a part of the EIA 
mechanism. This exptersie allowed the environmental group to pin on legal flaws and 
to launch social campaigns at relatively optimal time276. Not only the MOEA and the 
NSC had to re-evaluate the cost-effectiveness of their policies, the EPA also started to 
ask the corporations to release more information on toxic substances while 
conducting health risks assessments ever since the court made verdict. This strong 
civil participation into the checking mechanism helped to correct the state’s 
unproductive plans and to create an opportunity for the developmental state to adapt 
and learn. That was precisely one of the profound effects rising from democratization.  
In conclusion, democratization opened access for civil groups and also brought 
changes in the EIA system. The inclusion of grassroots activists in the EIA committee 
produced a very influential outcome by creating public monitoring and deliberation. 
This mechanism not only corrected the state’s decision flaws but also held the 
government accountable for its industrial policy on the LCD sector.  
                                                 
276 Su’s interview with the EIA members also confirmed this fact. See Su Sany-Ying (2008), Ibid, 
pp167. 
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Chapter 5 the Eighth Naphtha-Cracking Plant (ENP) of Guoguang 
Petrochemical Company 
Introduction 
The petrochemical industry has been a key sector for Taiwan since the MOEA 
began intentionally developing this sector from 1970s, for this industry was the 
foundation of Taiwan’s industrial chain. From the 1990s onward, several companies 
of Taiwan’s petrochemical industry have been considering migration to China, given 
the cheap costs of labor and land across the strait. In the meantime, the high amount 
of pollution caused by the petrochemical industry has made it a public enemy. The 
migration was quite reasonable since it was getting increasingly difficult for the 
petrochemical industry to establish new facilities in Taiwan. 
Before 1990, the petrochemical industry was mostly dominated by China 
Petroleum (CP afterwards, a SOE); for this SOE had been a sole supplier of ethylene, 
the product brought by naphtha-cracking. In 1989, the Taiwan government approved a 
grand naphtha-cracking facility, the Sixth Naphtha-cracking Plant (SNP), by the 
Formosa Group, to stop the Group’s ambition in building a petrochemical empire in 
China. This grand plan broke the monopoly in petrochemical business. With the rapid 
growth of SNP’s productivity and relevant facilities, Formosa has surpassed the CP 
and become the top provider of petrochemical products since 2003. 
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In contrast with Formosa’s smooth growth, the CP’s operation in petrochemical 
business has been deteriorating. Several crucial facilities were forced to shut down 
around 2010 due to generating high levels of pollution. Many downstream 
petrochemical firms under CP’s supply system were quite anxious about the 
decreasing productivity from CP, and planned to stabilize their supply chain by 
requesting that it establish new facilities. However, due to the character of SOE, the 
CP’s investment projects were quite inflexible. These private petrochemical firms 
thus decided to set up a joint company with CP, Guoguang Petrochemical (GP 
afterwards), to avoid the inconvenience of CP’s SOE role. GP was created to conduct 
more efficient investments without complying with the rigid rules of SOE.277  
The GP decided to restart a plan of building a new naphtha-cracking facility, the 
amount of investment of which was 40.5 billion NT dollars in Taiwan.278 It was also 
referred as the “Eighth Naphtha-cracking Plant (ENP plan afterwards)” In fact, this 
plan was initiated far from the 1990s and mostly was driven by the CP’s need to build 
new plants to replace highly polluting outdated facilities. (For example, the Fifth 
Naphtha-cracking Plant in southern Taiwan was forced to shut down in 2012) 
However, due to the strong resistance from local communities in different counties, 
                                                 
277 China Petroleum consisted of 48% of share of bonds. The reasons that the CP created a joint 
company, GP, to compete with the Formosa Group were as follows. First, as an SOE, China Petroleum 
was monitored by MOEA policies and therefore lacked flexibility responding to market fluctuation. 
Second, China Petroleum had the obligation to fulfill social services in the domestic market, and the 
products were mainly for domestic supply, with fixed price. 
278 The plan also included 1 refinery, 1 naphtha-cracking plant, 23 downstream petrochemical facilities, 
14 cogeneration facilities, and 13 industrial piers. It is a very huge plan. 
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the CP could not find an appropriate site to start this project until 2004. The original 
plan in 2004 was to start this plan in an “off-shore island industrial complex” in Taisi, 
Yunlin County. After four years, the GP was forced to transfer this plan to Dacheng, 
Zhanghua County, because of some business struggles and the concern of 
environmental capacity.  
In June 2008, vice president, Hsiao, hosted the stockholders of GP and promised 
that the ENP plan would be a “must be.279” He “promised” that the EIA review for the 
ENP would pass in 2009280, which was a very bold claim considering that the EIA 
committee was under an independent operation. In March 2009, the MOEA officially 
approved this plan, which meant that this plan was ready to begin if GP’s proposal 
could be approved by both the EIA review and the APC review committees.  
From 2008-2010, the Taiwan state leaders were quite concerned with this huge 
plan. President Ma admitted that the ENP was a major national goal since Taiwan 
“cannot afford to lose the petrochemical industry.” 281  Ma’s attitude was very 
consistent with most of Taiwan’s political leaders during 2004-2010; the ENP plan 
was a necessary infrastructure that Taiwan must develop in the very short run. 
However, passing the EIA review for the ENP plan has been a great challenge 
                                                 
279 He asked the cabinet member, Chu Yunpeng, to conduct necessary coordination in achieving final 
success, and himself will personally play a “volunteer” in pushing this project in order to get rid of the 
laggard image of the government. 
280 http://www.coolloud.org.tw/node/25781 
281 China Times, September 1st 2010, 
http://news.chinatimes.com/focus/0,5243,50106434x112010090100424,00.html 
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for the GP during 2006-2010. The ENP plan had encountered difficulty in convincing 
the EIA members on both their plans in Yunlin County or Zhanghua County. Many 
EIA members suggested that the EIA report sent by the GP was “sloppy and 
arrogant,” since the GP failed to list possible negative impacts on soil and water 
quality in nearby coastal areas. 
Because the GP did not make satisfactory progress on the EIA report, the ENP 
plan thus could not go any further toward preliminary construction.282 Recognizing 
that the ENP plan might not be able to start before 2011, the Petrochemical Union 
decided to play hardball with the government. In May 2010, the Union threatened that 
the private shareholders of GP would drop this plan if the government failed to 
provide an effective solution by June 2010, implying that the state must “take care” of 
the upcoming EIA review in order to keep this investment. Some involved 
petrochemical firms were quite unsatisfied with the slow progress of the EIA review 
and threatened to transfer their capital to China.283 Owing to these pressures, the state 
thus tried to intervene with the EIA reviews again. 
However, with the previous experience of the CTSP lawsuit, the MOEA behaved 
more moderate this time. The MOEA has realized that conducting an EIA on 
“petrochemical policy” before conducting EIA reviews on specific developing actions 
                                                 
282 http://www.shadowgov.tw/33578_0_is.htm 
283 The shareholders complained that while a similar procedure only took four months in Singapore, 
the EIA reviews in Taiwan lasted more than four years and the final outcome was still unclear. See PTS 
News. http://web.pts.org.tw/php/news/pts_news/detail.php?NEENO=147916 
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would better achieve the final success of ENP. In December 2010, the MOEA 
delivered a first version of the “EIA Report on Taiwan’s Petrochemical Industry”, 
illustrating that the state’s industrial policies, rather than sporadic developing actions, 
could be better monitored by EIA reviews. 
 Politics of the ENP Plan 
After the establishment of SNP in 1990s, the private-owned Formosa Group has 
dominated the petrochemical realm in Taiwan. The Taiwan government had a deep 
fear that the powerful Formosa Group would jeopardize the government’s capacity of 
controlling petrochemical industry, because the Formosa controlled most of the 
downstream petrochemical industries in Taiwan. In order to facilitate the competition 
in this market, the state tried to maintain a balance of power between the Formosa 
Group and the GP. If Formosa acquires the monopoly of the petrochemical market, 
the downstream industries would be taken over since they will be highly dependent 
on the Formosa Group, since CP has ceased to remain a viable provider of 
petrochemical raw products. The dominant status of the Formosa Group in the 
petrochemical industry would seriously reduce the government’s bargaining power 




Table 5.1 The Monopoly of the Formosa Group after 2015 (based on the production now) 
 Gas (barrels per day) Ethylene (tons per year) 
CP’s Fifth Plant 220,000 500,000 
China Petroleum (without 
the fifth plant) 
500,000 950,000 
Formosa Group 550,000 3120,000 
  Source: Compiled by the author284 
Therefore, the state-owned China Petroleum has to keep up with the Formosa 
Groups to meet government’s expectation. In order to shape an effective competition, 
the CP created an alliance among domestic medium-sized petrochemical firms outside 
the Formosa system. This “health competition” between CP and the Formosa was the 
ultimate goal of the ENP plan. 
For the GP, the establishment of ENP was an urgent issue, since the outdated 
facilities might retire soon, particularly with the Fifth Naphtha-cracking Plant (FNP). 
The FNP in Kaohsiung has been a public hazard in Taiwan, because of its dreadful 
environmental impacts on the local neighborhood. There has been a long series of 
environmental protests starting from 1980 against this facility, because of the serious 
pollution caused by frequent industrial accidents. The CP thus had to pay a 
considerable amount of compensation to the local residents. In order to pacify local 
grievances, in 1990, the state announced that this facility would be removed from it 




original location in 2015. If the GP failed to start the ENP plan before 2010, the 
dismantling of the FNP would lead to CP’s serious failure in the competition against 
the Formosa Group. Therefore, in order to maintain the “balance of power” between 
both corporations, the MOEA and the CP both needed the ENP plan to start as soon as 
possible. 
The 13+1 ASEAN System and the Threat of Capital Outflow in the 
Petrochemical Industry 
According to the estimation of Taiwan’s MOEA, the exportation to China of 
Taiwan’s petrochemical products consisted of 63.7% of the total petrochemical goods 
produced in Taiwan.285 China, without a doubt, has increasingly become the focus of 
Taiwan’s petrochemical business. In order to seize the market in China, some major 
petrochemical industries in Taiwan have already planned to migrate to China. In 2010, 
the new relationship between Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
countries and China also strengthened this force.  
From January 2010, the 13+1 framework of ASEAN started to be effective. Most 
products exported from ASEAN countries to China, including from Korea and Japan, 
started to receive zero-tariff treatment because of the “early-harvest” measures. With 
the enlargement of ASEAN, the exclusion of Taiwan from this framework would 
                                                 
285 http://www.ecfa.org.tw/ShowNews.aspx?id=966 
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make the products from Taiwan less competitive in the Chinese market. Among the 
industries in Taiwan, textile, mechanical, and petrochemical industries in particular 
would be most negatively impacted, because of their “upstream” features. These 
industries primarily ship semi-manufactured materials to downstream manufacturers 
in China, and finally exported finished goods overseas.286 The Petrochemical Union 
in Taiwan indicated that with the new 13+1 ASEAN framework being effective in 
2010, the Chinese market share of petrochemical goods produced from ASEAN 
countries would grow from 30% to 60%, since Taiwan goods are subject to an extra 
tariff of 6.5%, on average.287 
While a domestic demand for petrochemical products in Taiwan has already been 
fulfilled, most of the petrochemical products were manufactured for exportation. 
Among the global markets, China appeared to be the most significant one for the 
Taiwan petrochemical industry. Considering the ASEAN factor, some of Taiwan’s 
petrochemical firms believed that it would be more effective to set up manufacturing 
facilities in ASEAN countries than in Taiwan, since Taiwan was excluded from this 
13+1 framework. According to the estimation of Taiwan’s MOEA, the annual 
exportation of petrochemical products, up to 360 billion NT dollars, to China, would 
be very difficult to “digest” if the petrochemical firms failed to control Chinese 
                                                 
286 Comment Article from cabinet member Chu Yun-peng. 
http://udn.com/NEWS/OPINION/OPI4/5240157.shtml 
287 China Times, January 9 2010. Please see: 
http://n.yam.com/chinatimes/fn/201001/20100109890614.html 
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market.288 In other words, the petrochemical industry in Taiwan would encounter 
serious problems if no prompt action were adopted in respond to the ASEAN’s 
expansion. 
Could the ECFA help? Maybe Not 
The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) is a bi-lateral 
economic agreement between China and Taiwan. With the KMT’s win in the 
presidential election in 2008, the cross-strait relations had cooled down. Through 
several rounds of negotiations during two years, both sides have prepared to sign this 
agreement in 2010. Although the DPP has opposed this agreement, both countries 
officially signed this agreement in June 2010. This agreement would increasingly 
open Taiwan and China’s domestic markets to the other side, which means to allow 
the products manufactured on the other side to enter domestic market at a very low 
(or even without) tariffs. 
The ECFA has a tremendous impact on the petrochemical business, and the 
Taiwan government also considered it as a quick dose in solving capital outflow 
problems. The signing of ECFA with China would offset Taiwan’s disadvantage in the 
petrochemical industry and allow these industries in Taiwan to gain an equal status in 
Chinese market after the 13+1 framework takes effect. With the ECFA, the status of 
                                                 
288 The announcement from MOEA on April 12, 2010. 
http://dailynews.sina.com/bg/chn/chnoverseamedia/cna/20100412/02221338654.html 
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“upstream Taiwan” combined with “downstream China” in the petrochemical sector 
may be further guaranteed by this new economic agreement. Therefore, for the 
Taiwan side, the petrochemical industry was listed as the top priority for 
tariff-reducing items in the “early-harvest” list during the ECFA negotiation.289 Ever 
since the negotiation started, the deal on the petrochemical items has been a very hot 
topic, since both sides had their calculations in developing petrochemical industry. 
In fact, the migration of the Taiwanese petrochemical industry to China has been a 
new trend in cross-strait relations. On the one hand, the growing costs for lands and 
labors in Taiwan have been driving the corporations away. On the other hand, the 
Chinese government has built a petrochemical industrial complex in Quangang 
(Fujian) in the Haisi Special Zone to rigorously develop petrochemical industry. 
Under this circumstance, the Taiwanese petrochemical sector has become a 
bargaining chip in this cross-strait struggle. 
For the Taiwan side, fearing the future competition with China, the Taiwan 
government refuses to approve the petrochemical industry’s investment on any 
naphtha-cracking projects in China, just like the LCD industry. The Formosa Group 
once tried to develop a huge “Haicung plan” in 1989 in building a special industrial 
zone on petrochemical industry in China. However, the Taiwan government adopted a 
                                                 
289 Refer to the MOEA announcement. http://w2kdmz1.moea.gov.tw/user/news/detail.asp?id=19516 
 224 
“stick and carrot strategy” to block this plan. In this decade, the Taiwanese investment 
in upstream petrochemical facilities in China also required permission from Taiwan’s 
IRC. Due to this limit, Taiwan’s petrochemical industries could only launch 
downstream-level projects in the Haisi Special Zone. 
The ECFA appeared as a good opportunity to alleviate the grievances from 
Taiwan’s petrochemical sectors. If the tariff-reducing measures between China and 
Taiwan can be imposed on the petrochemical products produced in Taiwan, it would 
stabilize the petrochemical sector from moving to China. However, the Chinese 
government had their own agendas and was particularly concerned on breaking the 
current power balance between the petrochemical businesses across the Taiwan Strait. 
In order to keep the petrochemical industry chain under domestic control, the Chinese 
government only accepted joint-venture projects incorporated by Taiwan 
petrochemical industries and local Chinese medium-sized plants, particularly the 
naphtha-cracking facilities. Instead of only receiving some parts of Taiwan’s 
petrochemical industry, the Chinese government insisted that Taiwan petrochemical 
industries must move the entire supply chain to China. To put this differently, the 
Chinese government wanted to put this sector under state’s full control. By setting 
above limits, China could develop their own petrochemical businesses with the 
assistance of capital from Taiwan, but not constrained by Taiwan’s petrochemical 
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firms in the future. 
China’s intention to develop petrochemical products in an independent manner 
thus led to China’s reluctance in opening the market to Taiwan’s petrochemical 
products. There were two events suggesting that the Taiwan’s petrochemical sector 
was facing animosity from China. First, after the ECFA was finalized in June 2010, 
China eventually decided that ninety percent of the petrochemical products 
manufactured in Taiwan would not receive zero-tariff treatment from China, mostly 
because of the great pressure from China’s petrochemical sector. Second, China’s 
government also officially rejected the possibility that allowed Taiwan’s 
petrochemical firms to operate naphtha-cracking plants in sole proprietorship, for this 
upstream source had to be tightly controlled by the Chinese state. Chinese 
government delivered a clear statement in April 2010 and insisted that Taiwan’s 
naphtha-cracking projects had to incorporate with Chinese industries if they would 
like to move to China.290  
The Taiwan’s petrochemical industry thus encountered dilemma. On the one hand, 
Taiwan government seems incapable of providing the resources they need if they 
chose to stay. On the other hand, migrating to China did not only mean they would 
conflict with Taiwanese government directly, but they would also have to surrender 
                                                 
290 China Times, May 4, 2010. 
http://news.chinatimes.com/mainland/0,5245,50503524x112010050400498,00.html 
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their autonomy to the Chinese petrochemical industry. It might seem risky to hand 
over their autonomy and entire supply chains to the China government, though the 
Chinese government could provide a bigger market and cheaper lands for building 
new plants. Because the Taiwan government prohibited the outflow of both capital 
and technology to China unless those firms initiated equivalent investment in Taiwan 
domestically, it posed a serious problem to Taiwan’s petrochemical sector since the 
most significant investment, ENP, cannot start in near future. The announcement from 
the Petrochemical Union in pushing the ENP plan was actually an ultimatum to the 
Taiwan government stating, “Handle the EIA, or let us go to China.” Therefore, the 
state encountered a challenging task because the state officials had to handle the EIA 
reviews filled with opposing opinions within it, but at the same time, they also had to 
placate the anxiety of private capital.  
The State’s Autonomy 
Did the Taiwanese government lose their autonomy because of strong pressure 
from domestic firms? Some facts revealed that the state retained strong autonomy 
over the corporations. 
The Ban on the Petrochemical Industry’s Migration to China 
As described above, being afraid that Taiwan would lose control over 
petrochemical products in the Chinese market, the Taiwan government prohibited 
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Taiwan’s petrochemical sector from investing naphtha-cracking plants, the upstream 
foundation of petrochemical industry, in China. This ban was focused on the 
naphtha-cracking facilities only, and it only covered twenty percent of whole industry. 
Because naphtha-cracking facilities were the upstream segments, the separation of 
naphtha-cracking facilities from other petrochemical firms was costly. Therefore, if 
Taiwan’s petrochemical sector sets up major naphtha-cracking facilities in China, the 
whole petrochemical industry, which operated in cluster, will be forced to migrate 
with the upstream facilities in order to reduce the costs in transportation and 
uncertainty. Therefore, the Taiwan state would like to guarantee that Taiwan still 
manages to get a piece of pie if the migration is inevitable. 
In October 2009, the MOEA announced that the naphtha-cracking facilities were 
allowed to go to China “after” the ENP starts in Taiwan.291 In other words, the 
precondition to lift this ban was to start the ENP plan in Taiwan first. Like the “N-1” 
policy on the LCD industry, which used the Erlin and Holi-Chixing plans as 
bargaining chips, the petrochemical industry was also asked to fulfill “their duty” in 
Taiwan. This time, the bargaining chip was the ENP plan. 
The petrochemical industry in Taiwan was not excited about this decision. The 
biggest reason behind those grievances was the asymmetric analogy between the 
                                                 
291 Wealth Magazine, Vol 332.  http://www.wealth.com.tw/index2.aspx?f=301&id=816&p=1 
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LCD and petrochemical industries. While the semi-conductor and LCD industries 
both possessed the advantage of leading technology in Taiwan through establishing 
R&D departments in Taiwan, there was no technology secrets on naphtha-cracking 
facilities in petrochemical sector, because both Taiwan and China could easily 
acquired this technology from elsewhere. There were no business secrets or critical 
technological advantages to be protected in this ban but only capital. Thus, Taiwan’s 
petrochemical industry believed that it made very little sense to use the ENP as a 
threshold in blocking the migration of the petrochemical sector.  
Furthermore, while Taiwan’s petrochemical industry started to lose an advantage 
in the Chinese market, this industry was actually demanding the government’s 
assistance, not regulations, in negotiating with China. As the previous paragraph 
described before, foreign companies were not allowed to establish naphtha-cracking 
facilities in China without a joint-venture form incorporated with Chinese local 
petrochemical companies. It was not a desirable outcome for the Chinese government 
if the sources of raw materials were dominated by foreign capital, because China had 
begun to develop and protect this sector. Therefore, the Taiwan’s petrochemical 
industry was hoping that the Taiwan state would press China to loosen this regulation. 
They even suggested that the petrochemical industry should be bundled with other 
industries possessing technology advantage in the cross-strait negotiations of ECFA in 
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order to acquire a tariff-free status for Taiwan’s petrochemical products in China.292  
While the leaders of the petrochemical industry used harsh comments such as 
“brainless” in describing this bargain between the Taiwan state and petrochemical 
sector, the MOEA still insisted on their own agenda. For the MOEA, holding 
naphtha-cracking facilities in Taiwan was an important strategic action to respond to 
the rapid development of Chinese petrochemical sector. The MOEA believed that this 
threshold was necessary because China had forced Taiwan’s petrochemical sector to 
accept joint-venture management. In fact, most Taiwan petrochemical industries had 
acquiesced to this principle. Among them, even the toughest Formosa Group has 
stated that the company was considering accepting this term set by the Chinese 
government. While the Formosa Group often operated in single-venture form in 
Taiwan and elsewhere, the company’s position was eventually shaken in 2010.293  
If the Taiwanese firms accepted this term, the migration of naphtha-cracking 
facilities to China would cause fragmentation in Taiwan’s domestic supply chain. If 
there was no more new investment on naphtha-cracking project in Taiwan, the 
Taiwanese petrochemical firms, no matter operate in China or Taiwan, would 
inevitably be controlled by Chinese suppliers.  
Therefore, the MOEA decided that Taiwan needed to regulate this fast capital 
                                                 
292 Economic Daily, September 30, 2010. 
293 Economic Daily, March 20, 2010, Editorial. 
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outflow and to create an intact petrochemical supplying system in Taiwan. By holding 
the ENP in Taiwan, Taiwan’s petrochemical sector could be well-protected. 294 
Therefore, no matter how hard the Petrochemical Union criticized against the 
MOEA’s policy, the MOEA and the Executive Yuan still insisted on this principle. 
The strong position of Taiwan government in regulating the capital outflow in 
petrochemical sector clearly revealed the strong autonomy of the Taiwan state. 
The Penetrative Power 
During 2004-2008, the ENP plan in the Taisi had remained unsettled, because 
this plan failed to pass the robust EIA review. In 2008-2009, the shareholders behind 
of petrochemical industry expressed their impatience after paying several visits to 
Premier Liu. The petrochemical sector asked the government to give a clear answer 
on the EIA review within one year; otherwise they would ask the government just to 
lift this ban on capital outflow, since China has already designed a petrochemical 
industrial site in Haisi, Fujiang. In response to the pressures, the KMT administration 
decided to speed the administrative procedures on the ENP plan. However, there were 
some challenges ahead. 
Ineffective Penetration to the Investor 
The biggest challenges of the ENP plan were “review systems” in both the EIA 
                                                 
294 CTS News, http://news.cts.com.tw/cna/money/200912/200912140364148.html 
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and the APC committees. The EIA review for the ENP plan in Yunlin lasted for four 
years (2004-2008). Even when the GP changed the plan site to Zhanghua, the 
progress in the EIA remained slow. Therefore, the petrochemical industry kept urging 
the government to take a serious position on this time-consuming review.  
Instead of the EIA or the APC reviews, the one who needed to be responsible for 
the time delay seemed to be the GP, because the latter failed to meet the demands of 
EIA committee. For example, the operation of ENP plan would require a massive 
reclamation of coastal area in both the Yunlin and Zhanghua counties. This activity 
would pose a great impact to the marine ecosystem and local fishing agriculture after 
the reclamation. However, during the EIA reviews, the EIA committee members were 
quite disappointed with GP’s proposals. In the EIA meetings held from April to July 
2010, the GP failed to conduct relevant research or provide basic parameters in 
estimating possible negative impacts brought by the ENP plan. Some EIA member 
stated that the GP’s EIA proposal on the ENP plan was the “worst one in this decade.” 
Not only did the corporation cheated on data in marine ecosystem, neither did the GP 
addressed possible environmental impacts or solutions on future coastal reclamation. 
The EIA members therefore concluded that the GP’s report was “sloppy”, “arrogant,” 
and “inattentive to the environment.”295 
                                                 
295 http://e-info.org.tw/node/53787 
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Nonetheless, facing criticism from the EIA committee, the GP claimed that it 
was the government’s responsibility to conduct research on the health risks of local 
residents or wild species threatened by this project. The GP believed that the 
developer was not obligated to provide relevant research results296, and this mindset 
exactly proved the GP’s arrogance in front of the EIA committee. 
Table 5.2 the GP’s Failures in Being Socially Responsible 
Dishonest data GP claimed the scale of ENP would match up with the Formosa’s 
SNP plan, but the CO2 emission will only account for 33% of the 
CO2 emission from the SNP. Since the GP does not have any better 
technology in reducing CO2 emission, the statement was a lie. 
Fake Arguments The GP claimed the ENP could improve the problem of land 
subsidence in the Zhuoshui riverbank, but the establishment of this 
water-consuming facility in this water-scarce area may suggest just 
the opposite. 
Failures to Comply 
with EIA Rule 
The GP refused to conduct submarine photography to observe the 
newly-claimed coastal land. 
Intentional Negligence 
on Local Livelihood 
The GP failed to mention the environmental impacts to local 
agriculture, particularly fishing farms. 
Exaggerating the 
Future Benefit. 
1. The GP claimed that the ENP plan would bring 3% GDP growth, 
while all the energy-consuming industries only consisted of 4% 
of the Taiwan GDP. 
2. The GP over-estimated the CO2 quota from the tree-growing 
efforts. 
3. The GP exaggerated the job numbers the ENP could create. 
Source: Quoted from one previous EIA committee member. Dr. Xu Guangrong. Apple Daily, 
May 11th, 2010. 
In the APC review meetings in April 2010, the similar scenario repeated, for the 
GP delivered a perfunctory report to the APC committee. In their proposal, the 
                                                 
296 http://wenews.nownews.com/news/2/news_2996.htm 
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research on the water usage, local ecological diversity, geological drilling, and soil 
experiments were still far from complete. The APC committee was quite disappointed 
with the GP’s performance297, since the latter had not fulfilled its responsibility of 
conducting preliminary investigation before filing the report to the APC committee. 
While the GP always claimed they expected both the EIA and APC reviews to be 
“taken cared of” by June 2010, their proposals were not qualified enough to be 
approved by the EIA or the APC committees. 
This fact indicated that the GP was not fully prepared in their EIA reports, even 
after a two-year period of preparation. In fact, the MOEA was partly responsible for 
the GP’s poor performance in the review mechanisms, because the legacy of the 
developmental state rendered the MOEA indiscreet for the EIA reviews. Since the 
KMT administration and the MOEA both pledged to the GP that the EIA and APC 
reviews could be done before June 2010, the developer did not take these reviews 
systems seriously. Therefore, whenever this project encountered predicaments in the 
reviews, the GP rather spent time exerting pressures on the MOEA or The Executive 
Yuan rather than seriously complying with the requests from the EIA committee. 
 In the EIA review in April 2010, there were still more than three hundreds 
kinds of paper documents short in completing the EIA procedure, and most of the 
                                                 
297 See the blog of an environmental journalist, Hu Muchyng, in  
http://gaea-choas.blogspot.com/2010/04/blog-post_22.html 
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committee members believed that there was no way the GP could make it by the 
deadline through a normal review. Because the GP threatened to withdraw this project 
in Taiwan, the KMT administration thus took actions pressuring the EIA and the APC 
review by vigorously monitoring the EIA reviews. Acknowledging that the MOEA 
tried to escort the ENP plan without holding the GP socially responsible, the EIA 
committee members decided to defend for the system. In the review, they clearly 
stated that the Industrial Development Bureau (IDB, an agency under the MOEA) 
should help the GP to formulate better proposals instead of pressuring the EIA 
committee.298  
The fact that the GP was not ready to hand in a responsible EIA proposal within 
two months prior to the deadline revealed the state’s incapability to penetrate into the 
corporations. To put it differently, the MOEA was incapable of advising the developer 
to pass the EIA review in a non-political way. This also indicated that the MOEA’s 
failure to rationally calculate the external costs of their petrochemical policy resulted 
in the developer’s negligence of social responsibility. The developer, based on the 
previous experiences operating under a developmental state, chose mobilizing the 
state staffs and politicians instead of fulfilling their duty in review systems. 
 
                                                 
298 http://e-info.org.tw/node/53836 
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State’s Weak Penetration to Local Politics 
The other reason that the GP failed to provide sound EIA proposals in time was 
because they constantly changed the planned sites. Frequent location changes made it 
more difficult to conduct research of environmental impacts on local ecosystem 
brought by the ENP plan. The competition for costal industrial slot with the Formosa 
Group in Yunlin may have been a trigger in the GP’s decision to transfer the ENP plan 
to Zhanghua; however, the steady resistance of local counties against this huge 
petrochemical project was the primary cause. In fact, before Taisi (Yunlin) and 
Dacheng (Zhanghua), the CP attempted to initiate the ENP plan in different local 
counties over the last fifteen years. Most initiations were turned down by local 
counties, for the local counties either refused to bear the environmental costs or failed 
to reach consensus among local factions.299 Even when the vice president, Hsiao, 
strongly introduced this plan to Jiayi in 1998, the local politics still step in the way. 
This weak penetration of the central state into local politics was primarily responsible 
for the fragmentation in the policy, since this uncertainty made the GP incapable of 
planning ahead on their investments.  
 
 
                                                 
299 The proposal in Jiayi County was even mediated by the current vice President, Hsiao, in 1998. 
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Table 5.3 the History of the ENP plans in Different Counties 
Start Date End Date Sites Reasons to Withdraw 
1994 1994 Kaohsiung 
Taoyuan. 
Massive environmental protests from the local 
county (DPP) 
1995 2001 Jiayi Local factional struggles 
1999 2005 Pingdong 1.Resistance from the local county (DPP) 
2.Collateral impacts of abolishing the Meinong 
Dam during the DPP administration 
2003 2008 Yunlin 1.Strategic competition from the Formosa Group 
2.Local factional struggles 
3.Resistance from the local county 
2006 2010 Zhanghua N/A 
Source: Organized by the author 
From the table above, three features can be drawn from these struggles over the 
ENP plan. First, the CP often had the ENP planned in different sites simultaneously, 
which illustrated the high uncertainty in the decision-making process. The local 
county office, local factions, and local environmental groups all appeared as crucial 
players in the process.  
Second, it was difficult for the ENP plan to earn cooperation in local counties 
governed by the DPP, mostly because the DPP politicians held a more suspicious 
attitude against petrochemical industry. The environmental campaigns in these 
counties were also more intense.  
Third, while the local county government was capable of acting as 
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troublemakers in the policy process, the central government seemed less powerful in 
influencing local politics. For example, in Jiayi and Yunlin, the struggles in the local 
factions carried significant weight for the GP’s decision-making. Particularly, the 
factional struggles in Yunlin from 2003-2008, described in the following paragraph, 
were a typical example illustrating the state’s incapability to penetrate into the local 
level. 
Before 2004, Chang Rongwei, a powerful local factional leader, governed Yunlin 
County. Because Chang had very close ties with the Formosa Group, he had been 
quite apathetic toward the ENP plan because of the rival relationship between these 
two petrochemical giants. While Chang promised to the Formosa Group that the land 
in Taisi would be reserved for the Formosa Group, Legislator Hsu Shubo, the leader 
of another local faction, brought new players into local politics. In 2003, via the 
coordination by Hsu, the CEO of CP announced that the CP would start the ENP plan 
in Yunlin. This competition caused a short tension between the two major local 
factions in Yunlin. Having said that, the two factions eventually decided to cooperate 
for the huge common interests in contracting businesses. During 2003-2005, the ENP 
plan seemed to be accepted by the Chang’s local office, though the Formosa Group 
still boycotted it under the table. 
Nonetheless, after Chang was arrested because of corruption in 2004, the KMT 
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lost the county head election to the DPP’s Su Zhifen in 2005. The DPP’s win changed 
the previous deal reached by local factions. As a mandate of pollution victims, Su had 
more doubts on the health risks brought by petrochemical industry, and was inclined 
to reject both the FSP and the ENP plans. As the author described in chapter three, Su 
tried to establish technical thresholds, carbon tax and compensation funds, to block 
both plans despite major local factions had previously reached agreements on 
introducing the ENP plan into Yunlin.  
Acknowledging the fact that the ENP plan in Yunlin would not receive support 
from the local office and would also impeded by the Formosa Group, the GP then 
decided to move the ENP to Dacheng in 2008. In fact, the GP admitted that one of the 
biggest reasons that the ENP moved to Dacheng was because the county office in 
Zhanghua appeared supportive on this project. 
Through 1996-2008, the ENP plan has been staggering among different locations. 
During these fifteen years, the CP operating team kept contacting different local 
counties to seek for a possible site. While the negotiation with the local county, local 
factions and environmental activists may take years, the uncertainty cost was too high 
for the developer to bear. Therefore, the decision to build the ENP plan was held back 
several times during economic recessions. If one took the ENP’s past in Pingdong, 
Jiayi, and Yunlin into account, one would find that the attitude of the local county 
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office has been imperative in influencing the state’s petrochemical policy.  
Although the central government has been aware that the establishment of the 
ENP may be crucial given the fact that the outdated facilities of CP were forced to 
retire soon, it could not co-opt the local counties to follow the direction within these 
fifteen years.300 It may be concluded that the difficulty in receiving local support 
constructed major predicaments for the ENP plan. Because land acquisition, issuing 
construction licenses and granting approvals of preliminary constructions were all 
necessary preconditions for the ENP plan to be initiated, it required nothing but full 
support from local counties. Therefore, the relationship between developers and local 
counties appeared more critical than the state’s policy orientation in terms of policy 
implementation. The rejection of the ENP plan by the Pingdong, Kaohsiung, Taoyuan, 
and Jiayi counties before 2008 indicated that the central government, including both 
the DPP and the KMT administrations, had great difficulties in penetrating local 
politics and in carrying out their petrochemical policies. 
Even in Yunlin, where the dominating local factional leaders all reached 
agreements on the ENP plan, the relatively weak county head Su still managed to 
create troubles in driving the ENP plan away, since it would be difficult for the GP to 
proceed with land acquisition in Taisi without the cooperation from the local 
                                                 
300 The decision on stopping the polluting FCP operation before 2014 was made in 1988. During the 
time span from 1988 to 2010, there was very little progress on the ENP plan. 
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county.301 Some supporters of the ENP plan in Yunlin believed that while Dacheng 
(Zhanghua) appeared to be a less suitable site to establish ENP in terms of its 
vulnerable carrying capacity of local environment, the positive attitudes from the 
Zhanghua county head, Zhuo, was conducive to GP’s final decision in transferring to 
Dacheng.302  In other words, local politics posed a great impact on the state’s 
industrial policies. 
In sum, the penetrative capacity into local politics of the state appeared to be a 
liability in the policy process. First, the state failed to take environmental 
consideration into their policies. After the ENP plan encountered the challenges in the 
EIA review, the government was not capable in guiding the developers to meet the 
demands of the EIA committee. Instead, the MOEA made efforts to intervene in the 
EIA reviews. Second, the state also failed to make reciprocal agreements with local 
offices after democratic transition. Most of the time the state allowed struggles 
between the local factions and political parties to impede state’s policies. The high 
level of uncertainty generated from local political struggles contributed to the 
ineffective implementation of the state’s policies. 
Economic Rationality 
Although there were several economical concerns behind government’s decision 
                                                 
301 China Times, May 10, 2008. 
302 UDN News, May 14, 2008. 
 241 
in promoting the ENP plan, there were also great amount of disagreements on the 
economic efficiency of the ENP plan in terms of its significance to domestic economy. 
The economic rationality behind this plan was quite weak because there was not 
sufficient proof stating that this plan would bring structural changes in this sector or 
meet domestic demands. 
The Balance of Power within the Petrochemical Business 
As the chapter two described, the Formosa Group and the CP Group have been 
the biggest petrochemical products providers in Taiwan. This duel oligarchy has 
existed for twenty years. As a private company, the Formosa pursued their best 
interests and focused on exportation when the company found the profitability in 
Taiwan was relatively low.303 In contrast with the Formosa, the state-owned CP was 
obligated to act as an upstream provider to meet domestic demands. Historically, it 
was the CP providing more petrochemical materials to the medium-sized private 
petrochemical firms than the Formosa did, although the Formosa had a higher 
production amount after the SNP was built in Yunlin.  
A. the Danger of the Formosa’s Monopoly 
The CP claimed that because their FNP in Kaohsiung had to be retired in 2015, it 
was urgent for the CP petrochemical system to build another naphtha-cracking facility. 
                                                 
303 While the Formosa Group decided to develop another small naphtha-cracking plant in 2003, the 
MOEA officials only urged that the Formosa Group share future surplus ethylene with other domestic 
petrochemical industries. It illustrated that the ethylene produced by the Formosa Group was not 
domestic market oriented. Please refer to the news: http://www.coolloud.org.tw/node/52618 
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Otherwise, the companies under the CP umbrella could face an immediate crisis 
because they were heavily dependent on consistent supply from CP’s provision of 
ethylene. According to the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research, the shut down of 
the FNP in Kaohsiung would result in a loss of economic value of 425 billion NT 
dollars (equal to 13.3 billion US dollars), and about half of the petrochemical industry 
in Taiwan would collapse.304  
The GP also claimed that the ENP plan was very essential to Taiwan’s economy 
since the demand of ethylene in southern Taiwan exceeded 2.67 billion tons per year, 
and the existing facilities of CP could only provide 1.08 billion tons per year. Even 
with 1.2 billion tons of extra production brought by the future ENP plan, the total 
supply would not suffice for future domestic demands. Therefore, the establishment 
of the ENP was necessary in keeping the downstream petrochemical business in 
Taiwan, and “no other alternatives can redeem the loss originated from the FNP 
retirement.”305 
In fact, the self-sufficient rate of ethylene inTaiwan had reached ninety 
percent.What needed to be responsible for the shortage of ethylene after FNP’s 
retirement was the Formosa Group‘s exportation policy. Therefore, the MOEA 
officials also believed, after the expansion of the existing SNP, the monopoly of the 
                                                 
304 UDN News, July 5, 2006. Also see China times, September 15th, 2010. 
/news.chinatimes.com/politics/0%2C5244%2C11050201x132010091501197%2C00.html 
305 See the “Review and Respond on the ENP plan” in the EIA reviews. April 2007.  
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Formosa Group in the petrochemical industry would occur, and the imbalance of 
power between the Formosa and the CP would cause a catastrophic outcome for 
national economy. The petrochemical raw materials would be controlled by the 
Formosa, and rubber products would escalate, since the Formosa was an 
interest-driven corporation.306 In other words, the establishment of the ENP plan 
would help to break this imbalance of power and stabilize the market. 
Table 5.4 the Current Imbalance of Power between the Two Petrochemical Groups  
Current Ratio of Production 
 (CP/The Formosa) 
After SNP’s expansion and retirement of the FNP in 2015 
1 : 2.9 1 : 3.4 
Source: Taiwan’s MOEA, organized by the author 
Although it was true that the Formosa would overwhelmingly surpass the CP in 
ethylene production after the FNP retires, it was arguable that the government needed 
to maintain the balance by intervention. The retirement of FNP in 2015 may pose a 
challenge to the CP, but it does not mean the petrochemical industry under the CP 
umbrella would suffer after this event. In fact, the CP could still choose to upgrade 
their existing facilities such as the Third Naphtha-cracking Plant (TNP) in Kaohsiung 
as the alternative. 
The TNP was an outdated facility built by the CP in 1978. Because the production 
rate was limited by its outdated hardware, the upgrade of TNP was initiated in 2005 
                                                 
306 Liberty News, August 27, 2010. http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2010/new/aug/27/today-life9.htm 
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and was expected to be completed in 2012. The estimated production rate is expected 
to increase from 25 tons per year to 80 tons after the upgrade.307 After the upgraded 
TNP starts to operate in 2013, it will ensure a consistent supply of petrochemical raw 
materials to downstream petrochemical firms.308  
However, the MOEA still claimed that the upgrade of the TNP was not able to 
cover the gap between domestic supply and demand on ethylene. The MOEA made 
such a conclusion because they adopted a conservative model in estimating gains 
from the upgrade of the TNP.309 However, the production rate of the new TNP can be 
very flexible. In fact, the production rate of ethylene by the new TNP can be up to 0.8 
million tons per year based on its original design.310 By this amount, the new TNP 
can cover the entire loss of production brought by the retirement of the FNP. (see 
table below)  
 Table 5.5 Ethylene production in the future (unit: million tons per year) 
Two Versions Loss from FNP 
retirement 
Gain from TNP upgrade Total Sum 
MOEA Version 0.5 0.37 -0.13 
Normal Version 0.5 0.57 +0.7 
Organized by the author 
                                                 
307 In 2008, the EIA committee originally rejected the EIA proposal of the TNP upgrade. After exerting 
political pressure, the TNP upgrade was soon approved by the EIA committee because of little social 
attention. 
308 China Times, December 30th, 
2008.  http://news.chinatimes.com/CMoney/News/News-Page/0,4442,content+120601+12200812300
0390,00.html 
309 The MOEA only set the production rate of the new TNP as a fixed 0.6 million tons per year. 
310 http://www.coolloud.org.tw/node/42769 
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 Therefore, the state’s promotion on the ENP plan based on the retirement of the 
FNP could not stand. While the MOEA often stated that the purpose of establishing 
the ENP was to replace the outdated FNP, the key factor behind the ENP plan was that 
the MOEA had an agenda in creating a balance of power between these two 
petrochemical giants. In order for the CP system to compete against the Formosa 
Group, the CP needed to bolster ethylene production to a much larger scale. The 
upgrade of the TNP can only keep the petrochemical industry under the CP system 
from declining. It was the ENP plan, which could guarantee the survival of the CP 
and its subordinate firms. 
 B. Was the Balance of Power Intrinsically Good for Taiwan’ Economy? 
  If assisting pan-CP firms was to break the one-company dominance through the 
establishment of the ENP, there were two levels of questions involving in this 
proposition. First, was the dominance of the Formosa group in Taiwan’s 
petrochemical industry detrimental to Taiwan and this industry? Second, if the 
answer to the first question is positive, was supporting the CP the most efficient 
method to break this dominance? 
The MOEA’s answer was definitely “yes” for both questions.  In September 
2010, the MOEA director, Yen, made an announcement stating that “the purpose of 
building the ENP is to avoid Formosa’s monopoly,” and listed oil prices as an 
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example. According to Yen, during 2007-2008, the skyrocketing oil price hindered 
Taiwan’s economy. The Taiwan government once asked the oil providers, both the 
Formosa and the CP, to freeze domestic gas prices in order to stabilize the economy. 
While the CP complied with the government and suffered a loss of ten billion NTD, 
the Formosa Group decided to export most of their petroleum products overseas to 
avoid the business without profits.311 Yen thus concluded that it was dangerous 
allowing an interests-driven private firm to dominate the market, especially for such 
strategically important goods. Yen also implied that the price of livelihood goods may 
escalate once the Formosa Group takes over the market in the future.  
In fact, Yen’s argument was quite misleading. In terms of the question in the first 
level, even though the competition between these two corporations can be maintained 
by the state’s robust calculation, the price of ethylene would be unjust. It is a 
controlled subsidy rather than a free market mechanism. The price of ethylene 
produced by the CP has been constantly lower than those produced by the Formosa 
Group and imported items312 . However, the cost of operating naphtha-cracking 
facilities of CP was actually higher given their smaller scale, more outdated facilities, 
and higher personnel costs. With those disadvantages in CP, it was a very surprising 
fact that the CP still manages to supply the market with a lower price in this long 
                                                 




period. In fact, this may suggest that the CP has played a role in stabilizing the 
ethylene price without considering the market mechanism.  
In 2008, the petrochemical branch of the CP suffered a loss up to thirty million 
USD, because they failed to reflect their costs to downstream petrochemical firms.313 
It was actually the taxpayers bearing the cost since the CP was a SOE, and this 
twisted price mechanism caused the distortion of external costs of developing 
petrochemical industry in Taiwan. In this sense, the CP was a “state tool,” for it 
served a bigger goal in implementing government’s economic policies. Therefore, 
although the existence of CP in the petrochemical market may help to lower the price 
of ethylene, it actually caused more inefficiency in the market.  
Table 5.6 the Price Difference between CP, Formosa and Imported Items (ethylene/per ton) 
 Compared to Formosa Compared to imported item 
CP’s Ethylene price 20 US dollars lower 100-150 US dollars lower 
Source: http://www.coolloud.org.tw/node/43201 , 2009 
Despite the fact that a distorted market may not be the desirable goal for 
Taiwan’s economy, even when one agrees on that the monopoly of ethylene by a 
malicious corporation, if any, could be theoretically dreadful to national economy, the 
second level of question is still valid. Should the Taiwan state support the ENP 
plan to break this dominance? Did the fears against Formosa’s dominance over 
                                                 
313 Apple Daily, July 12, 2008. 
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petrochemical market automatically lead to a conclusion in giving birth of the ENP 
plan by the GP? The answer remains unclear. 
The first problem of Yen’s notion on this “duopoly” was it might not be more 
competitive than monopoly. Historically speaking, the competition between the 
Formosa and CP in the gas market was quite evident in proving this point. Taiwan’s 
petroleum market had been once totally monopolized by the CP, and the Formosa 
Group was permitted to enter this market in 2000. Although the Formosa group 
claimed that the competition in the gas market would help to reduce the gas price, 
facts suggested the opposite. In fact, the CP and the Formosa entered a “joint-pricing” 
mechanism on a tacit pact, and the competition did not really occur. The Formosa has 
been exporting their oil products, including gas, to digest their overstock. Therefore, 
the price of gas remained fixed after the Formosa entered this market.  
Second, it is very difficult to artificially maintain the balance of power. Before 
1999, the CP was the sole domestic provider of ethylene, and the Formosa Group was 
in a much weaker position while entering the market. However, a decade after 1989, 
the Taiwanese government had to nurture the CP to keep this SOE in the game. The 
CP was far behind because of its higher operational costs and slower progress in 
formulating new market strategies. This fact suggested that the market may change 
rapidly, and the productive capacity was also highly associated with the companies’ 
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strategy selection, operational costs, and their missions. Also, while the CP planned to 
initiate the ENP plan to be back into the game, the Formosa begun to expand their 
SNP at the same time as well. The result of competition is quite dynamic, and it may 
be very difficult for the government to ensure the outcome of the competition, let 
alone to remain a balance of power, since the government may have difficulty in 
anticipating “how much is enough”. 
 Therefore, the goal for the MOEA was not to maintain the balance of power in 
the petrochemical industry per se, but rather to guarantee a consistent supply of 
low-cost petrochemical materials in Taiwan, which may be an inefficient policy 
given its negligence on external costs and its competitiveness on global market. 
The rapid growth of the Formosa, a private company that may be more difficult to be 
restrained by the MOEA, jeopardized the state’s plan in providing petrochemical 
materials at a fixed low price, since this private provider refused to undersell raw 
materials to domestic petrochemical firms.  
In addition, if the dominance of the Formosa Group continues, this firm will 
eventually build relationship with most of the downstream petrochemical 
manufactures in Taiwan. If the Formosa Group decides to migrate to China one day, it 
would create a crisis because its growing downstream partners may have to side with 
the Formosa during the migration. Therefore, the Taiwan state was trying to intervene 
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for the market by developing a Taiwan-friendly petrochemical entity, which could 
faithfully implement the state’s policy. More precisely, it was not the competition 
that the Taiwan government wanted to create, but a “loyal policy practitioner” to 
support petrochemical sector in Taiwan.  
The ECFA and the Competition with China 
According to the MOEA’s plan, with the ENP plan, Taiwan’s goal in 2015 is to 
become the operation center in Eastern Asia.314 Under this goal, the most competitive 
opponent would be China. With new facilities accomplished in 2012, China may have 
a leaping development in the ethylene industry with a total production of 9.5 million 
tons per year. Most important of all, these facilities will be controlled by three big 
Chinese SOEs. Because the Taiwan government felt reluctant to let the Chinese 
petrochemical firms control the supply of ethylene, a Taiwan-operated ENP plan 
would be necessary in building a self-sufficient supply chain.315  
 Therefore, the other purpose for the Taiwan state to push the ENP was to 
maintain Taiwan’s current advantage in the petrochemical business, both in the 
Taiwanese and Chinese markets. Not only the ENP could bolster petrochemical 
productions in Taiwan, but the ENP also stood for the government’s effort to hold 
capital of petrochemical firms in Taiwan before they move to China. However, did 
                                                 
314 Please refer to the IDB’s “the Development Strategy of Taiwan’s Petrochemical Industry” in the 
EIA review meetings. April 2007. 
315 Central News Agency, December 14th, 2009. 
http://news.cts.com.tw/cna/money/200912/200912140364148.html 
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this policy really create better economic efficiency? There were some facts suggesting 
that this policy was rather a political decision than an economic one driven by 
reasonable economic efficiency, since the economic benefits from enlarging 
petrochemical sector was not evident. 
A. Oversupply of Petrochemical Products in China 
According to the estimation from Oil and Gas Magazine, China will become the 
biggest producer of ethylene in 2015, and the total production of Chinese 
petrochemical production will be equal to the combination of Taiwan, Japan and 
Korea.316 With the rapid development of the petrochemical industry in this decade, 
the Chinese petrochemical industry has grown vigorously. Another study from IEK 
(Industrial Economics and Knowledge, a research institute under Taiwan’s MOEA) 
also suggested that the overall supply of ethylene by Chinese petrochemical providers 
had been exceeding the total demand in the Chinese market after 2008. In addition, 
the gap between supply and demand will continue to increase until 2012.317 Given 
the fact that China does not need to import crude oil from outside, China is able to 
develop this sector with cheaper costs and reliable sources. It also means that it would 
be very difficult for Taiwan’s petrochemical firms to compete with their Chinese 








counterpart. Not to mention the transportation costs of the products shipped from 
Taiwan to China would make Taiwan’s petrochemical products more uncompetitive.  
In fact, China has appeared as the biggest market for petrochemical products 
from Taiwan. About 70% of the petrochemicals produced in Taiwan were exported to 
China. While China became the major market for Taiwan’s petrochemical products, 
the oversupply of petrochemical products in both the Taiwanese and Chinese markets 
would soon become a potentially precarious situation to Taiwan’s petrochemical firms. 
In other words, in the near future, establishing a grand-scale ENP in Taiwan would be 
a very arguable decision. 
In the meantime, the global ethylene market also reached its limit. The analysts 
from Chemical Market Associates Inc. (CMAI) stated that the recent rapid boom from 
the Asia and Middle East petrochemical industry has push overproduction to a new 
stage. "It's going to take a number of years for this overhang in 2010 to be 
absorbed.318” Given the upcoming surplus of supply in global and Chinese markets on 
ethylene, the profitability of the ENP plan would be uncertain. 
Besides, the “ASEAN+3” system has exerted another wave of pressures on 
Taiwan’s petrochemical community. The new production brought by the ENP plan 
would become less competitive if Taiwan fails to reach an agreement with China on 
                                                 




reducing tariffs on exported products. Therefore, certain economical arrangements 
between Taiwan and China must be created in order for Taiwan’s petrochemical 
industry to increase productivity. The ECFA agreement appeared to be an opportunity 
to protect Taiwan’s petrochemical sector, but unfortunately, the Taiwan government 
failed to build this cushion in the negotiations in 2010. 
B. ECFA as the Solution? No! 
According to the research from the Chinese Economic Research Institute in 2009, 
the reduction of tariffs on Taiwan’s petrochemical products from 6.7% to zero, 
through signing the ECFA treaty with China, would bring 38 billion USD in revenue 
to Taiwan’s petrochemical products.319 In other words, while the petrochemical 
industry in Taiwan believed that they had reached a dead end, the ECFA may give 
them a chance to offset the disadvantage if tariff reduction could be realized, though 
some petrochemical entrepreneurs believed the gain might be marginal. 320  If 
Taiwan’s petrochemical products acquire tariff-free status in China, in terms of the 
production costs, “there would be little difference between investing in Taiwan and 
China then.”321 Therefore, to put Taiwan’s petrochemical industry on the tariff-free 
list had been the top priority in ECFA negotiation for Taiwan side. 
                                                 
319 Business Weekly, Vol 1138, September 14, 2009. 
320 Some Taiwan’s petrochemical entrepreneurs believed that ECFA would not enlarge the market 
share of petrochemical products like the MOEA claimed. The petrochemical industry estimated that the 
ECFA could “only prevents the market share from dropping 
321 This was from the interview with the owner of the Formosa Group. Tianxia Magazine, vol 437. 
January 2010.  http://www.cw.com.tw/article/index.jsp?page=1&id=39997 
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If Taiwanese government was not capable of putting petrochemical industry into 
the “Early Harvest List” in the cross-strait negotiation, the ENP plan could be a 
harmful decision. Petrochemical industry in Taiwan will had to face the challenges 
from growing Chinese domestic petrochemical competitors and a series of critical 
competition form ASEAN countries in Chinese market then. Therefore, the 
petrochemical industry in Taiwan strongly asked the Taiwan government to protect 
their interests in the ECFA treaty, for it was the last incentive for them in investing in 
Taiwan. 
Given the small scale of domestic market of petrochemical products, 
“overproduction” has been a constant risk for Taiwan’s petrochemical firms. While 
the gap between domestic supply and demand of ethylene in Taiwan was 0.6 million 
tons per year, the size of the ENP was expected to produce 1.2 million of ethylene. 
This huge production will inevitably trigger overproduction problem once it starts 
operation. In fact, the MOEA’s publication in 2009 has clearly stated that both the 
SNP and the ENP’s production will target industrial zones in China to digest their 
oversized production.322 Therefore, the operation of the ENP will inevitably face the 
overproduction issue in the Chinese and global market. 
However, Taiwan’s petrochemical products could, to be the better part, remain 
                                                 
322 IEK, 2009-2010 Petrochemical Annual Book.  
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status quo only when the ECFA granted tariff-free status to Taiwan’s petrochemical 
status. If the Taiwanese government failed to put petrochemical sector on the ECFA’s 
early harvest list, current overproduction of petrochemical products would erode the 
profitability of this sector, not to mention after adding great amount of production 
from the ENP plan in the future. In other words, it may be a very shaky sector for the 
government to invest on. 
The Chinese domestic petrochemical corporations such as Sinopec and CNPC 
also acknowledged that an upcoming harsh competition in Chinese market would 
occur due to the overproduction across the strait. During the cross-strait negotiations, 
these companies kept lobbying the Chinese government to shut the door to the Taiwan 
petrochemical industry. In May 2010, the Chinese government finally ruled that, in 
the upcoming ECFA treaty, about 90% of major petrochemical products from Taiwan 
would still carry a 6.5% tariff if exported to China (and ASEAN).323 Owing to the 
requests of the Chinese domestic petrochemical industry, the Chinese government 
refused to benefit the competitors from Taiwan.  
To China, this decision was also a strategic move in the cross-strait competition. 
Instead of allowing Taiwan’s petrochemical industry to stay in Taiwan and enjoy the 
zero-tariff benefit, the tariff in an “ASEAN+3” system would create huge pressure for 
                                                 
323 China Times, May 26, 2010. 
http://news.chinatimes.com/mainland/0,5245,50503758x112010052600208,00.html 
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Taiwan’s petrochemical firms. Once Taiwan’s petrochemical firms decide to migrate 
to China under this pressure, given their mandatory joint-venture character with 
Chinese domestic firms, Chinese government would be able to take full control of this 
industry across the strait. Instead of staying as a part of the production chain, the 
petrochemical sector in China could take a more dominant position. 
 However, the MOEA’s promotions on the ENP plan still carry on even though 
Taiwanese government failed to put the petrochemical sector on the list. While the 
petrochemical products in Taiwan will not receive tariff-free status in the future, the 
ENP plan was a great risk on future overproduction. This suggested that economic 
rationality behind the ENP plan has been surrendered to political concerns. 
C. Supply Creates Demand? 
 The salience of the ENP plan was the productivity of ethylene, which has been 
the key of industrial chains. Therefore, the MOEA defined it as a national strategy to 
be self-sufficient on ethylene. In the “EIA Reports on Petrochemical Policy” in 2010, 
the MOEA claimed that the goal of Taiwan’s petrochemical policy was to be “fully 
self-sufficient for domestic needs on ethylene.” However, even though the MOEA 
officials believed that the ENP plan may help to reach the goal in being self-sufficient 
on ethylene, there was no agreement among economists whether Taiwan needed 
another naphtha-cracking facility.  
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According to Taiwan’s Business Week Magazine, before the SNP was built in 
1998, the self-sufficiency rate of ethylene in Taiwan was only thirty-eight percent and 
thus it might be reasonable to develop this upstream facility as ethylene was an 
upstream element in the petrochemical industry. However, after the upgrade of the 
SNP in 2003, Taiwan’s self-sufficiency rate of ethylene has increased and eventually 
exceeded ninety percent in 2008. With such a high self-sufficiency rate of ethylene, 
there was no urgent need for Taiwan to develop a huge project to meet this ten percent 
gap.  
Besides, there was also a hidden problem in this “self-sufficiency myth.” Because 
ethylene was a byproduct of the oil refinery industry, the production of ethylene was 
closely associated with the production of crude oil. While more than 99% of Taiwan’s 
petroleum has depended upon importation from abroad, the self-efficiency rate of 
ethylene was a myth, since Taiwan could by no means self-sufficient on oil. In this 
case, it was the oil, instead of ethylene, that matters for being self-sufficient.  
Most important of all, a more crucial problem on the ENP plan was the attitude of 
Taiwan’s petrochemical firms. Owing to the character of the petrochemical industry, 
the establishment of the upstream naphtha-cracking facilities was mostly driven by 
the downstream demands. It was the so-called “reverse integration.” In Taiwan, it was 
the demand from small downstream petrochemical firms, which triggered the 
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establishment of Taiwan’s first naphtha-cracking facility in 1968. During 1973-1984, 
it was the thriving demand of ethylene in Taiwan that triggered the Taiwan state to 
develop the upstream petrochemical industry as the “target industry” and built three 
naphtha-cracking facilities.324 In other words, it was the existing demands, which 
brought upstream facilities, not vice versa. There has been a very similar scenario 
occurring in China recently. 
However, in the last two decades, there were sixty percent of Taiwan’s 
downstream petrochemical firms migrated to China. Owing to the character of 
“reverse integration” in this sector, those firms were actually seeking local upstream 
naphtha-cracking facilities in China to cooperate with. Therefore, if there was a 
choice, those firms would prefer to build their naphtha-cracking sources in China. In 
fact, during the 1990’s, some private petrochemical firms in Taiwan had attempted to 
set up the naphtha–cracking facilities in China. Based on the comparative advantage, 
they appeared relatively apathetic in conducting investment in Taiwan. 
The impetus driving this group migration was that it has been increasingly 
difficult to evade environmental regulations and to acquire cheap lands in Taiwan for 
petrochemical sector.325 Far from 1995, the CP has already sought for a possible site 
                                                 
324 Chu, Wan-Wen Chu. 2001, “Taiwan’s Petrochemical Industry After Liberalization And 
Globalization,”(自由化與全球化之後的台灣石化業)，Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social 
Studies(台灣社會研究季刊)，Vol 44，pp13-47 
325 Commercial Times, September 6, 1998. 
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for the ENP plan in Taiwan. However, the highly polluting feature prevented the CP 
from finding a local county office willing to accept this plan because of its extremely 
high external costs. With the massive environmental campaigns against large-scale 
petrochemical facilities, the ENP plan, along with other petrochemical projects found 
itself unwelcome in most places. In the meantime, the cost of acquiring suitable sites 
for industrial use also drastically increased in Taiwan after a certain level of economic 
growth. Those factors also decreased the willingness of the petrochemical 
entrepreneurs to invest in Taiwan. 
During 1995-2002, the CP encountered a small series of privatization. The ENP 
plan looked like an appealing target to draw investors’ attention while their 
disadvantage against the Formosa Group in petrochemical sector would make the CP 
a liability in the stock market.326 Therefore, the CP decided to build joint venture 
with Taiwan’s private firms in starting the ENP plan, but agreements could not be 
made among the coalition, for most private firms did not find it profitable to launch 
the ENP plan in Taiwan.327 At that time, most Taiwan private firms had little interest 
in joining the ENP plan. It was the fact that their facilities in Taiwan were highly 
dependent on the CP’s supply of ethylene, which pushed them to join this coalition. In 
2002, the CP had to start this plan without the participation of other private firms.328 
                                                 
326 Epoch Times, October 15, 2002. http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/2/10/15/n235665p.htm 
327 Epoch times, April 25, 2003. 
328 Epoch times, October 15, 2002. http://epochtimes.com/b5/2/10/15/n235665.htm 
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The choice of private firms revealed the fact that marginal utility of the ENP plan was 
open to question. 
When the financial crisis occurred in 2008, this petrochemical industry in 
Taiwan was immediately hit. With problems digesting their massive production, the 
issue of “Move to China” was brought up again since the market in China was the 
only place remaining growing during this global recession. While China has become 
the primary market for Taiwan’s petrochemical products, most of the petrochemical 
firms believed it was crucial for Taiwanese firms to “occupy the seats” in order to win 
the future competition over Chinese market. In terms of competitiveness, it would be 
inefficient to keep the upstream facilities in Taiwan while letting go of the 
downstream ones. The fragmented supply system may actually result in the increase 
of production costs.329  
While major petrochemical entrepreneurs blamed the government for suffocating 
the petrochemical industry in Taiwan, the MOEA expressed their priority in this 
decision. In 2009, the MOEA claimed that the profitability of certain sectors “was 
not the primary concern” of the Taiwanese government. Rather, the reason that the 
Taiwan government banned the investment of upstream petrochemical facilities in 
China was because lifting this ban would cause three negative influences. First, it 
                                                 
329 See the statement from the CEO of the Formosa Group. Apply Daily, February 13, 2007. 
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would result in capital outflow. Second, it would affect domestic confidence to invest. 
Third, it would trigger a collective migration to China including more downstream 
firms and massive unemployment330 . This statement clearly showed that the 
decision to start the ENP was not based on a market-driven concern. Instead, 
political concerns such as reducing the unemployment rate dominated the 
decision-making agenda. 
In October 2010, Du, the director of Taiwan’s IDB, also stated that: First, in 
order to maintain Taiwan’s economic growth, the petrochemical industry has to exist 
in Taiwan. Second, in order for the petrochemical industry to stay in Taiwan, the 
government has to “exploit investment in upstream facilities to push forward growth 
for other sectors.” Otherwise, Taiwan’s petrochemical industry will entirely migrate to 
China, and this capital outflow would increase the unemployment rate in Taiwan.331 
Du also announced that the top priority in formulating ENP plan was to “Leave 
Industry’s Roots in Taiwan.”
332 By “root”, Du was referring to capital and jobs. To 
put Du’s words differently, the government would create the productivity without 
concerning market demands, and they believed that the demand may be created later 
overstock problem occurs. 
                                                 
330 Economic Daily, December 17, 2009.  
331 See the PTS TV Program,” Our Island,” Vol 578, October 11, 2010. 
http://web.pts.org.tw/php/html/island/list.php?pbeno=1549 
332 This speech was given when Du attended a seminar held by Taiwan’s Plastic Industry Development 
Center on October 13, 2010. See Commercial Times, October 13 2010.  
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Du’s notion clearly violated the “reverse integration” pattern of the 
petrochemical industry. This twisted mindset on economic growth by political 
concerns imposed a negative influence on market rationality of private firms. During 
2008-2009, both GP and the Formosa Group delivered naphtha-cracking plans in 
Taiwan (the ENP for the GP, and the expansion of the SNP for the Formosa Group). 
However, in the meantime, they both asked the government to lift the ban on the 
investment of naphtha-cracking facilities in China. It suggested that both plans were 
not made based on the concerns for profitability, but in trade of an open window to 
China. 
In fact, even the shareholders in GP were highly pessimistic about the future 
ENP plan. Rather than worrying that the EIA review would terminate the possibilities 
of starting the ENP plan in Taiwan, they actually believed it was neither profitable nor 
efficient, given the clear disadvantage in the skyrocketing costs in operating the ENP 
plan in Taiwan. They wanted the EIA committee to approve this plan, because, like 
the LCD industry, the ENP was the “safe deposit” they had to pay before the 
migration. Even when the EIA approved the ENP plan, most shareholders would 
rather not start it.333 
 
                                                 
333 The chairperson of Petrochemical Union asserted that the ENP was officially dead, since most 
stakeholders would like to withdraw their capital. Their primary concern was whether the government 
would life the ban if the ENP plan failed to pass the EIA review. See Liberty Times, November 27th, 
2010. http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2010/new/nov/27/today-e1.htm 
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Economical or Political? 
The threshold in impeding capital’s outflow to China was not a single event.  
Starting from 1988, while the Formosa Group was banned from implementing the 
Haicang Plan in China, the Taiwan government was very reluctant in approving 
large-scale investment conducted in China. From 1992-2000, the KMT implemented 
a “No Rush, Stay Patient” policy to boycott fast capital inflow into China caused by a 
great difference of wages across the strait. In order to redirect the capital, the Taiwan 
state even launched several projects encouraging Taiwan’s firms to invest in 
Southeast Asia and Central America during 1996-2000.  
During 2000-2008, the cross-Strait was frozen due to the DPP’s 
pro-independence position. The DPP administration had a stricter policy in limiting 
capital flowing to China. The most significant case was the investment plan brought 
by Formosa Group. In 2003, the Formosa Group planned to invest on new 
petrochemical facilities in China, and the DPP administration adopted “technical 
measures” to delay the review.334 President Chen even publicly asked Taiwanese 
businessmen to be “patriotic” and loyal to Taiwan in 2006 in regard to conducting 
investment in China.335  
The capital inflow to China was considered a national security issue when 
                                                 
334 http://big5.huaxia.com/20030917/00121833.html 




“China is too important economically for Taiwan to resist politically”. National 
security thus became a major concern in these industrial policies, while the Taiwan 
government was also anxious about losing capital and jobs triggered by the migration 
to China. Therefore, the ENP plan became necessary under the principle of “Leave 
Roots in Taiwan.” Only when the ENP plan was realized in Taiwan will it be more 
politically correct to lift the ban. 
Therefore, a reasonable sense of economic rationality was missing in the 
policy-making of the ENP plan, regarding industrial policy. The state seemed to place 
more attention on facilitating the GDP rate, rather than truly developing the 
petrochemical business in meeting future market changes. For those bureaucrats, 
keeping investments in Taiwan appeared to be a much more important concern. 
Deliberation 
During the policy formulation, one of the major problem was that the MOEA 
failed to conduct a comprehensive review on the energy and water issues. The MOEA 
often made arbitrary decisions to accommodate with the ENP plan without including 
the voices of local residents and civil groups. However, the huge negative impacts 
brought the ENP plan led to the jam in the EIA procedures and created more room for 
possible deliberation, since there was hardly any agreement on the cost effectiveness 
of the ENP plan among the petrochemical industry and local neighborhood. The 
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conflicts in EIA procedure aroused widespread attention from different government 
agencies. Both the Legislative Yuan and the EPA asked the MOEA to adopt a more 
deliberative policy-making procedure before submitting this hot potato to the EPA. In 
other words, this series of conflict set a good model for deliberative policy making, 
though may not perfect, for policy formulation in the future. Although the 
deliberation in the MOEA policy system was rather symbolic, it was the first time that 
the economic bureaucracy had to listen to the voices from local neighborhood.  
Inconsistent Deliberation on Energy Efficiency and CO2 Emission 
The first critical issue brought by the ENP dispute was the energy use. Taiwan is 
a country with scarce natural resources, and the development of energy-intensive 
industry specially requires discretion. According to the data from Taiwan’s Energy 
Bureau, the energy-intensive industry such as the petrochemical industry has 
possessed a disproportionate ratio of energy consumption. Based on the data, from 
1988-2008, these industries consumed more than 30% of total energy, but only 
produced 4% or lower of the GDP. In 2008, the energy-intensive industries consumed 
36.5% of the total energy, but only contributed 3.86% of the GDP. Furthermore, with 
the rapid increase of energy prices, the cost of importing energy overseas also 
increased. In 2008, the importation of energy cost Taiwan 15.3% of the total GDP, 
which also suggested that Taiwan had to spend 5.5% of the total GDP to feed these 
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energy-intensive industries, while only receiving 3.86% of the GDP in return.336 In 
this case, investment on the energy-intensive ENP plan may be seen as an inefficiency 
of energy in terms of cost effectiveness, since the opportunity cost exceeded the 
possible benefit. 
Table 5.7 the relationship between energy import and GDP produced in Taiwan 
Year Total Energy Import 
Consisted of GDP 
Ratio (%) 
Total Energy Consumption 
Ratio by Energy Intensive 
Industries (%) 
Total GDP Produced by 
Energy-Intensive Industries 
(%) 
1988 2.81 32.0 4.28 
1990 3.81 28.1 3.90 
1995 2.58 27.9 3.85 (3.66)* 
2000 3.88 (3.94)* 27.3 4.02 (3.72)* 
2005 7.94 (8.14)* 32.3 4.15 (3.15)* 
2008 15.3 (15.8)* 35.9 3.86 (2.90)* 
2009 10.02 36.3 - NA 
Source: 2009 Energy Statistic Pamphlet published by the Energy Bureau in Taiwan. (Organized by the 
Taiwan Environmental Protection Union.) * indicated the estimation from environmental groups. 
In addition, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), in 2007, 
Taiwan was listed eighteenth place in terms of total amount of CO2 emission, and had 
the top growth rate in CO2 emissions on average.337 The total amount of CO2 
emission from Taiwan was approximately 257 million tons per year. The EPA director 
also proved that the average CO2 per capita in Taiwan was 12.08 tons, which was 
                                                 
336 See the 2009 Energy Statistic Pamphlet published by the Energy Bureau in Taiwan. 
337 Based on IEA data and presented by Liu Shao-chen in SINICA. 
http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/7/4/25/n1690344.htm 
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2.76 times above global average.338  
As one of the top emitters of CO2, Taiwan would inevitably face the challenge 
of Kyoto Protocol in the near future. By paper, the Taiwanese government had a plan 
to reduce 87 million tons of emission by 2020.339 However, the ENP plan was 
expected to increase at least 12 millions tons of CO2 emission after it started 
operation340, and this number may be an underestimation.341 
Besides, with the proposal of the Reduction of the Greenhouse Gas Act (GGRA), 
in order for the ENP plan to receive the emission rights, the GP has to buy them from 
overseas sources if the carbon regime starts becoming effective. According to the 
estimation of Taiwanese environmental groups, the minimum annual CO2 emission 
brought by the ENP plan would be somewhere between 47 million tons and 67 
million tons, dependent on the fuel sources the ENP will use. It will cost the GP 2.35 
billion USD yearly to purchase these permits.342 It would make the ENP plan much 
less profitable if one adds the cost of CO2 emission into the evaluation on cost 
effectiveness. If the MOEA decided to follow a “fully self-sufficient” policy for the 
                                                 
338 The director of the EPA, Shen, proposed the data. See EPA website: 
http://ivy5.epa.gov.tw/enews/fact_Newsdetail.asp?inputtime=0990418193441 
339 http://www.in-en.com/article/html/energy_0911091196557163.html 
340 Like the FSP, the ENP will contribute a big burden in this carbon-reducing plan, because the CO2 
emission brought by the ENP plan was estimated to reach 8 to 16 million tons per year, depending on 
the scale of the following expansion. 
341 According to environmental scholars, this number was not incredible since the average CO2 
emission of the SNP is 67.55 million tons. While the size of the ENP was approximate to that of the 
SNP, a more reasonable estimation was 36 millions tons, at least, if the ENP adopts the best available 
technology. http://e-info.org.tw/node/57959 
342 This estimation is based on the market price of 50 US dollars per ton of CO2 emission. Taiwan 
Environmental Protection Union did this calculation. Please refer to: http://www.tepu.org.tw/?p=2045   
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petrochemical industry, the expanded SNP combined with the ENP would consist of 
more than one-third of Taiwan’s total CO2 emission in the future. Therefore, the CO2 
emission problem was an issue, which needed to be treated seriously. 
However, instead of searching for solutions, the MOEA bureaucrats claimed that 
since Taiwan was not a signature entity of the Kyoto Protocol, given its ambiguous 
status of national identity, this international treaty did not bind Taiwan. During 
2005-2006, despite acknowledging the huge amounts of CO2 emission brought by the 
FSP and the ENP, the MOEA officials claimed they would definitely support this 
project by all means. This action illustrated Taiwan’s negligence on possible risks 
brought by its petrochemical policy.  
During 2005-2007, even with the anti-nuclear activist Chang Goulong as the 
EPA director, who expressed his suspicion about the ENP plan in a weekly meeting 
within The Executive Yuan, the MOEA staff chose to ignore Chang’s opinion. While 
Chang insisted that both the FSP and ENP had to be reviewed under a “policy EIA” 
scope, which suggested the EIA committee, should shift the review focuses from a 
single project to the industrial policy as a whole. After five years, this policy EIA 
was eventually realized in December 2010.  
In the early stage, in order to reconcile the conflicts between the MOEA and the 
EPA, Premier Hsieh finally chose to assign this decision-making task to the 
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“Sustainable Developmental Council, SDC”, a platform-based agency led by an 
environmental law scholar, Yeh. In the regular meetings in the Executive Yuan, the 
Premier Hsieh allowed this agent, instead of the MOEA in previous administrations, 
to take charge of the comprehensive reviews of this policy. In 2005, the Premier 
Hsieh echoed the conclusion from the SDC and decided that the CO2 emission and 
water scarcity should be both listed as the primary concerns of this policy.343 
Throughout his term, the ENP plan was held back because of this strong deliberative 
function from the SDC.344 
During Premier Hsieh’s term from 2004-2006, he took a more deliberative 
position on this petrochemical policy. He froze the government’s budget in promoting 
the ENP plan and claimed that the ENP would not be finalized until the impacts of 
possible emission of greenhouse gas could be dealt properly. Also, the EPA under 
Hsieh’s period adopted a strong position on legislating the GGRA and tried to 
integrate more perspectives about the state’s petrochemical policies. 
After Chang and Hsieh both resigned in 2007 and 2006, the deliberation within 
the state on the ENP plan was declining. The successors of the EPA and SDC had 
been more inactive on this project345, and the SDC was also even abandoned after 
                                                 
343 See the record of twentieth meeting of the SDC on July 8, 2005.  
344 From 2005 to 2010, Premier Hsieh was an anomaly among all the administrations. Most of the 
administrations, including Su (2007-2008), Liu (2008-2009) and Wu (2009-now), all framed the ENP 
plan as a national-level project that the state must make every effort to complete. 
345 For example, while the legislators criticized that the future FSP and ENP combined would consist 
of 66 % of current CO2 emission in Taiwan, the EPA director, Shen, even claimed that the high volume 
 270 
2008 since it was only a policy platform. After Chang’s hard works in pushing the 
draft of the GGRA into the Legislative Yuan in 2006, there was very little attention on 
this act in the Legislative Yuan during 2006-2010. There were only two articles 
passing the legislative review, while the rest of the articles still haven’t been 
meaningfully discussed. This hollow commitment on greenhouse gas reduction also 
illustrated the government’s inconsistency on energy issue.  
 Lack of Equity and Deliberation on Water Supply 
Another problem brought by the ENP plan was the water shortage in central 
Taiwan. For the ENP plan, no matter if it was built in Taisi (Yunlin) or Dacheng 
(Zhanghua), it would encounter the problem of water shortage since it required 0.4 
million tons of water per day after 2017. In this regard, the ENP plan appeared to be 
an environmentally disastrous project considering its external cost. Similar with the 
CTSP, the destiny of the ENP plan highly relied on a series of water-collecting 
engineering projects in the future, which also challenged the planning of water 
management. 
Due to severe water scarcity in central Taiwan, the external costs to conduct the 
ENP plan in this area were extremely high. Both the Erlin and ENP plans in 
                                                                                                                                           
of CO2 emissions brought by the ENP plan was not an urgent issue, since petrochemical firms can 
grow trees oversea to receive credits. Shen obviously neglected the fact that, as the director of the EPA, 
he was expected to protect Taiwan’s environment. The quota earned by growing trees overseas was a 
feasible strategy of industrial sectors, but definitely not an appropriate solution proposed by the EPA 
director, since the goal of the EPA was to reduce the total emission. 
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Zhanghua were expected to consume 0.6 million tons of water per day in the future, 
while the total household consumption of water in Zhanghua was only 0.36 million 
tons. The water supply for both projects combined clearly exceeded the water 
carrying capacity in this area.  
In order to implement both plans, the Water Bureau planned to build a tier in 
Dadu River and to transport 0.8 million tons of water per day to both Yunlin and 
Zhanghua. The pipeline construction would cost another 30 billion NT dollars, and 
was designed to serve the sole interests of these industrial projects. Although the 
Water Agency claimed that they will collect usage fees from the users after the Dadu 
tier started to function, the cheap water price still appeared as an issue of injustice. 
Table 5.8 the Injustice of Water Distribution 
Plans Price of Water (per NTD for per unit) 
ENP plan 8 
SNP Plan  4 
Household Use 13 
Source: Water Agency 
The justice problem was not only that the corporations were allowed to consume 
more inexpensive water than the civilians did, but the corporations also got the 
priority to be provided water before households. While Water Bureau made those 
decisions without the participation of civil groups and agricultural groups, the 
distributional and procedural justice in this water governance were therefore 
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questioned in the EIA review process.  
First, the Zhanghua-Yunlin areas have encountered water scarcity issue for 
decades. Among the 0.36 million tons of daily water usage per day in Zhanghua 
county, 0.3 million tons of them were extracted from under-ground water. Therefore, 
land subsidence had been a serious problem in local area and was jeopardizing the 
safety of high-speed rail passing through this area. In Zhanghua, local authorities and 
experts had to establish restricted areas to prohibit local people from setting up 
extracting wells. Therefore, water was a huge issue in this area, and providing 
household-use water for local residents was presumably equally important. However, 
the water authority directly handed the new water from Dadu tier to the ENP plan 
without discussing this with local residents. The plan of the Dadu tier was built to 
provide water solely for industrial usage, and the government did not plan to build 
water-cleaning facilities along with this project, which means the water rights of local 
residents were neglected. 
Second, although the MOEA claimed that the water quality of Dadu River may 
not be suitable for drinking, the water extracted from Dadu River can still be used for 
agricultural irrigation. As a matter of facts, the land subsidence was also caused by a 
shortage of irrigational water, since farmers often drill for underground water while 
having difficulty finding water from the irrigational channels in summer. Therefore, 
 273 
the agricultural sector was presumably entitled to have a share in this “water pie.” 
However, farmers, like other local residents, were excluded from the decision-making 
process. 
Third, the Dadu tier was planned to be finished by 2014 as soonest, if its EIA 
proposal went smoothly. Before the completion of the Dadu tier, the ENP plan had to 
“borrow” thirty thousand tons of agricultural water every day. In this sense, the ENP 
plan did not only crowd out future water rights from the agriculture sector, but also 
plundered existing water rights from them. However, the local agricultural sector did 
not receive compensation. Neither the MOEA nor the Water Bureau tried to reach 
reciprocal agreements with the agricultural sectors for these intrusive actions. 
To sum up, the state conducted arbitrary actions with very little deliberation in 
water-extracting plans to supply the ENP plan. The authoritative legacy of the 
developmental state rendered the MOEA reluctant in receiving multilateral 
agreement.  
First Time Administrative Hearing in the MOEA System 
In order to better settle the ENP controversy, the Economic Committee in the 
Legislative Yuan decided that an administrative hearing had to be held in Dacheng 
before the EIA committee conducted further reviews. At the beginning, the IDB under 
the MOEA refused to hold this unprecedented administrative hearing, and claimed 
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that the EPA should be responsible for holding this public channel since this project 
was a “private investment.” However, the EPA staff also refused to take this 
responsibility for they believed that there were no legal sources suggesting the EPA 
was the supervising agent. With both government agencies passing this hot potato to 
each other, the MOEA was forced to hold the first administrative hearing targeted on 
major national-level industrial projects in December 2010 in Dacheng, Zhanghua. 
According to Taiwan’s “Administrative Procedural Act,” the MOEA could be 
obligated to hold a preliminary hearing, if needed, to clarify the situation involving 
conflicts, to exchange information and scientific data, and to arrange a scheme of 
following official administrative hearings. By law, the official administrative hearing 
was also required to leave sufficient time for public participation and information 
exchange. Those rules were trying to ensure that the public debates could be 
conducted peacefully and reasonably before the policies can be made. 
However, as the novice in holding an administrative hearing, the MOEA failed to 
comply with the regulations, and directly skipped preliminary works before the 
official hearings. The MOEA even failed to send notices to local representatives. 
Being quite unprepared, participants had little idea about the attributes of this hearing, 
and therefore did not trust this mechanism. Because participating citizens were only 
allowed to speak for three minutes per person, the hearing turned into chaos while 
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most the participants assumed that the government had already made the conclusion. 
After a series of violent conflicts, the IDB’s vice-director, Lien, was forced to dismiss 
the meeting without any conclusion being reached.346 Due to the MOEA’s hastiness, 
an occasion of public deliberation thus turned into a physical battlefield of both sides. 
Participants constantly yelled, insulted, and even physically attacked their antagonists 
in the hearing.   
Because of MOEA had never held the administrative hearing in their own 
policy-making system, the staff were very unfamiliar with the rules of this 
deliberative methods. However, the spirit of deliberation was not entirely deteriorated 
by this misconduct. In fact, based on this experience, the EPA had been initiating a 
proposal that MOEA will have to hold certain amounts of administrative hearings 
before submitting the proposals to the EIA committee.347 Although the EPA intended 
to use this method to reach some social consensuses before EIA review started, it will 
actually forced the MOEA take responsibility in broadening civil participation before 
making major decisions. This administrative hearing, though appeared symbolic, 
indicated that the public deliberation could be better implemented in the MOEA if 
social agreements cannot be reached. The administrative hearing held by the MOEA 
on a state-patronized project, though still immature, was a milestone in the state’s 
                                                 
346 Peopo News, http://www.peopo.org/portal.php?op=viewPost&articleId=72471. 
347 It was based on the personal interview with the EPA official. 
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deliberative policy-making. The efforts of the EIA committee and civil groups paid 
off in setting up this precedent for future. 
Accountability and Transparency 
In the ENP case, the key to evaluate the government’s accountability was 
whether the state complied with legal obligation and opened up to supervision of 
checking institutional mechanisms or public monitoring. Therefore, a fully 
independent reviewing function from government agencies, and transparent 
information release, were both the keys of the state’s accountability. The author finds 
the positive outcomes from these conflicts were as follows. First, the MOEA started 
to accept institutional monitoring, and decided to deliver the EIA proposal on 
petrochemical policy to the EPA in December 2010. Second, the EIA made clear rules 
in forcing the developer to hold public hearing in local areas before the EIA reviews 
wjile the MOEA still exerted great pressure on the EIA. 
While politicians still tried to intervene with political expediency, it became 
increasingly difficult for the central government to penetrate interview mechanisms. 
For the agencies without monitoring mechanisms, the manipulation of law can easily 
happen. However, in the ENP case, the economic bureaucrats appeared more careful 
in respecting the transparency and independence of the EIA review committees, 
mostly because of the impacts from the lawsuit of CTSP. The politicians may still 
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chose to manipulate the policy process, but the impacts were less viable on the EIA 
committee.  
 State’s Attempts in Manipulating the Administrative Procedures 
Given the fact that the GP’s EIA proposal was not fine enough to pass the EIA 
review, some involved administrative agencies decided to manipulate the procedures 
in coordination with the MOEA’s orders. Among them, the most significant two 
examples were the Water Bureau and CPA (Construction and Planning Agency). The 
administration adopted several unaccountable measures to exert expediency in 
evading the monitoring of possible checking mechanism. 
A. Water Bureau: Irresponsible Water Supply for the ENP plan 
Given the water shortage in local area, whether the ENP plan could acquire 
sufficient water supply was a fundamental issue in the EIA review, since extraction of 
under-ground water could cause further environmental degradation. Because the EIA 
committee members particularly emphasized the salience of water sources in the 
review, “finding water” became a crucial task for MOEA bureaucrats. As the 
subordinate agent under the MOEA, the Water Bureau had been responsible to find 
needed water for the GP in order to protect the ENP plan in passing the EIA review.  
However, knowing that it would be very a difficult task given the sensitive 
environmental condition of local areas, the water authority, to some extent, sacrificed 
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its professional expertise and thus proposed several irresponsible solutions. The 
character of expediency in these policies was revealed in the following dimensions.  
 Rely on Future Facilities That May Not Be Realized 
In order to fulfill water demands from the ENP plan, the Water Bureau created 
several water-extracting programs, including the Dadu tier in Dadu River, Niaozui 
Artificial Lake, and Jiji tier in the accompanied Hushan Dam. These three 
water-extracting facilities were expected to provide the Zhanghua and Yunlin areas 
1.5 million tons of water per day, in theory.  
However, there was extremely high uncertainty involving these three 
water-supply programs. First, the water–collecting programs focus on long-distance 
transportation would also cause other environmental impacts in different areas. The 
second question appeared to be challenging government’s accountability, because 
those programs were not ready to begin anytime soon. The Dadu tier was just 
entering robust EIA reviews, and the outcome remained uncertain up to present. In 
terms of the Niaozui Artificial Lake, the Water Bureau had not submitted a relevant 
EIA proposal for review yet. As for the Jiji tier, because it was a part of Hushan Dam, 
its operation will mostly depend on the scheme of Hushan Dam. However, the 
Hushan dam was still in the lawsuit process since the developer illegally started the 
construction in prior of the EIA.  
 279 
Therefore, as a matter of providing certainty in the water supply, these three 
programs were by no means responsible. Rather, these solutions only transferred the 
environmental costs of the ENP plan to other areas, which may not be included in this 
EIA review. If the EIA committee accepted these programs as future water-supplying 
mechanisms for ENP, a very possible outcome may be that these water programs 
would automatically pass the EIA review in the future because “they have to be 
approved because ENP needs them.” Otherwise, the ENP plan would encounter 
water-supply problems if parts of the water-supplying chain were missing. Therefore, 
these water programs based on evading reviews were actually creating more troubles 
in other EIA cases. 
 Illegal Supply of Agricultural Water 
During the experts meetings in July 2010, the GP claimed that they had acquired 
the necessary water provided by the Zhanghua Irrigation Water Association (ZIWA 
afterwards). However, the EIA committee soon questioned the legitimacy of this 
water collecting action. 
First, during the EIA reviews on the Erlin plan in 2009, ZIWA had reached an 
agreement with the EIA committee that, due to the scarcity of agricultural water in 
central Taiwan, the Erlin plan would be the last case in loaning agricultural water for 
industrial purposes from ZIWA. Therefore, the deal between the GP and ZIWA would 
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be a violation of previous environmental commitment made by ZIWA.  
Second, according to the law in agricultural management, agricultural water can 
only be allocated to other purposes when drought or scarcity of water occurs. In other 
words, relieving water scarcity in drought season was the only legitimate reason to 
make use of irrigational water in other purposes. However, the water supply from 
ZIWA to the ENP plan would constitute constant water traffic on a regular basis. This 
constant supply of irrigational water to the industrial sector was an illegal action, but 
the Water Bureau still endorsed this plan.  
In the EIA sessions, the CEO of the GP admitted that he employed his personal 
connections in ZIWA to retrieve water resources for the ENP plan. The following 
statement from the GP illustrated the irresponsibility of the water-management 
agencies: 
“The shareholders wanted this case to go faster, so we thought about the water in 
the Zhuoshui River. Then we knew that it still took too much time, so I contacted 
ZIWA. How on earth could I know how they got the water and what kind of promises 
they made in the EIA review about the Erlin plan last year? All I want is water!” 
(Quote from the speeches from the CEO in the EIA review) 
During the policy process, the role of the Water Bureau was quite an 
embarrassment. Rather than being designed for water conversion, this government 
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agent was ordered to produce necessary “water resources.” Therefore, once the 
Executive Yuan confirmed that the ENP was a part of the state’s petrochemical policy, 
this agent was responsible for supplying water in carrying out the state’s policy. 
Under this circumstance, the boundary between the corporations and the Water 
Bureau was quite vague. In the experts meetings in May 2010, the Water Bureau 
officials even represented the GP in sending reports to the EIA members in describing 
the future water supply for the ENP.348  
In fact, the water-management officials also recognized that the water supply in 
central Taiwan was very stringent. However, they were forced to create these 
programs regardless of the environmental carrying capacity, since they received the 
direct order from The Executive Yuan to generate water. An official from Water 
Bureau unwillingly admitted that: 
“The ENP plan was an imperative of the government. As a part of the government, 
we are obligated to solve the problem, even though we find it very difficult to carry 
them out.” (Quoted from the speech from the officials from the Water Bureau in the 
EIA review in May 2010) 
Therefore, as a direct subordinating branch in the MOEA, water-managing agent 
had primarily acted as an implementing body without being monitored by other 
                                                 
348 The Water Bureau did not find it a problem until the EIA members posed challenges against their 
unclear character. See 
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agencies. Its expertise and professionalism in allocating water was sacrificed under 
political intervention. In this case, the Water Bureau had to provide irresponsible 
programs, which also violated their expertise and law, to meet water demands for the 
ENP plan. There was little checking mechanism on this administrative manipulation 
within the MOEA system. Only in the reviewing mechanisms such as the EIA could 
the regional water usage be comprehensively reviewed. 
B. Dacheng Wetland Issue 
Next to the planned site of the ENP, there was a 2000-acre of wetland around the 
Dacheng coastline across the south Zhuoshui riverbank. Because of the rich 
biodiversity of this wetland, the land is environmentally crucial for conservation 
purposes.349 In 2007, while the CPA began selecting national-level wetlands for 
conservation uses, Dacheng was chosen as the ninth most significant wetland in 
Taiwan by participating marine scientists. However, in the final confirmation 
meetings held by the CPA in 2008, owing to the protests of local political leaders 
supporting the ENP plan, the director of the CPA decided that the Dachang wetland 
had to be removed off the list of national-level wetlands.350 
In the review meetings in 2010, facing criticism from environmental groups, the 
                                                 
349 This wetland has been a shelter of several endangered species such as white dolphins and Eurasian 
curlews 
350 In fact, because the CPA adopted a relatively loose standard in reviewing the importance of 
wetlands, there were thirty-nine wetlands listed as national level-one shelters in the final selection. 
However, the Dacheng wetland, as the ninth place regarding its environmental significance, was only 
listed as a “disputing” one rather than a listed shelter. It signifies the political controversy behind the 
selection 
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CPA officials admitted that Dacheng, given its ecological salience, was undoubtedly 
qualified to be included, as a national wetland, but local politics seemed to step in the 
way.351 Because the tag of “national wetland” would bring more legitimacy for 
conservation actions in Dacheng areas, some local politicians, who treated the ENP 
plan as a quick booster of the local economy, thus tried to block this conservation 
action from the CPA. 
In February 2010, the CPA decided to list the Dacheng wetland as a national-level 
conservation shelter to celebrate International Wetland Day. However, a shareholder 
of GP then wrote to Premier Wu to express his concerns. After the letter was 
submitted, the Executive Yuan soon asked the CPA to hold this decision to prevent the 
creation of another obstacle in the ENP project.352 In this case, the environmental 
expert’s decision on the wetland conservation was thus again compromised by 
political intervention. With very little accountability check mechanism, policies can 
be easily distorted. 
The irresponsible water-supplying programs and the removal of the Dacheng 
wetland off the conservation list both illustrated that the professions of bureaucracy 
can be easily compromised and manipulated in bureaucratic system. These twisted 
decisions only proved that the checking mechanism outside the administrative 
                                                 
351 See the announcement from the Wild Heart Association, 
http://zh.wildatheart.org.tw/archives/eeeceieciee.html 
352 See the news from Taiwan Environmental Association, http://et.e-info.org.tw/node/134 
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branch was crucial in reviewing the legitimacy and efficiency of the state’s plans. 
More Transparency Created by the EIA 
Since local communities often loathed the petrochemical sector for its highly 
polluting feature, the EIA reviews were filled with grievances from local residents. 
Most local residents that they were not respected in the policy process, for the 
corporations only dealt with local governments. While most of the residents needed to 
work in their hometown, it was a luxury for them to participate in the EIA or public 
hearings in Taipei. The transparency in the policy was therefore became a significant 
issue. 
To solve this antagonism between both sides and to facilitate the communication, 
the EPA thus imposed new regulations to release information to the public. In June 
2009, the EPA formulated the Principles of Public Hearings in the EIA and the 
Principles of Public Seminars in the EIA. Both acts ordered the developers and their 
supervisors to hold public hearing and seminars in local counties before submitting 
EIA proposals. The developers and their supervisors were required to notify social 
groups, local council members, village heads, and other stakeholders ten days before 
the meetings. The messages must be sent in paper documents and be posted on the 
EPA website.353  
                                                 
353 See the Principles of Public Hearings in the EIA and the Principles of Public Seminars in the EIA, 
article 3. 
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Owing to this reform, the developer, the GP, and the MOEA had to hold a series 
of public hearings and seminars on the ENP plan from November 2010 to January 
2011. The Water Bureau was also asked to hold public hearing on the water-collecting 
programs in rural Zhanghua. In these occasions, local participants were more 
motivated to express their opinions and to question the policies.354 Through these 
approaches, the EIA, as a monitoring agency, successfully opened the black box of 
decision-making to the public.  
Resisting Politicians’ Intervention in EIA Committee  
Bearing cost of endless waiting, the GP therefore threatened to withdraw the 
case if the EIA committee did not approve their EIA proposal by June 2010. I 
response of the corporation’s expectation, Premier Wu thus asked the EPA to process 
the EIA review “more actively.” Vice President Hsiao and Premier Wu both pledged 
that the “ENP plan will start in 2010” and “the EIA review will be completed by 
2010.” 355  
Because of the time pressure, the EPA spent May, June and July in 2010 
conducting experts meetings. In order to facilitate the process, the EPA condensed 
more than one hundred related issues into four sessions of experts meetings and two 
                                                 
354 For example, in the public hearing on Dadu Tier held in December 2010, in face of the challenges 
from a wide arrays of local residents and environmental groups, the supervisors in Water Bureau 




preview sessions. The EIA members even made jokes about the frequency of meeting 
sessions as literally “one meeting per week.” This joke showed that the EPA had 
speeded up the review procedures to meet Premier Wu’s expectation. The EIA and 
APC committees were both arranged in tight schedules in order to match the 
developer’s plans. 
 However, the abysmal quality of the GP’s EIA proposal made it impossible for 
the EIA reviews to go any further soon.356 During a series of experts meetings in 
May and June, the EPA officials have recognized that, in order to have the ENP pass 
the review, the GP had to make compromises because the negative environmental 
impacts brought by this plan were proven significant. Because the GP failed to 
provide credible data to protect environmental quality in adjacent areas, the EPA 
decided to conduct coordination between the EIA and the GP.  
Among those environmental concerns, the conservation of coastal white 
dolphins drew a great amount of social attention, since it was categorized as an 
internationally endangered species. While the reclamation of coastal wetland by the 
ENP plan would potentially block the migration channels of white dolphins, the 
separation of dolphin schools may cause extinction of this species, which represented 
a large-scale degradation of marine quality. In June 2010, the director of the EPA, 
                                                 
356 Even the environmental consulting company of the GP admitted that this was the most challenging 
case they ever had, since there was very little time and data to be used while the ecological sensitivity 
of this case has been widely acknowledged. 
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Shen, proposed that in order to reach mutual benefits for precious dolphins and ENP 
plan, the only feasible solution was to preserve an ecological hallway for white 
dolphins, which meant the ENP plan and its industrial port had to be divided in two 
different places and connected by a cross-sea bridge. This suggestion from Shen 
indicated that the bureaucracy was influenced by the legal precedent of CTSP, and 
became more aware of the possible risks if the EIA failed to conduct a meaningful 
review. The EPA officials tried to work the plan out by making this deal more 
acceptable for both sides. This autonomy of bureaucracy, though limited, allowed 
more room for comprehensive EIA reviews.  
However, the GP still declined this initiation because this cross-sea bridge would 
increase cost by an additional 24.5 billion NTD. The CEO, Chen, stated that the 
shareholders of GP would not agree to spend this amount of money on protecting 
white dolphins. The MOEA also suggested that the ENP plan should remain 
unchanged since any design change would hinder the “utility of the investment.”357 
Encountering the dilemma, the EPA director had to publicly urge the GP to bear more 
social and environmental responsibility.358   
Instead of taking advice from the EPA, the GP claimed that they would initiate a 
“guiding program” to settle this issue. According to the GP’s proposal, the company 
                                                 
357 See the official announcement from the Industrial Development Bureau, 
http://www.moeaidb.gov.tw/external/ctlr?PRO=news.NewsView&id=9761 
358 UDN News, June 10, 2010. 
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will adopt “feeding methods” to guide the dolphins to bypass the reclaimed coastal 
lands. This alternative was an empirically untested and theoretically arguable solution, 
and it did not receive any credible support from the animal science community. 
Although most of the marine scientists and EIA members were very suspicious about 
the feasibility of this method, Premier Wu surprisingly echoed this idea. He stated: 
“White dolphins have their own ways to survive and to swim. If they can make 
turns in the Taichung Harbor, they can make turns in Zhanghua. Unlike cars, 
dolphins can make turns at their own will.”
359
 
This superficial statement was simply a political intervention for both the 
independence and professional expertise of EIA committee. Although this was not the 
first time that Premier Wu decided to personally intervene for the EIA process, like he 
did in the Erlin plan in 2009, the EIA committee did not buy GP’s proposal this time. 
In four sessions of experts meetings and two preview sessions during the EIA, the 
participating experts all came to the conclusion that the sessions were “incomplete” 
and were still awaiting more credible proofs. The EIA members even initially added 
another experts meeting on carbon issue, and made the review sessions even longer.  
While the GP and Premier Wu both expressed their strong desires in have the 
ENP plan to pass the EIA as quick as possible, the EIA members stated that it would 
                                                 
359 UDN News, July 7, 2010. 
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be impossible to approve this case as the GP expected. The committee members 
concluded that since the GP was not fully prepared, a more reasonable date to expect 
the approval of the EIA review would be the end of 2010 or much later. In fact, the 
ENP plan was still under the review up to the April 2011, and there was little sign 
suggesting that the EIA committee would approve it soon. This strong position of the 
EIA committee clearly conflicted with the political directives of the KMT politicians.  
Adjust and Learn: Better Accountability and Autonomy of the Checking 
Mechanisms in the ENP Case 
Normally, when the state officials strongly showed their determination about 
government-patronized plans, it gave the EIA members political hints when making 
decisions. With little intention to challenge the government, each EIA member felt 
hesitated to be the first one to pull the trigger. This problem of collective actions thus 
contributed to the fact that the EIA members could only focus on trivial problems 
such as pollution abatement when they sensed strong government’s patronage behind 
the projects. The EIA members were more reluctant to challenge the core issues 
directly, but tried to circle around or to add provisos to the final decision. The 
conditional approval of the Holi and Erlin plans were typical examples. 
During the review sessions on water-supplying mechanisms for the ENP in 
March 2010, the EIA committee has been quite about the Dadu tier project despite 
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most of the EIA members still holding doubts about this water-collecting mechanism. 
One of the EIA members privately admitted that:  
“If we rejected this proposal, then it was very likely that the developer would 
deliver a more problematic one. The current EIA system was not strong enough to 
keep it from the government’s intervention. If the developing behavior was not 
stoppable, then probably we should just choose the better solution.” (Quoted from the 
interview with the environmental activists) 
However, he also addressed: 
“It was very often that only when there was an EIA member pulling the first 
trigger that the rest of them would start to join this battle vigorously. This was our 
national character of being gregarious”. 
This statement proved that the EIA members often felt powerless when political 
intervention appeared stronger. The EIA members sometimes were bothered by their 
low self-efficacy in such an important occasion. However, although political 
intervention still prevailed in this case, both the EPA bureaucrats and EIA committee 
members did perform better autonomy in the ENP case.  
For example, according to GP’s original proposal, the estimated VOCs emission 
brought by the ENP plan would be 4362 tons per year. This amount would consist of 
three percent of the total VOCs emission in the central Taiwan area. Before the EIA 
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reviews began, the Air Pollution Branch of the EPA had criticized this high volume of 
emission. He believed that this high volume of emission would not only deteriorate 
air quality in the central Taiwan area, but also jeopardize the ‘VOCs Emission 
Reduction Plan”, a plan, proposed by the EPA, to cut at least 31 % of the total 
emissions by 2015. The EPA staff thus suggested that the EIA members should force 
the GP to reduce VOCs emission up to 50%. It was quite rare that the EPA staff 
perform a guardian role in front of EIA reviews. 
The origins of this better accountability partly came from massive public 
participation into the ENP case, granted by the participation and transparency 
produced by deliberative measures. Both the legal lawsuits against the CTSP filed by 
environmental lawyers and massive participation of local communities in the public 
hearings caused a tremendous impact in countering the state’s power. 
Since the legal disputes broke out on the CTSP case, the EPA officials started to 
pay more caution to legal responsibilities. After the legal struggle from 2006-2010, 
the Supreme Court finally ruled that that the EIA review on the CTSP’s expansion in 
Holi-Chixing and Erlin plan should be voided due to the lack of discretion in the EIA 
review. Therefore, the EPA particularly paid attention to possible flaws of the EIA 
reviews in the ENP case. The legal precedent from the Holi-Chixing and the Erlin 
verdict forced them to be more cautious in the possibility of violating legal 
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procedures. In the review sessions of the ENP plan, the EPA officials insisted that the 
GP had to conduct all necessary research before starting the EIA review. Therefore, 
although Premier Wu gave specific orders in facilitating the ENP, the ENP was not 
able to complete it in 2010. 
Furthermore, the massive social campaigns against the ENP also gave supports 
to the EIA members. In June 2010, a group of eighteen honorable research fellows in 
the Academia SINICA (the National Central Research Institute, the supreme research 
institute sponsored by the central government) publicly opposed the ENP plan. Within 
two months, there were more than one thousand college scholars and public figures 
joining this campaign. This campaign created a safe cushion for the EIA member to 
hold a stronger position, since the social campaign led by the scholars created 
legitimacy for the EIA members in challenging this plan from a scientific perspective.  
Once the first strike was launched, the snowball effect soon broke the barrier of 
collective actions. Almost all of the EIA members joined the choir in reprimanding 
the GP’s proposal. While the experts meetings in the CTSP Erlin plan were proven as 
a loophole in the EIA, the series of experts meeting on the ENP plan appeared to be 
more environmentally responsible.  
Besides, a powerful industrial accident also played a part when a similar facility 
in Formosa’s SNP exploded twice in July 2010. These explosions caused an economic 
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loss equivalent to 0.3 billion USD.360 Suffering from the SNP’s pollution for a long 
time, the local residents in Yunlin besieged the SNP for months in protesting. The 
industrial accidents also contributed to setting up a negative image for the 
petrochemical industry, and indicated the malfunction of the industrial management 
and monitoring after the unsound EIA review.  
Influenced by this massive social participation, the state was not able to 
implement this plan with administrative manipulation. The MOEA had to file the first 
“EIA report on petrochemical policy” to the EIA, and listed different developing 
plans for public discussion. This improvement on state accountability and 
transparency, though were ignored by the developmental state of Taiwan before, were 
proven significant in correcting the state’s inefficient plans through strong monitoring. 
Although the developmental state of Taiwan was not used to this change, the 
participation of civil sector through checking mechanisms proved very significant. 
Owing to the monitoring function of EIA reviews, the Taiwanese government 
and society had more time and room to conduct public debates on this issue. The 
former DPP Premier Su Zhenchang, who had enthusiastically pushed for these major 
investments in his term, officially confessed that the DPP’s petrochemical policy on 
the ENP plan in his term was “a mistake.”361 In their presidential campaigns, Su and 
                                                 
360 UDN News, July 25, 2010. http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NAT2/5746242.shtml 
361 China Times, March 26, 2011. http://news.chinatimes.com/focus/50108389/112011032600120.html 
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former Premier Cai both pledged to stop this investment if they are elected as 
Taiwanese president in 2012. 
Conclusion 
Overall speaking, the Taiwan state’s policy on petrochemical industry in this 
decade could not be defined as a market-conforming developmentalism, since it was 
not based on maximizing interests for petrochemical industry. On the surface, the 
legacy of Taiwan’s developmental state had particularly emphasized the significance 
of establishing naphtha-cracking facilities in Taiwan because of its salience in 
industrial chain. Rather, it actually served a more general goal – keeping the capital in 
Taiwan. The intentional blocking of petrochemical industry flows to China by 
using the ENP as a threshold illustrated the state’s basic intention to control 
capital. While the state remained powerful in regulating capital outflow, the 
authoritarian legacy of the developmental state led to a petrochemical policy with 
little efficiency.  
While overproduction of petrochemical raw materials had become a potential 
danger in both Taiwan and China, this expansive policy on the ENP would encounter 
serious problems while the ENP may not be capable to digest the overstock in the 
future. Besides, as the petrochemical industry showed great interests in migrating to 
China both because of the expansion of ASEAN and China’s protectionism, the ENP 
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plan may be considered rather a bargaining chip between the Taiwan state and the 
petrochemical industry than a profitable investment. While the technology of 
naphtha-cracking was not associated with business secrets, the target that the 
government aimed to protect was not technology or the industry, but the state’s 
control in capital. This politics-oriented policy could hardly achieve 
market-conforming success because the comparative advantage of enlarging this 
sector may not exist. Its huge amount of negative external costs was even more 
important for a small island without natural resources, since the petrochemical 
industry was an energy-intensive sector. 
While the state tried to push through this policy, the politicians found that it was 
increasingly difficult to manipulate the checking mechanisms because of the 
increasingly strong monitoring of social sectors and monitoring agencies. With the 
social campaigns led by scholars and a crucial verdict from the Supreme Court on the 
CTSP case, as the example, the bureaucrats started to adopt a deliberative approach in 
solving this issue and paid more respect to the checking mechanisms. The massive 
social participation granted by these institutional arrangements thus prevented 
the administration from further manipulating the review procedure. The stronger 
monitoring from government’s checking mechanism and civil sectors eventually led 
to the state’s re-evaluation on its previous flawed petrochemical policy. 
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Chapter 6  Conclusion 
 
 The legacy of Taiwan’s developmental state rendered itself concentrating on 
previous patterns. The techno-bureaucrats tended to promote capital-intensive 
programs without carefully evaluating their economic efficiency. In the three cases 
examined by this dissertation, the opportunity costs and external costs all appeared 
considerable compared with the profitability of these inefficient projects. Because of 
the state’s intention to control capital outflow to China and Vietnam, the Taiwan state 
was persistent in carrying out these projects by intervention with political leverage.  
Developmental States and the Impacts of Democratic Transition 
While developmental states were often argued incompatible with democratic 
regimes, this dissertation demonstrated the opposite prospect. It showed that the 
status of Taiwan’s developmental state remained firm after democratic transition 
given that the state was still autonomous in terms of defining and preserving national 
interests. The techno-bureaucracy still showed great enthusiasm to economic growth 
based on a mindset of “late comer” developmentalism. As one of the MOEA officials 
described, 
“The huge capital brought by these projects was too precious to be given up. We 
are still far behind developed countries. Therefore, we could not afford not growing. 
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Continuous rolling of the growth rate is imperative to this country. The alternatives 
and other models can wait until we catch up with developed countries.” 
In terms of the salience of economic bureaucracies in Taiwan, he also argued that, 
“Normally we made most of the decisions regarding economic affairs. In FSP, 
CTSP and ENP cases, the Premiers often listened to us when we concluded that these 
projects should be done for Taiwan’s economy. The Executive Yuan normally 
approved all of our initiations. There was barely any re-evaluation on those projects 
at the higher level. In fact, there was no need to re-evaluate them. How can it be 
wrong with more investments?”  
From the perspective of Taiwan’s MOEA, it had been devoted it to stimulating 
Taiwan’s economy by promoting as many domestic investments as possible. Its 
dedicated efforts granted its dominant role in the state’s decision-making. That was 
precisely the spirits of developmental states. However, without a comprehensive 
supervision system, the policies formulated by strong bureaucrats were left 
unchecked. This dissertation proved that the Taiwan’s MOEA, due to the lacking of 
accountability and deliberation, ended up with promoting risky investments with 
little consideration on social and market constraints, for they assumed that 
preserving capital in Taiwan was the first priority. 
However, the EIA system ensured by democratic transition had a profound impact 
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in correcting these mistakes. Although the new government formed by the DPP was 
also co-opted by the MOEA in endorsing these policies, the new elements brought 
by the democratic transition was influential in creating a public sphere in 
monitoring the state’s industrial policies. 
First, the DPP’s previous experience in environmental activism created a more 
deliberative EIA committee. The inclusion of grassroots activists in the EIA 
procedure from 2005 to 2007 empowered the social groups to better recognize both 
the cost-effectiveness of policies and routine practices of institutional supervision. 
Although the grassroots activists eventually were removed from the EIA committee in 
2007, their expertise in practicing the EIA review allowed them to exert their 
influence in both shaping social pressure and filing legal actions against the 
government’s policies. 
Second, the temporary segregation between the KMT and the developmental state 
offered a better chance for the checking mechanism to function with less political 
intervention. Compared to previous KMT administration, the DPP politicians 
generally showed more respect to checking institutions because they were more 
unfamiliar in adopting administrative manipulation within the system. Both the 
autonomy and the function of the EIA and the APC had great improvement under the 
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DPP administration. 362 This autonomy, consolidated by massive public 
participation, increased the difficulty of manipulation even when the KMT 
regained their power after 2008. A statement from the MOEA official described the 
changes in the EIA committee after 2005: 
“Before the CTSP and ENP plans, the EIA reviews were simply negotiations. The 
EIA committee would raise the standard a bit higher to prove that they did their jobs, 
and we would accept their term since they were just trivial problems. Ever since 2005, 
we found the EIA committee non-negotiable. We were forced to conduct research, to 
hold administrative hearings, and to do policy EIAs. Even so, we were still nowhere 
near the EIA committee’s standards.” 
  Therefore, democratic transition opened a door for the possibility of monitoring 
the state’s behavior, and it was the public participation and institutional 
monitoring that through this door reinforced the developmental state in Taiwan 
by correcting the state’s errors in conducting inefficient projects. Through the 
interdependent governance within the review mechanisms, these industrial programs 
were smoothly postponed. Some programs were even called off by corporations 
themselves. The increasing deliberation generated by public participation in the 
public checking mechanism, though still at the initial stage for a developmental state, 
                                                 
362 Most EIA members admitted that the EIA meetings and public hearings held under the DPP 
administration allowed more room for discussion and different opinions. Generally, the involved 
government agencies could tolerate longer review process and more radical protests under the DPP 
administration before 2008, particularly during Hsieh’s term as Premier (2004-2007). 
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has improved the state’s accountability for public policies in Taiwan to some extent. 
The state was forced to review their inefficient policies driven by political 
considerations, and it finally conformed to economic rationality. 
 Table 6.1 the Influence of the EIA on State’s Industrial Policies 
Cases Sectors The changes of industrial policies caused by the EIA review 
FSP Steel The Formosa decided to withdraw the FSP plan in Taiwan and 
started in Vietnam in 2009, where the economic efficiency can 
be better reached. 
CTSP LCD Panel Because of the verdict from the administrative court, the state 
was forced to unhook the CTSP’s Erlin plan with the AUO’s 
investment in China. Both Holi-Chixing plan and Erlin plan 
were demanded to stop in August 2010. 
ENP Petrochemical The MOEA has encountered strong resistance from the EIA 
committee, and the state may be forced to lift the ban on the 
investment on the naphtha-facilities in China in May 2011. 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 Taiwan’s State Capacity: the Comparison on Three Cases 
 In terms of the five indicators on state’ capacity in this dissertation, the author 
concluded some features from Taiwan’s industrial policies on these grand plans. 
 First, in terms of the state’s autonomy, the actions of the state in these three cases 
verified Weiss’ argument. The path-dependent nature made it difficult for Asian 
developmental states to adopt the liberal model even after democratization, for states 
still had fundamental needs to control the capital. States had to remain autonomous to 
regulate capital outflow, despite that some of the capital migration may be categorized 
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as more market-conforming strategies. While the DPP has considered itself a more 
liberal party compared with the KMT, the partisan difference on state’s autonomy was 
not significant, for both parties revealed strong intention to prevent capital outflow. 
Table 6.2 the State’s Autonomy in Three Cases: the Comparison 
 Limitations on 
capital outflow 
Close relationship between 
politicians and corporations 
State’s overall autonomy 
from business interests  
FSP N Y Moderate 
CTSP Y N Strong 
ENP Y N Strong 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 As far as the state’s penetrative capacity is concerned, the democratic regime in 
Taiwan, to some level, indeed has weakened the state’s penetrative capacity into 
business groups and local politics. The state found it increasingly difficult to co-opt 
corporations and local resistance complying with the state’s unilateral agenda. In all 
the three cases, local politics appeared crucial because the state was less capable of 
implementing the policies without local politicians’ cooperation. 
Table 6.3 the State’s Penetrative Power in Three Cases: the Comparison 
  Penetration to local 
counties 
Penetration to the 
corporations 
State’s overall penetrative 
power  
FSP Weak Weak Weak 
CTSP Moderate Moderate Moderate 
ENP Weak Weak Weak 
Source: Compiled by the author 
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The third indicator is economic rationality. In this dissertation, the state’s 
patronage in all the three cases was not primarily based on economic efficiency, for 
over-production and low-profitability appeared to be the common features of these 
capital-intensive projects. Rather, these policies served a more political goal as 
accumulating capital input in Taiwan. Although the techno-bureaucrats remained 
powerful in the decision-making process, they tended to adopt familiar patterns in 
invigorating economy. In Taiwan, most elected politicians were convinced by 
techno-bureaucrats’ expertise and eventually found a common ground with the 
MOEA, since they also had needs to pursue constant economic growth. To be more 
precise, these politicians’ efforts striving for “the image of prosperity” by providing 
immediate benefits brought by new investment were an important feature of those in 
developmental states. 
Table 6.4 the State’s Economic Rationality in Three Cases: the Comparison 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 State’s economic rationality  
FSP No No No Arguable No Y Weak 
CTSP No No Yes Yes Yes Y Moderate 
ENP Yes No No Arguable No Y Moderate 
1. Remove major supply and demand bottlenecks 
2. Integrate the economy 
3. Internalize a particular technology cycle 
4. A motor to regional development 
5. Open new markets and supplies 
6. Contribute to industrialization 
Source: Compiled by the author 
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Fourth, in terms of the indicator of deliberation, these cases showed that 
deliberation within policy-making institutions was not satisfactory, because the 
MOEA and the Executive Yuan tended to prioritize “the efficiency of policy-making” 
with less consideration on “economic efficiency” of these grand plans. However, 
public deliberation generated from the EIA reviews began to gain its salience in 
influencing policy outcomes after democratic transition. Although the MOEA and the 
Executive Yuan tried to avert this time-consuming monitoring, the inclusiveness of 
local communities and civil groups in the EIA reviews brought more momentum in 
building a public sphere for debates. In the FSP case, the widespread criticism in the 
EIA reviews induced a series of the state’s introspection. The MOEA eventually 
concluded, in 2010, that the establishment of the FSP may not be the optimal outcome 
for Taiwan’s steel sector. For the ENP cases, the former DPP politicians also 
confessed, in 2011, that they have been making mistake in promoting the ENP plan 
during their term. Overall, the state’s deliberation capacity, owing to the 






Table 6.5 the Level of State’s Deliberation in Three Cases: the Comparison 








FSP Weak Weak Moderate Moderate Weak 




High High Moderate to 
High 
ENP High Moderate High High High 
Source: Compiled by the author 
Finally, the accountability of the state’s industrial policies in Taiwan appeared to 
be low, for the MOEA had no experiences being restrained by civil groups, 
stakeholders, and monitoring institutions before. The MOEA and the Executive Yuan 
thus constantly adopted manipulative measures to evade public and legal monitoring 
since they were anxious about promoting industrial plans. The EPA, as a subordinary 
unit of central administration, often joined the administrative agencies, conducting 
expediency and manipulation.  
As a result of the efforts of activists and specialists in the EIA reviews in 
circulating information and drawing social attention, the state had been held 
increasingly accountable in terms of policy making. The verdict from the 
administrative court, facilitated by activists, made the state bureaucrats more cautious 
in following legal procedures in most cases after the CTSP plan. This direct link 
between the state’s accountability and bureaucrats’ administrative responsibility may 
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better ensure the independence of EIA committees. After the legal dispute of the 
CTSP, the ENP plan received stricter examination in the EIA reviews, and there were 
few signs suggesting this case be approved by the EIA in the near future. This 
indicated that the accountability of the state has been strengthened by civil 
participation in policy monitoring. 
Table 6.6 the Level of State’s Accountability in Three Cases: the Comparison 




Transparency State’s overall 
accountability  
FSP Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
CTSP High High Moderate to High High 
ENP High High High High 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 In conclusion, according the three cases in this research, the author suggests that 
in Taiwan, the penetrative capacity and economic rationality of the state seemed 
declining after democratic transition, the state autonomy remained strong, and 
deliberation and accountability of the state had improved in these five years. 
Therefore, Taiwan is still a developmental state with the techno-bureaucracy 
dominating national economic policies and controlling capital. The democratic 
transition did not lessen politicians’ pursuit of constant national economic 
development; moreover, it brought in correcting mechanisms and thus further 
reinforced the capacity of the developmental state. On the one hand, democracy might 
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deteriorate the developmental state’s autonomy by opening the policy door to 
corporations, local politicians, and civil groups; on the other hand, it also 
strengthened state’s capacity in deliberation and accountability. 
 Rebuilding the Developmental States: Civil Involvement and 
National Planning 
 This dissertation has implications on the relevant research of developmental 
states in Asia. As the cases showed, the MOEA in Taiwan has been troubled by 
massive capital outflow. In order to preserve capital, the MOEA had to set limitations 
on the capital flow and promote these three projects even when it acknowledged that 
those projects might be economically inefficient. The tendency of transnational 
capital moving to areas that are more peripheral has constituted great constraints on 
economic bureaucrats’ rationality, as they believed that economic growth could not be 
assured without continuous investments. In other words, the impact of 
democratization on the developmental state may not be as significant as the impact of 
capital outflow and biased rationality was on the developmental state in Taiwan. 
 Therefore, the situation of Taiwan, like other previous developmental states, was 
actually in a quandary. On the one hand, these developmental states, while identifying 
themselves as “late-comers,” still tried to catch up with developed countries with 
specific developing strategies and sectors. On the other hand, the more recently 
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emerged “late-comers” such as China and India are eroding the comparative 
advantages of these “older” developmental states. Hence, these developmental states 
found themselves caught in an awkward predicament, and the available options have 
suddenly become complicated. They may choose to stick with previous sectors and 
limit the capital outflow with the costs of competing against newly industrialized 
countries. Alternatively, they may choose to find new potential markets to enter. With 
these options ahead, the developmental state also needs to evolve accordingly. 
 This dissertation has proved that the previous hierarchical pattern for some 
developmental states may lose its validity since comparative advantage of different 
sectors may change over time. Those early developmental states would encounter a 
hardship if they simply followed the old paths, since wages and rents have largely 
increased with the economic growth. The three cases in this dissertation suggested 
that, although these sectors had great contributions to Taiwan’s economic growth 
before, the MOEA’s continuous promotion of these projects failed to reflect the 
changes of domestic industrial structures and people’s new demands of alternative 
development. These twisted policies indicated that the current decision-making 
structure within the Taiwan state had difficulties to measure the opportunity costs and 
external costs of the developing plans accurately. In short, the findings of this 
dissertation echoes Evans’s argument that deliberation would emerge as the most 
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important state capacity on development. 
The problem that Taiwan was facing was, in order to improve the state’s 
competitiveness, the government had to provide both efficiency and certainty under 
democratic regimes, and the bureaucrats found it very difficult to remain efficient 
with the monitoring mechanism around. However, this dissertation has indicated the 
potential risks of the state’s unilateral dominance on making policies and has 
confirmed the positive impact of checking and monitoring mechanisms on policy 
outcomes. It should be noted, nevertheless, that simply passively reacting to state 
policies via these mechanisms might not produce efficient policy outcomes. In order 
to improve both the efficiency and the quality of decision-making, deliberation 
among social and state actors has to be sophisticatedly operated before any major 
national plan is completely formulated. 
The case studies on Taiwan’s developmental state suggested that civil 
involvement in the developmental state would be increasingly essential in the future. 
Due to the struggles in the EIA review in these cases, the Taiwan government realized 
that the state needed a public sphere to launch policy dialogues between public and 
private sectors. For instance, in order to identify ways to efficiently use energy, the 
Taiwan government held energy forums and invited civil groups and industries to 
participate in the Energy Roundtable Forum in both 2005 and 2009. However, simply 
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including the private sectors into the policy-making process was not enough. One of 
the participating experts once commented that the forum could not move any forward 
without a comprehensive policy system on industrial policies. Therefore, other than 
incorporating the private sectors, a new policy platform for national developmental 
plans may be very much needed for the developmental state to reinforce its capacity.  
“The Pilot Agency” has been considered an essential element of the 
developmental state. The Taiwan government indeed had these agencies, such as IEK 
and CEPD, which were established for pursuing economic growth during 1980s. 
However, with various possible developing alternatives ahead, the current 
decision-making system was proven outdated, for they could barely integrate external 
costs and international constraints into account. Because those agencies were only 
responsible for the balls in their own course, policy outcomes thus became 
fragmented without a coordinative platform to guide comprehensive national 
development. Therefore, Taiwan’s cases suggested that an institutional channel for 
deliberation at a higher governmental level was imperative to sustaining the 
developmental state. 
Having that said, it is still too early to make predictions about the destiny of 
Asia’s developmental states, given that these countries have different trajectories in 
national development. A more wide-ranging research which incorporates Korea, 
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which has reached considerable success on software and cultural industries recently, 
and China, which has built a national economic planning agency in guiding fast 
economic growth (National Development and Reform Commission, NDRC), may 
seem necessary in making further arguments regarding the adaptation of 
developmental states.  
 Future Focus on Taiwan’s EIA System 
 Although the EIA was proved influential in enhancing the state’s deliberation 
and accountability in Taiwan, some issues are worth discussing in the future. 
A. The Special Features of Taiwan’s EIA System 
Unlike the EIA in the US and most countries, the EIA system in Taiwan was 
quite distinct. While the governments in most countries would ask the policy initiators, 
the MOEA in Taiwan’s case, to hold the EIA reviews as policy guidance, Taiwan’s 
EIA Act handed this mechanism to the EPA and granted a “veto power” to the EIA 
committee. This independent feature created more potential to form a powerful 
checking mechanism regulating the state’s industrial policies, especially for a strong 
developmental state. 
However, this power segregation also caused a great amount of administrative 
inefficiency. Because of the high costs in coordination within government branches, 
the EPA, MOEA and the central administration are considering to return this power to 
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the policy initiators, since the EPA conceived that it was a heavy burden to hold the 
EIA reviews on all major developing actions, particularly with the veto power at hand. 
While some legal experts maintain that allowing the decision-makers to conduct EIA 
reviews as a policy advisor would be more appropriate to maintain the consistency 
and certainty of the policies, environmental groups argue that the system of check and 
balance needs to exist in Taiwan because there is no institution of higher levels to 
hold the MOEA’s policies accountable. Therefore, the current EIA system is by no 
means perfect, but it appears to be the last line of defense in ensuring the quality of 
the policies. Before the state gets a hold of better institutional designs of evaluating 
different developmental agendas with quality deliberation, the conflicts surrounding 
the EIA review can be considered a series of “trial and error” experiments on the path 
searching for a greater accountability of the state. 
B. Representation Problems in the EIA 
Although the EIA review has functioned as an institution of deliberation and 
monitoring, the legitimacy of the EIA committee members was still very problematic. 
As one of the former cabinet member suggested, 
“The power of the EIA members is unreasonably enormous. These fourteen 
members entirely decided the destiny of thousands of others. They are neither elected 
nor sent by any social groups, but are allowed to make decisions simply based on 
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their own will without needing to respond to the society. In my opinion, they are just 
simply too powerful in this democratic system.”
363 
Indeed, while the Legislative Yuan and the EIA system could check the MOEA’s 
policies, the EIA members were making decisions without many constraints. Their 
mandate and accountability were unclear, since they were not considered government 
employees by law. There was also very few efforts in building a mechanism avoiding 
the conflicts of interests by the EIA members, since some EIA members were 
associated with research grants from the government and environmental consulting 
companies. 364  This democratic deficiency could be a danger in a closed 
decision-making system. 
Besides, because the selection of EIA members was based on their scientific 
expertise, it was often difficult for the MOEA staff and local residents to 
communicate with the EIA members on science issues. Rather than participating in 
the EIA reviews as equal stakeholders, the actions of MOEA, local communities and 
environmental groups were more like political lobbyers. These stakeholders could 
only make statements and passively wait for the final call from the committee. This 
top-down pattern in decision-making made the authority of the EIA review quite 
                                                 
363 This was quoted from Lin Siyao, the vice secretary of Executive Yuan in Su’s term during 
2005-2007. http://www.udn.com/2006/7/3/NEWS/FINANCE/FIN1/3386618.shtml 
364 In December 2010, the environmental groups pointed out that some EIA members were contracting 
government’s health risk assessment on the ENP. However, there was hardly any action taken on this 
issue. 
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problematic. The veto power of the EIA review entitled the committee members an 
immense political authority, but it was politically inappropriate that this authority 
could neither be restrained by any political institutions nor be challenged by 
stakeholders without scientific proficiency. This “scientific authoritarianism” may 
erode the democratic elements since the public was more capable of monitoring 
politics, not science. 
C. The Future of Legal Approach by the Civil Groups 
While the legal lawsuits against the government in the CTSP cases were proven 
influential in changing the state’s policies, the legal approach also had its limits. It 
was not an easy task to fully transform court orders into administrative codes. 
Although the EPA formulated the “Technical Codes on Health Risk Evaluation” in 
April 2010 to respond to the court verdict, there was still a large grey area in those 
technical codes. The biggest problem in these codes was the neglect of environmental 
background information, and thus the existing pollution could be separated from the 
new ones. In other words, even if the planned site has been seriously contaminated, 
the developing action could still manage to pass the evaluation if this plan was 
technically tolerable in the lab where the local environmental parameters were not 
taken into consideration in the evaluation.365  
                                                 
365 See Lihpao, July 18th, 2010.  http://www.lihpao.com/?action-viewnews-itemid-97996 
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The example above illustrated the fact that there was a great gap between legal 
reforms and good policy-making. Therefore, in terms of enhancing the state’s 
deliberation of accountability, the legal approach was only a good start, but definitely 
not an answer. Although civil lawsuits represented a magnificent progress in this 
democratic regime, it was still not sufficient for the government to make good 
policies. The Taiwan state still needs a sophisticated institutional arrangement 
reflecting different visions to manage developmental agendas efficiently and more 
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